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Abstract 
This thesis examines how faith-based organisations (FBOs) engage at the sub-state level in 
the UK. Despite the important political role played by religion historically, in contrast to 
Scotland, FBO engagement has received very limited attention in the cases of post-
devolution Wales and Northern Ireland. By conducting a comparative study of these two 
cases, the thesis addresses the central research question: ‘In what ways have faith-based 
organisations engaged with devolved political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK’.  
In terms of its structure, the thesis is divided into two parts. The first half provides the 
foundation for the empirical study by assessing the current literature on FBO engagement at 
the sub-state level in the UK. Following this, it establishes the theoretical framework by 
conceptualising the FBO as a pressure group. This also informs the research questions, 
variables and hypotheses investigated.  The second half of the thesis reports on the 
empirical case study based research. The findings highlight how FBOs engaged with 
devolved political institutions by adapting their political advocacy structures. Each FBO has 
pursued an insider strategy, with strongly rooted FBOs often supplementing it with an 
outsider strategy. In response, the majority of FBOs have received a privileged insider status 
from government, with the exception of weakly rooted FBOs in Northern Ireland. As regards 
effectiveness, strongly rooted FBOs are well placed to act as effective pressure groups, as 
are weakly rooted FBOs if they have identified resources desired by decision makers and are 
in circumstances where a government has established sponsored structures for faith 
communities.   
This thesis’ main contribution is its empirical study of FBO engagement at the sub-state level 
in Wales and Northern Ireland. More general insights are achieved by triangulating the 
findings with existing studies from the Scottish case. The thesis also contributes more widely 
to the literature on religion and politics in the UK, pressure group theory and to the 
privatisation and de-privatisation of religion literature. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 The aims of this study 
This thesis examines how faith-based organisations (FBOs) have engaged with devolved 
political institutions in the UK. The ‘FBO’ will be defined in greater detail in section 2, but it 
can broadly be understood as an organisation with a clear agenda which is influenced by 
faith. While studies of religion and conflict (e.g. Appleby 2000, Fox 2002, Jeurgensmeyer 
2008) and the relationship between religion and identity, and religion and nationalism (e.g. 
Jeurgensmeyer  1994, Preica 2004, Sutton 2013) are common areas of study in political 
science, research into how FBOs attempt to influence political systems and public policy 
have received less attention. Support for the secularisation thesis in the first half of the 
twentieth century, which predicted that religion would significantly decrease in its public 
role, with some variants of the theory foreseeing the disappearance of religion altogether 
(Fox 2013: 17) was almost unanimous. Consequently, scholarship that studied how FBOs 
engaged in the political sphere or whether these organisations were developing new 
attempts or strategies of engagement were limited. Instead, the dominant narrative in the 
literature was one of decline and the privatisation of religion (Toft et al 2013:74). While 
religion and FBOs have retreated into the private sphere, there has, since the 1980s, been a 
widening scholarship which asserts that religion has re-entered the public sphere. José 
Casanova (1994) illustrated the resurgence of religion through examples of powerful FBOs 
such as the Catholic Church in Poland and Brazil and Evangelical Protestantism in America. 
Casanova (2001) has since widened his argument beyond the West, to include Islamic 
countries such as Iran, Turkey and Indonesia. 
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The most in-depth body of literature which gives attention to the role of FBO 
political engagement at the national level examines the political system of the United States 
of America. This literature assessed the influence of the Christian Right on both electoral 
politics and public policy (e.g. Bruce 1998, Green et al 2003, Wilcox and Robinson 2010). It 
has pointed to the two fold agenda of the Christian Right in mobilizing the faithful to elect a 
‘Christian’ President as well as lobbying decision makers to impose a Christian morality 
within the US political system and its public policy. This scholarship has also extended to the 
study of religion and faith-based lobbying beyond the Christian Right to other faith 
communities within the US political system (see Fowler et al 2014). 
Another national political arena in which a growing literature studying FBO 
engagement has emerged is the UK’s Westminster political system. Studies such as Moyser’s 
(1985) and subsequently Medhurst and Moyser’s (1988) analysis of the Church of England’s 
political engagement and Thompson’s (1997) discussion of fundamentalist Christian 
organisations lobbying Westminster on sexual morality, amongst other issues, were early 
contributions to this literature. However, as the UK political system became more 
susceptible to FBO engagement owing to New Labour’s ‘third way’ approach, encouraging 
FBOs amongst other third sector organisations to take part in public policy making (see 
Dinham 2008), the study of FBO engagement in the UK also broadened. Indeed, New 
Labour’s involvement of faith organisations in providing services, bridging social capital and 
social cohesion led to a swathe of literature examining FBO engagement with public policy 
in the UK (e.g. Furbey and Macey 2005, Dinham and Lowndes 2008, Dinham 2008, Dinham 
2009). New Labour’s interest in engaging with minority faith communities has also led to a 
literature on minority faith-based political engagement, particularly amongst the Muslim 
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community (McCallum 2011, O’Toole 2012, O’Toole et al 2013, DeHanas et al 2013, Peace 
2015). The liberalisation of UK equality law since the early 2000s has also led scholars to 
highlight the conflict between LGBT and conservative Christian organisations in Britain 
through a small body of literature on FBO efforts to lobby on questions of sexuality (Hunt 
2003, 2011, 2014, Kettell 2013). Comparative studies across Europe, allow for greater 
theorising of FBO engagement and offer rich insights into how FBOs engage politically in the 
21st century (e.g. Warner and Wenner 2006, Pfaff and Gill 2006, Fink 2009, Silvestri 2009, 
2010, Kreienbrink and Bodenstein 2010). 
A smaller body of literature with regards to faith-based political engagement at the 
supra-national level examines FBO engagement in the context of the European Union (EU). 
While a considerable amount of this scholarship discusses the role of ‘Christianity’ in the 
narrative of the EU and European citizenship (Schlesinger and Foret 2006, Foret 2010, 
Ramadan 2013), research has also assessed how FBOs attempt to influence decision makers 
within the EU, particularly as the Amsterdam Treaty created opportunities for faith-based 
engagement in 1999 (Steven 2010, Leustean 2011, Turner 2013, Bollmann 2013). Likewise, a 
small literature on FBO engagement in the United Nations (UN) discusses the openness of 
the UN to faith-based engagement, as well as the mobilisation and strategies of FBOs at the 
UN (see Berger 2003, Lehmann 2016, Stensvold 2016). This body of literature is not as well 
developed as the study of FBO engagement at the national level, but scholarship on these 
arenas is increasing.       
Scholarship focusing on the national and supra-national levels has therefore been 
developing over the last twenty years, but there is limited literature on FBO engagement at 
the sub-state level. The existing literature on FBO engagement within the UK sub-state 
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political systems will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but for now it is 
important to simply note the lack of a systematic study of FBO engagement at the sub-state 
level. Having identified this gap in the literature, this thesis examines FBO political 
engagement at the sub-state level. This study examines the sub-state level in the UK, 
because of the important role religion has played in these regions historically and because 
the circumstances in which power was devolved to these regions provides potential 
opportunities for FBO engagement.  Wales and Northern Ireland, the sub-state regions of 
the UK which have received the least attention in terms of scholarship on FBO engagement 
are selected for study. In light of this, FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK is 
examined based on the following central research question:  
‘In what ways have faith-based organisations engaged with devolved political 
institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’  
In order to investigate the central research question in the case of Wales and 
Northern Ireland in a holistic sense, three secondary research questions have been selected. 
These secondary research questions enable the study to examine each aspect of a FBO’s 
engagement from its capacity to engage, to how it goes about engaging, to whether it is 
successful in its engagement at the sub state level. The secondary research questions are as 
follows: 
1. ‘What type of political advocacy structures have faith-based organisations 
adopted to engage with political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
2. ‘What type of strategies have faith-based organisations adopted to engage 
with the political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
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3. ‘Are faith-based organisations at the sub-state level in the UK well placed to 
act as effective pressure groups in the decision making process?’ 
The sub-state level is a valuable area of study as it has become an important political 
arena across Europe (see Hooghe et al 2010: 52-55). Regions in almost every western 
European state have some level of legislative and fiscal responsibility (see Keating 2013:  
106). A number of policy areas which FBOs have traditionally engaged with have been 
devolved to the sub-state level, reflecting Keating and McEwen’s assertion (2005: 413) that 
the role of sub-state governments in social policy fields has greatly expanded. This includes 
areas such as education, welfare, social care and health, areas in which FBOs have 
traditionally taken an interest. The sub-state has become an arena which holds considerable 
political power and therefore should not be ignored by political scientists wanting to 
understand political actors and their power and influence in the twenty-first century. 
Consequently, it is important to analyse the way that FBOs that traditionally operated at the 
state level have adapted their structures in order to engage with the devolved institutions, 
as well as the way in which FBOs traditionally centred at the sub-state level have responded 
to the devolution of these policy competencies. 
There are also a number of reasons why it is valuable to examine FBO engagement in 
the particular context of the devolved UK. Historically, FBOs wielded a good deal of political 
power at the sub-state level in the UK. For instance, the Presbyterian Church of Scotland’s 
annual General Assembly was considered for many years as the closest institution Scotland 
had to a National Parliament (Keating 2010: 93-94). In Wales, politically astute 
nonconformists and their allies in the Liberal Party joined together to disestablish the 
Church of England in Wales in the early 20th century (Morgan, 1999: 229-230). Religious 
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ideas and symbols have also played a key role in creating a wealth of ideological concepts in 
Northern Ireland’s society (Mitchell 2011), particularly in relation to its political conflict 
between 1968 and 1998.    
The political engagement of FBOs with the devolved political institutions of the UK is 
also a salient area because of the political circumstance in which power was devolved to the 
sub-state level. Many believed that political devolution would provide a ‘new politics’ at the 
sub-state level (see McAllister 2000, McEvoy 2006a, Cairney and McGarvey 2013: 11) and 
New Labour’s devolution project was projected as an attempt to modernise and revitalise 
Britain’s democratic process (Blair 1998: 17). Those in favour of devolution hoped that new 
democratic institutions would usher in an age of opportunity for third sector organisations 
and a wide range of interests to engage with the policy process (see Chaney and Fevre 2001, 
Osborne 2003, Cairney and McGarvey 2013: 12). Moreover, in Scotland, civil society, 
including FBOs, played an important part in shaping the devolution settlement, leading to a 
prominent role for third sector and pressure groups in Holyrood’s policy process (Cairney 
and McGarvey 2013: 11). The devolution settlement in Wales was designed so that the 
National Assembly for Wales could be an institution inclusive in its consultation (Chaney and 
Fevre 2001) with its statutory duty to consult the voluntary sector (Chaney 2004). Similarly, 
the Belfast Agreement brought power sharing government to Stormont, with government 
departments expected to consult widely throughout both communities (Osborne 2003: 
350). The agreement also enshrined a far-reaching equality agenda as part of the revived 
Northern Ireland institution (see McCrudden 1998, Beveridge et al 2000, Osborne 2003) 
which in theory could provide opportunities for non-Christian FBOs to engage politically 
within the sub-state political system.    
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On this basis, political devolution potentially offers a wide range of organisations and 
interests with new opportunities to engage with the devolved political institutions at the 
sub-state level. When examining interest groups more broadly, Keating et al (2009) noted 
that interests have consolidated around the devolved institutions, taking advantage of 
opportunities to lobby in a way that had not been available before political devolution. 
Furthermore, a range of studies have pointed to a variety of organisations engaging at the 
sub-state level in the UK across a range of policy areas (Jordan and Halpin 2006, Lyall 2007, 
Chaney 2007, 2016, Royles 2007, Cairney 2007, Holden and Hawkins 2013, Keating and 
Wilson 2014, and Rumbul 2013). Similarly, while secularisation is a reality in different parts 
of the UK, particularly Wales and Scotland (see Brown 1997, Brierly 1997, Chambers 2004, 
Davie 2015), Chambers and Thompson’s (2005a) research claims that devolution in Wales 
has created conditions for FBOs to potentially re-enter the public sphere.  In light of this, it is 
of academic interest to examine how FBOs have engaged in greater detail. By analysing how 
FBOs have adapted to political devolution between 1998/9 and 2016, the strategies they 
have developed and the extent to which they are well placed to act as effective pressure 
groups, this thesis addresses a gap in the literature by analysing how institutions which 
traditionally wielded a high level of political power and social control within Wales and 
Northern Ireland are faring in today’s sub-state political systems. 
1.2 The Faith-Based Organisation: A Definition 
Before outlining the structure of this thesis, it is important to define the faith-based-
organisation. The discussion begins with an examination of the faith community, followed 
by a detailed definition of the FBO within this wider context. As part of this, Clarke’s (2008: 
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27-31) typology of FBOs is presented, and the decision to focus on the ‘representative’ and 
‘socio-political’ FBO is justified. 
In order to define the FBO, it is important to understand the context in which is 
exists; the faith community. There is no explicit definition of the faith community, with 
many policy papers using the term in a vague undefined manner (e.g. Home Office Faith 
Communities 2004). However, Dinham (2009, 2010) offers the fullest explanation of the 
faith community in the literature. Dinham (2010: 538) notes the oxymoronic nature of the 
faith community, noting that it can be based in one location, or can stretch across a number 
of locations. Religious establishments and denominations are therefore faith communities in 
their own right, but are also located within wider, over-arching faith communities and are 
key players within them. For instance, a faith community can revolve around a building such 
as a church or mosque which has its own space for interactions, its own shared history, 
values and activities common to its members or the faith community can constitute a 
national or even international entity (Dinham 2010: 538-9). This thesis therefore 
understands the faith community as a particular space within which the interactions of a 
faith can happen. This can be a situated faith community such as a church or mosque or an 
over-arching faith community such as a national faith community or an international 
network. 
If FBOs are therefore located within the faith community, it is important to define 
the FBO within the wider space of the faith community, something a number of definitions 
fail to do. For instance, the AmeriCorps definition (in Ferris 2005: 313) is problematic 
because it considers religious ‘congregations’ as FBOs, failing to explain the difference 
between the faith community and the FBO. Kramer et al’s definition (2002: 2) also has its 
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problems because it does not allow for standalone FBOs which do not hold religious services 
or worship to be FBOs. This is an issue because it would not include organisations such as 
Christian Aid or the Muslim Council of Britain as FBOs.  These organisations are directly 
connected to churches or mosques, but they are not located within them, instead they 
stand alone within wider faith communities.  
Clarke and Jennings’ (2008: 6) definition provides a much more open definition of 
the FBO. It distinguishes between the faith community and the FBO and recognises both the 
FBO as a standalone organisation within the wider faith community and as an organisation 
which can exist within a more situated faith community. They define the FBO as: ‘any 
organization that derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings and 
principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within that 
faith.’ (Clarke and Jennings 2008: 6). One problem with this definition is that it has a rather 
loose understanding of the connection between an organisation and a faith, with the 
organisation only needing to be inspired by a faith, rather than being driven directly by the 
tenets of a faith. This understanding of the term ‘faith’ in ‘faith-based organisation’ is 
problematic because at one point in history most Western European organisations within 
civil society would have had some relationship to a faith or a religious institution. Therefore, 
many organisations which are still active today in Western Europe have historic roots in a 
faith of some kind. For instance, Clarke and Jennings’ (2008: 6) definition would allow for 
groups such as the Scouts, Urdd Gobaith Cymru or the Red Cross, whose founders were 
motivated on the basis of their faith (see Edwards 1943, Warren 1986 and Morgenstern 
1979) to be categorised as FBOs. This is problematic because while these organisations have 
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been ‘inspired’ by a faith, it is not appropriate to regard them as FBOs, but instead as 
secular organisations which have roots, a tradition or a history connected to a faith.  
It is possible to firm up Clarke and Jenning’s definition of faith by drawing on Sider 
and Unruh’s (2004: 119-120) scale of faith, set out in Figure 1, which underlines the extent 
to which different organisations are driven and directed by faith. 
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Figure 1: Role of faith in faith-based organisations 
Organisation  Role of Faith 
Faith-permeated organisations Faith is integrated into the organisation’s 
content and is seen to be an essential 
dimension to the programme’s 
effectiveness. 
Faith-centred organisations Similarly to the above category the 
organisation is strongly connected to the 
religious community through funding 
sources and affiliation and requires the 
governing board and most staff to share the 
organisation’s faith commitments. The 
programmes are designed so that 
participants can readily opt out of these 
activities and still receive the programme’s 
benefits. 
Faith-affiliated organisations The organisation is connected to faith 
through its founders alone. The programme 
will incorporate little or no explicitly religious 
content but might affirm faith in a general 
way. 
 
Faith-background organisations The organisation looks secular, but might 
have a historical tie to a faith. Religious 
experience does not contribute to 
programme outcomes. 
 
On this basis, organisations such as the Muslim Council of Britain can be viewed as a 
‘faith-permeated’ organisation because faith is evident in the way it is governed and in its 
advocacy role.1 An organisation such as Christian Aid would be ‘faith-centred’ because its 
staff, funding and affiliation has a strong connection to a faith, while its programmes are 
                                                     
1
 See www.mcb.org/about-mcb/ 
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designed so that participants can readily opt out of these activities and still receive the 
programme’s benefits.2 Unlike Clarke and Jennings (2008: 6) which define a FBO as an 
organisation which derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from a faith, this thesis 
views FBOs as organisations permeated and centred in a faith. In understanding ‘faith’ in 
this way, the thesis focuses on organisations whose aims are all based in furthering the 
denomination, institution or organisation’s faith based world view. It therefore understands 
the FBO as: Any organisation that’s agenda, direction and purpose is permeated with or 
centrally based in the teachings and principles of the faith or from a particular 
interpretation or school of thought within the faith. 
 
The FBO is on this basis located within the wider structure of the faith community, 
along-side or over-lapping with, religious institutions and denominations such as churches 
or mosques, as shown in Figure 2.   







                                                     
2
 See www.christianaid.org.uk/aboutus/who/aims/our_aims.aspx 
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Now that the FBO has been defined, it is possible to outline the type of FBOs this thesis 
examines. Clarke (2008:27-31) outlines a range of different FBOs and their function in his 
typology of FBOs, presented in figure 3. This thesis concentrates on the representative FBO 
and the socio-political FBO. 
Figure 3: Clarke’s (2008) typology of FBOs 
Faith-Based Organisation Description 
Representative Organisations / Apex Bodies These FBOs rule on doctrinal matters, govern 
the faithful and represent them through 
engagement with the state and other actors. 
Charitable / Development Faith Based 
Organisations 
These FBOs deal with issues of poverty and 
social exclusion.  
Socio-Political Faith-Based Organisations FBOs with a political role which do not exist 
within or as part of a religious institution or 
denomination. 
Missionary Faith-Based Organisations FBOs involved with proselytization. 
Radical / Illegal / Terrorist Organisations FBOs which justify radical, illegal and 
terrorist activity on the grounds of a faith. 
 
The aim of this thesis is best carried out by studying the representative and socio-
political FBO because they have the clear function of attempting to engage with political 
systems. Both have clear political roles of representation and mobilisation, and hence their 
actions coincide with that which the central research question endeavours to understand. 
Clarke (2008: 25) notes that representative FBO ‘governs the faithful and represents them 
through engagement with the state’. It would therefore make sense that the representative 
FBO attempts to represent its faith community by influencing public policy as it engages 
with different aspects of the state. Likewise, this thesis’ interest in faith engagement with a 
wide range of policy areas is encapsulated in Clarke’s (2008: 25) definition of the socio-
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political FBO, when he notes that it mobilises ‘social groups on the basis of faith identities’. 
In mobilising social groups on this basis, the socio-political FBO is, in all likelihood, looking to 
influence decision makers and public policy decisions. Clarke’s (2008: 27) description of the 
socio-political FBO states that ‘they interpret and deploy faith as a political construct, 
organizing and mobilizing social groups on the basis of faith identities, but in pursuit of 
broader political objectives’.  
1.3 The structure of the thesis. 
Having outlined the aim of this thesis and defined the FBO, the structure of this thesis is 
now presented. The thesis is structured in two main parts. The first part establishes the 
building blocks for carrying out the study. Chapter 2 assesses the existing literature on FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level and makes a strong case for this research project. 
Chapter 3 advances a theoretical framework for the empirical research. Chapter 4 outlines 
the research design and methodology used for the empirical research. The second part of 
the thesis outlines the research findings responding to the central research question. 
Chapters 5 and 6, the empirical chapters, present the research findings on Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Chapter 7 then analyses the research findings and discusses the practical 
implications of these findings. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the thesis’ conclusions and 
contributions.   
The second chapter assesses the literature regarding FBO engagement at the sub-
state level in greater depth. The chapter analyses the literature and points to the dearth of 
studies on Wales and Northern Ireland and the lack of a comparative study at the sub-state 
level. Secondly, the range of theoretical frameworks used to analyse FBO engagement in the 
literature is examined. After assessing civil society theory and social movement theory, 
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pressure group theory is posited to provide the more powerful explanatory framework for 
studying FBO engagement at the sub-state level. 
The third chapter advances a theoretical framework for the empirical study. The 
chapter begins by justifying and defining the term ‘pressure group’, before critically 
assessing pressure group theory. The chapter ends by assessing the merits of pressure 
group theory as a theoretical framework for studying FBO engagement at the sub-state 
level. 
The fourth chapter is divided into two parts; research design and methodology. The 
research design section begins by outlining secondary research questions which together 
contribute to answering the central research question. Dependent and independent 
variables and eleven testable hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature are then 
presented. The independent variable ‘sub-state autonomy’ is used to select Wales and 
Northern Ireland as case studies. The independent variables ‘roots in society’ and 
‘theological orientation’ are used to select the FBO case studies for the cases of Wales and 
Northern Ireland using a case study matrix. In the case of Wales, the Church in Wales, the 
Catholic Church in England and Wales, The Muslim Council of Wales (MCW) and Cytûn: 
Churches Together in Wales are selected for study. In Northern Ireland, the Presbyterian 
Church in Ireland, the Catholic Church in Ireland, the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC) and the 
Caleb Foundation are selected. The methodology section of the chapter begins by outlining 
the thesis’ case study strategy. The decision to focus the study of FBO engagement on 
education, constitutional issues, the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act in the case of 
Wales and same-sex marriage in the case of Northern Ireland is discussed. The chapter then 
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outlines the thesis’ method of data collection and analysis before discussing the issues of 
bias, reliability and generalisability. 
The second part of the thesis presents the empirical research and analysis. Chapters 
5 and 6 examine the central research question by presenting the research findings in 
relation to political advocacy structure, strategy and effectiveness. The findings in Chapter 5 
indicate that each FBO selected in the case of Wales is a territorial organisation apart from 
the Catholic Church in Wales which has experienced partial ‘institutional isomorphism’. Each 
FBO has increased its capacity to engage with the devolved institutions by appointing staff 
members, apart from the MCW which has developed a voluntary based political advocacy 
structure. The strongly rooted FBOs supplement this strategy with a responsible outsider 
strategy to a greater extent than weakly rooted FBOs. In return, each FBO receives a level of 
specialist insider status. Here, factors such as resources which can be exchanged for 
privileged insider status are important, whether this is education provision, as in the case of 
the strongly rooted FBOs, or as a representative of a faith community or ‘faith’ in its wider 
sense, as in the case with the weakly rooted FBOs. While the weakly rooted organisations 
have weaker political advocacy structures than the strongly rooted organisations, faith 
structures, such as the Faith Communities Forum, assist weakly rooted organisations in 
overcoming their inability to be as proactive in their engagement as organisations with staff-
based political advocacy structures. Even so, it is also noted that weakly rooted FBOs’ 
reliance on these state sponsored faith structures could be counter-productive if they 
become what is termed in the pressure group literature as ‘prisoners’, unable to criticise or 
challenge decision makers.   
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The investigation of the Northern Ireland case in chapter 6 finds that apart from the 
Caleb Foundation, each FBO has adapted its political advocacy structure’s in order to engage 
with the devolved institutions by appointing staff members. In this case, decision makers 
have conferred specialist or core insider status on groups with strong roots within society, 
but those with weak roots have not had this status conferred upon them. Theology does 
appear to reduce the Caleb Foundation’s ability to have specialist or core insider status 
conferred upon it by decision makers, but roots in society appear to play a much greater 
role. This can be seen in the privileged access and status bestowed on the Catholic and 
Presbyterian churches in the areas of education, same-sex marriage and constitutional 
affairs which are not available to the BIC and the Caleb Foundation. The Catholic and 
Presbyterian churches have resources which decision makers require and hence are 
rewarded with this access and status at the expense of other FBOs. This is most evident in 
the stark contrast between FBO effectiveness. Weakly rooted FBOs are unable to access the 
political system owing to under developed political advocacy structures combined with a 
lack of core or specialist insider status and no appropriate state sponsored faith structures 
sponsored by the executive. 
Chapter 7 examines the central research questions in relation to the findings in both 
Wales and Northern Ireland and examines their practical implications. It posits that a 
greater level of sub-state autonomy is found to lead to increased capacity in the political 
advocacy structures of FBOs. The role of roots within society is noted to have some 
influence on FBO strategy, status and effectiveness with theological orientation only having 
a minimal influence. The chapter argues that in both cases strongly rooted and weakly 
rooted FBOs pursue insider strategies, but that strongly rooted FBOs also supplement this 
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with a responsible outsider strategy, using their staff capacity and position within society to 
do so. Strongly rooted FBOs also receive specialist or core insider status because of the 
resources they are able to use in negotiations with decision makers. Weakly rooted FBOs on 
the other hand receive peripheral insider status unless they are able to identify resources 
(such as facilitating government consultation with difficult to reach communities) which 
they can exchange with decision makers in return for specialist or core insider status. 
Likewise, strongly rooted FBOs are more likely than weakly rooted FBOs to be well placed to 
act as effective pressure groups. This is because strongly rooted FBOs have appropriate 
political advocacy structures to engage in the devolved political systems and have specific 
resources they can exchange for core or specialist insider status. However, weakly rooted 
FBOs are able to overcome this if state sponsored faith structures exist, giving them direct 
access to government decision makers. Chapter 7 concludes by examining the practical 
implications of the findings for FBOs and devolved institutions. Here, the practical 
implications are separated into four main sub-sections. This includes the implications for 
FBOs such as the opportunities political devolution has provided for FBO engagement, the 
suitability of the insider strategy supplemented with a responsible outsider strategy and the 
role of resources in FBO engagement with decision makers. In the case of the devolved 
institutions, the implications include the role state sponsored faith structures can play in 
mediating weakly rooted FBO engagement.  
The thesis concludes by examining its contribution to the wider literature. The thesis 
confirms pressure group theory’s utility as a theoretical framework for understanding FBO 
engagement. It is useful for understanding how FBOs adapt their political advocacy 
structures for engaging in different arenas, the strategies they utilise, the status conferred 
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upon them by government decision makers and their effectiveness. Furthermore, the thesis 
adapts conceptual frameworks in a way that enhances their utility for studying FBO 
engagement. For instance, the thesis contributes to the literature regarding faith 
communities and FBOs by offering broader definitions of the terms. It also adapts pressure 
group theory for the study FBO engagement. In this respect, the thesis notes the 
importance of Grant’s (1995: 20) ‘prisoner’ insider status, which has been side-lined by 
Maloney et al (1994). The thesis also provides a more detailed criterion by which to 
measure effectiveness in analysing the political advocacy structure of FBOs, FBO strategies 
as well as the status conferred upon FBOs and whether the FBOs met their objectives. These 
adaptations provide a much more detailed measurement of effectiveness than is currently 
found in the pressure group literature.  
Finally, the way in which the study’s findings address the broader literature on the 
privatisation and de-privatisation of religion is examined. In the main, the empirical findings 
concur with the ‘de-privatisation of religion’ thesis as FBOs have engaged effectively in the 
devolved political sphere. However, weakly rooted organisations appear to require state 
sponsored faith structures if they are to act as effective pressure groups, demonstrating the 
fragility of this political engagement in some cases. The conclusion then looks ahead to 
possible future research avenues, and to the possibility of developing further the 
conclusions of this thesis by studying FBO engagement at the sub-state level beyond the UK. 
The possibility of extending the research to a ‘multi-level’ study of how FBOs adapt between 
the different political arenas is also discussed. 
In sum, this thesis demonstrates that the devolved executives and legislatures are 
open to faith, although we see an unevenness in the way strongly rooted Christian 
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denominations receive preferential treatment in Northern Ireland at the expense of weakly 
rooted, particularly non-Christian, FBOs. Even so, FBOs at the sub-state level have 
responded to this openness by increasing the capacity of their political advocacy structures 
to engage with the devolved institutions. While a majority of FBOs have had specialist or 
core insider status conferred upon them by decision makers, some of the weakly rooted 
organisations have had peripheral insider status conferred upon them. However, state 
sponsored faith structures can aid weakly rooted organisations in overcoming this. From this 
perspective, state sponsored faith structures are positive, but only if they avoid weakly 
rooted FBOs becoming prisoners of the devolved institutions. The case of the sub-state level 
concurs with the ‘de-privatisation of religion’ thesis, but also reveals how fragile the 
emergence and engagement of weakly rooted FBOs can be owing to their reliance on state 
sponsored faith structures. 
1.4 Contribution of this thesis 
This thesis primarily provides an empirical contribution in its study of FBO engagement at 
the sub-state level. Consequently, the thesis contributes to four main bodies of literature. 
Firstly, the thesis contributes to the literature on the role of religion in the UK’s sub-state 
political systems. Its study of eight FBO case studies across Wales and Northern Ireland can 
be used to develop generalisations regarding FBO engagement more widely in these under-
studied regions. On this basis, the findings can be triangulated with the literature on FBO 
engagement in Scotland to provide some broader conclusions. The thesis also makes a 
theoretical contribution to the small body of literature which understands FBOs as pressure 
groups and to refining pressure group theory more widely. The thesis’ conclusions also feed 
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into the wider discussion regarding secularisation and the de-privatisation of religion in the 
UK and beyond.    
Conclusion 
We have seen that scholarship relating to faith-based political engagement at the national 
and supra-national level has increased in recent years as scholars have begun to recognise 
the role of religion and FBOs within the political system. Even so, the study of FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level has remained under-studied, with few systematic and 
comparative studies. The rise of the sub-state level and the devolution of policy 
competencies of interest to FBOs further emphasises the importance of studying FBO 
engagement in this political arena. Furthermore, the circumstances in which power was 
devolved in the UK strengthens the case for studying the sub-state level in the Wales and 
Northern Ireland. This study opens the way for future research on FBO engagement at the 
sub-state level beyond the UK and to the possibility of extending the research to a multi-
level analysis of FBO engagement at the sub-state, national and supranational level. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The previous chapter indicated that there has been a steady increase in the literature on 
FBO engagement with the political sphere at the supra-national and national level. 
However, it also noted the limited attention given to FBO engagement at the sub-state level. 
It drew attention to the sub-state level as an arena with an increasing level of constitutional 
power, particularly in areas of social policy in which FBOs have historically been active. 
Hence, it is pertinent that attention is given to FBO engagement at the sub-state level, 
particularly in the context of the UK. 
In light of the gap in the literature identified in the first chapter, this chapter 
provides a more detailed analysis of the extant literature regarding FBO engagement at the 
sub-state level in the UK. While this thesis focuses on Wales and Northern Ireland, the 
literature on Scotland will also be critically assessed. Scotland has received more attention 
to date and the literature provides valuable insights into the dynamics between FBOs and 
devolved institutions at the sub-state level. It is also pertinent to examine the literature on 
Scotland given the similar context and timing of devolution across the UK. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first part investigates the 
literature on FBO engagement in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland in the twentieth 
century prior to 1998/9. The literature thus offers an historical basis to understanding FBO 
engagement in a UK context. The second section examines literature on FBO engagement 
since 1998/9. This literature can be separated into three main segments. The first segment 
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consists of literature on religion and politics in the UK and on pressure groups in the UK. 
Unsurprisingly, these studies are brief in their analysis, but do illustrate that FBOs are active 
at the sub-state level, furthering the argument for studying FBO engagement in this arena. 
The second segment investigates literature which focuses on the opportunity structures 
available for FBO engagement post-devolution. These studies consequently do not focus on 
FBO engagement, but point to ways in which FBOs have responded to these opportunities.  
The third segment of literature examines theoretically based, in-depth studies, of FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level. These studies analyse FBO engagement, and offer a 
nuanced analysis of FBO strategy and effectiveness, particularly by drawing upon pressure 
group theory. However, these studies have only been conducted to date in relation to the 
Scottish case. The final section of the chapter analyses the theoretical frameworks utilised 
to analyse FBO engagement in the literature on the sub-state, national and the supra-
national levels. It argues that while each framework provides a way in which to analyse FBO 
engagement, pressure group theory  affords the more powerful explanatory framework for 
studying FBO engagement at the sub-state level.  
2.1. Literature focusing on FBO engagement pre 1998/9. 
2.1.1 Religion and Society 
Because FBOs have traditionally wielded a substantial level of influence in Wales, Scotland 
and Northern Ireland, there are a number of studies on the historical role of religion in these 
societies. Brown’s (1997) work on religion and society in Scotland since 1707, Morgan’s 
(2011a) study of Christian religion and society in Wales in the twentieth century , Hughes’ 
(1999) history of the Roman Catholic Church and society in Wales between 1916-1962 and 
Bradshaw and Keogh’s (2002) volume on Christianity in Ireland are examples of studies 
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which reference the historical role of religion at the sub-state level. These studies are not 
primarily political, offering instead a history of religious life, practice and institutions in the 
regions. Even so, these studies do discuss political engagement as part of their historical 
analysis, pointing to the traditionally powerful role some FBOs had within these societies. 
Brown (1997: 98-101, 143-147) notes the way in which the Church of Scotland was very 
influential at the local level when it came to school boards and alcohol consumption 
throughout the nineteenth and part of the twentieth century. Likewise, Morgan (2011a:30-
37) discusses the role of the Nonconformist denominations in the campaign to disestablish 
the Church of England at the start of the twentieth century. Hughes (1999: 131-157) 
discusses how the Catholic Church lobbied for Catholic Education funding in Wales during 
the twentieth century, and notes the opposition it faced from Nonconformists and local 
authority leaders in Wales. A range of the Catholic Church’s political strategies are also 
noted, including lobbying MPs and education boards for funding for Catholic schools 
(Hughes 1999:133) as well as the use of figureheads speaking publicly in its favour (Hughes 
1999: 153-154). In the case of Ireland, Keogh (2002:203-230) notes the role of the churches 
on education boards in Ireland, the relationship between the Church of Ireland, the 
jurisdiction of Northern Ireland and the British state and the way in which the Catholic 
Church embodied Irish national sentiment. While these historical studies only briefly discuss 
FBO political engagement, in a rather descriptive manner, they underline some important 
issues by pointing to how politicised religion and the role of FBOs have been at the sub-state 
level in the UK historically. They also note the historical role of FBOs in policy areas that are 
devolved post-1998/9. 
38 | P a g e  
 
2.1.2 Historical Studies focusing on FBO political engagement 
The literature also contains historical studies that place a greater focus on FBO political 
engagement. Studies such as Davies’ (2008) work on the history of the Council of Churches 
in Wales and Mitchell’s (2011) study of the role of religion in Northern Ireland’s political 
conflict go into some detail. Works such as McGrath’s (2000) study of the Catholic Church 
and Catholic education in Northern Ireland; Ó Corráin’s (2006) work on the Irish churches 
and the state in Ireland and Northern Ireland between 1949 and 1973 and Forrester’s (1993) 
article on the Church of Scotland’s engagement with public policy during the second half of 
the twentieth century provide more detailed insights into the political engagement of FBOs 
at the sub-state level as they focus on specific policy areas. Once again, the discussion in 
these studies is rather descriptive, but they underline a number of important points.  
Davies’ (2008) study mainly discusses the history of the ecumenical movement in 
Wales, and how Christian denominations slowly moved towards working together during 
the twentieth century. In doing so, it underlines the political engagement of the 
organisation in a range of policy areas. For instance, the author discusses how the 
organisation met with the Secretary of State for Wales to discuss industrial planning in 
Wales in 1972 (Davies 2008:109-111). However, the Council’s political action emerges most 
clearly in its engagement with Wales’ self-government debate (Davies 2008: 81-100). Davies 
also notes the political advocacy structure of both the Council and Cytûn. The author notes 
that while the Council of Churches was supportive of self-government in 1979 (Davies 
2008:92), Cytûn’s political advocacy structure did not allow it to take a position on 
devolution during the 1997 referendum. Instead, he notes Cytûn’s work to assist 
denominations in coming to a position on political and other matters (Davies 2008: 95).  
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Likewise in the case of Northern Ireland, Mitchell’s (2011) study attempts to 
understand the role of religion in creating boundaries between the Catholic and Protestant 
community. This includes looking at the theological concepts found in both Catholicism and 
Protestantism in Northern Ireland, but also at the churches’ engagement in politics. 
Mitchell’s study discusses the way in which the churches in Northern Ireland represent their 
communities to government, speaking out publicly on issues of importance. However, 
Mitchell is also clear about the tensions which exist between the churches and their 
respective communities. She notes the challenges for Protestant churches to represent the 
unionist community due to fragmentation, but a more unified Catholic Church has in recent 
times also come across opposition to its representative position from within the nationalist 
community. However, Mitchell’s (2011: 55) assertion regarding the limited influence of the 
churches only sets the tone of the debate by focusing on their engagement as leaders 
speaking publicly on behalf of their community, rather than examining their policy 
engagement. 
McGrath’s (2000) study on the Catholic Church and Catholic schools in Northern 
Ireland presents an historical analysis of how the Church has campaigned for fully funded 
Catholic education in Northern Ireland. Despite being an historical study, rather than a 
political analysis, the volume offers a more informative analysis of the Church’s political 
engagement prior to devolution in 1998, going into much greater detail than Mitchell’s 
(2011) study. As a result, McGrath studies the Church’s private engagement with decision 
makers, providing a more nuanced analysis of the Church’s engagement in this policy area. 
McGrath (2000:8) notes the Church’s political advocacy structure, noting that the 
Bishops had oversight of the Church’s strategy when it came to education. McGrath (2000: 
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14) notes the tensions that have existed between funding for Catholic education and 
handing over control of schools and the curriculum to the state. McGrath (2000) also 
underlines the two-pronged strategy of the Catholic Church in education. On the one hand, 
the Church worked to ensure Catholic education is funded, trying to limit the control of 
politicians over Catholic Education, while also attempting to defend the principle of 
segregated education, at times in coalition with Protestant clerics and unionist politicians 
(McGrath 2000: 5). McGrath’s (2000) study goes further than most of the historical studies 
in its discussion of the Catholic Church’s effectiveness. He provides a mixed review of its 
effectiveness, recognizing that while the Church had success in gaining financial aid for its 
schools, it was not the Church’s lobbying which ultimately led to full state funding in 1993, 
but instead government realization that Catholic Schools were under-funded, leading to a 
neglect of the community’s educational needs (McGrath 2000: 248). This represents a 
nuanced discussion of the Catholic Church’s effectiveness in engaging with education policy, 
but the author does not utilise a specific criterion to analyse effectiveness. 
Likewise, Ó Corráin (2006: 140) discusses the Northern Ireland case and role of the 
Catholic Bishops as guardians of the Catholic/nationalist community acting as their ‘default 
spokespeople’ on a wide range of issues from education to welfare to civil rights. While the 
Catholic Bishops were hostile to the Stormont regime after partition, they became more 
agreeable over time, and post 1945 began focusing on improving the position of Catholics 
within Northern Ireland rather than pushing for the reunification of Ireland (Ó Corráin 2006: 
115-116). The author notes that without politicians to represent the Catholic/nationalist 
community, politicians looked to the Bishops as community leaders (Ó Corráin 2006: 148). 
The Bishops campaigned for education funding for Catholic schools, met with British 
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politicians attempting to broker peace in Northern Ireland (Ó Corráin 2006: 120-132, 166) 
and fought against cuts to benefits and services which they believed disproportionately 
affected the Catholic/nationalist community (Ó Corráin 2006: 135). 
In the case of Scotland, Forrester’s (1993: 72-73) work on the Church of Scotland 
discusses its political advocacy structure, but its engagement with a range of policy areas is 
the main focus. The study analyses its engagement with some of the big questions in 
Scottish politics between the 1940s and 1990s, from North Sea oil to nuclear weapons to 
housing to benefits and income to the question of self-government (Forrester 1993: 74-75). 
The article offers insights into the strategies used by the Church and Nation committee, 
noting its use of written reports to try and influence the political debate as well as 
occasional lobbying via private meetings between the chairman of the Church and Nation 
committee and government. Even so, this short article does not go into great detail 
regarding the strategies pursued by the Church of Scotland in these policy areas, but instead 
focuses to a greater extent on the content of the written reports. As with Mitchell’s (2011) 
study, Forrester (1993) focuses on the political engagement of the Church within the wider 
public debate, rather than engagement with decision makers behind closed doors. Forrester 
(1993) analyses the reports written by the committee, to understand how these influenced 
wider debates, rather than analysing their strategy of directly influencing decision makers. 
Despite this, Forrester (1993: 75-80) does discuss Church support for self-government and 
notes how it engaged with politicians and civil servants on a range of issues from nuclear 
arms, to housing and presented Margaret Thatcher with a copy of the General Assembly’s 
report on poverty after her infamous ‘Sermon on the Mound’ at the 1988 Assembly. Even 
so, one is left wondering as to exactly the nature of the relationship between the Church 
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and Scottish Office. In fairness, the short length of this article, which covers a range of policy 
areas, does not have the capacity to provide a detailed analysis of FBO strategy.  
While these historical studies are somewhat descriptive and do not set out how FBOs have 
engaged politically at the sub-state level, they act as an important background for understanding 
FBO engagement historically. Each of these studies offers an insight into the political advocacy 
structures of FBOs at the sub-state level, while Forrester (1993), McGrath’s (2000) and O’Corráin’s 
(2006) studies discuss some of the strategies utilised. McGrath’s (2000) analysis of the Catholic 
Church’s engagement with government decision makers, as well as its engagement with the wider 
debate, serves to underscore the need for the study of both elements in order to present the bigger 
picture in terms of FBO political engagement. In the case of McGrath (2000), there is also some 
attempt to discuss effectiveness, although no specific criteria is used to analyse this. 
2.1.3 Literature which utilises a theoretical approach to analysing FBO 
engagement 
The final segment of pre 1998/9 literature progresses from an historical analysis to studies 
that are based on theoretical frameworks that allow for a much more nuanced analysis of 
FBO strategies. Lynch’s chapter in Boyle and Lynch’s (1998) volume on the Catholic 
community in Scotland and Brewer, Higgins and Teeney’s (2011) book on the role of the 
Church in Northern Ireland’s peace process both focus on the role of FBOs within their 
respective regions, analysing both their societal engagement as well as political 
engagement. Lynch (1998) analyses the Church’s role in education and abortion policy and 
its role in international aid, while Brewer et al’s (2011) study focuses on the Peace Process 
and constitutional issues. Lynch’s (1998) chapter on the Catholic Church and political action 
in Scotland uses interest group theory to understand how it has engaged in Scottish politics.  
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In his analysis, Lynch (1998: 50-53) utilises the insider/outsider distinction to 
illustrate how the Church mobilised its members to lobby MPs and to sign petitions while 
also lobbying the Scottish Office on matters relating to the curriculum in an ‘insider’ 
capacity. Lynch (1998: 55) also predicted that the devolved political system would offer the 
Church a more fluid environment to engage in. Likewise, Brewer et al’s (2011) use of civil 
society theory illustrates a strategy of ‘public and private’, whereby the churches made 
cautious statements in public, ‘matched by frenetic activity’ in private (Brewer et al 2011: 
93). This included calling for peace and calm while attempting to bring people to the table in 
private in order to reach a solution. The authors use a set of theoretical concepts to discuss 
the Church’s strategy, such as ‘elastic band leadership’ and ‘leash leadership’ (Brewer et al 
2011: 98). These enable the authors to identify how the Church combined front and back 
facing leadership where they attempted to push their communities towards an agreement 
from behind while attempting to reign in the more radical elements of the community. This 
theoretical concept could also be understood as a strategy of engagement used by the 
churches in order to slowly edge towards a political solution.  
The use of these different theoretical frameworks allow both Lynch (1998) and 
Brewer et al (2011) to move away from description, to an in-depth analysis of FBO 
engagement. In applying these theoretical concepts, both works discuss how a range of 
strategies can complement each other and their ultimate impact on the wider politics of the 
region. In so doing, the studies offer a much more holistic picture of FBO engagement.      
However, while both Lynch (1998) and Brewer et al’s (2011) analysis of FBO strategy 
is greatly enriched by their theoretical frameworks, they do not stretch to measuring 
effectiveness. The authors’ discussion of effectiveness goes no further than that of 
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McGrath’s (2000). They offer a nuanced discussion surrounding the issue of effectiveness, 
but do not provide a means by which to measure it. For instance, Lynch (1998: 50-58) offers 
examples of the Church’s success in influencing education legislation as well as its failure to 
influence the Labour party, and legislation more generally, on the issue of abortion. 
Likewise, Brewer et al (2011) do not offer a conclusive judgment regarding the effectiveness 
of churches in the political peace process, but instead leave the success and failures of the 
churches open for consideration. The authors note that the churches were not as confident 
when speaking publicly as they could have been (Brewer et al 2011: 118, 121), but also note 
that it is important to remember the importance of the churches working as backchannels 
(Brewer et al 2011: 94). One might argue that these authors have not attempted to measure 
effectiveness because it is difficult to know who is really influencing policy. Indeed, Lynch 
(1998: 62) notes the difficulties of trying to measure effectiveness as a reason for not doing 
so. Even so, both Lynch (1998) and Brewer et al’s (2011) studies are important because they 
are the only studies pre 1998/9 which utilise clear theoretical frameworks for understanding 
FBO political engagement at the sub-state level. Despite not using a rigorous measurement 
of effectiveness, these frameworks have greatly enriched the studies. While Lynch’s (1998) 
warning regarding the difficulties of measuring effectiveness should be heeded, 
effectiveness is a vital part of understanding FBO engagement. 
In sum, the literature on FBO engagement prior to political devolution in 1998/9 is 
mainly historical and consequently tends to be quite descriptive. Even so, a number of 
important findings in these studies can act as an important backdrop to this thesis. Lynch 
(1998) and Brewer et al’s (2000) studies also underline that by utilising a theoretical 
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framework, such as pressure group theory or civil society theory, it is possible to move 
beyond a more descriptive and one dimensional analysis. 
2.2 Literature on FBO engagement Post 1998/9 
This section progresses to investigate literature on FBO engagement post 1998/9. The 
literature can be divided into three main segments. The first discusses FBO engagement 
both briefly and in general terms by recognising FBO activity at the sub-state level, but 
without analysing it in detail or in a theoretically informed manner. The second segment of 
the literature points to the way in which the devolved institutions at the sub-state level 
encourage FBO engagement. The final segment of literature focuses on FBO engagement at 
the sub-state level. To date, the literature only focuses on Scotland, leaving Wales and 
Northern Ireland under-studied. It does not examine both representative and socio-political 
FBOs across the sub-state level, and only concentrates on Christian FBOs, leaving non-
Christian FBO engagement under-studied.       
2.2.1 FBO Engagement within Wider Studies 
The vast majority of literature on FBO engagement at the sub-state level is found within 
volumes published on the devolved societies post devolution, in studies on religion and FBO 
engagement in the UK and in works on pressure groups in the UK. The general nature of 
these studies means that they point to the prominent role of FBOs at the sub-state level but 
do not provide much in the way of detail regarding their engagement.    
These studies cover a number of issues. Walker (2002: 254) notes in his brief 
segment on religion in Scotland that devolution has changed the dynamics of Scottish 
politics, and in doing so has ‘posed a challenge’ to the churches in having their voices heard. 
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Walker (2002: 255) argue that the Church is no longer able to rely on its ‘national status’, 
but instead has to ensure it produces ‘submissions of high quality’. Both Keating (2010: 94-
95) and Hill et al’s (2014) studies briefly discuss the role of Action of Christians Together in 
Scotland (ACTS) with their Scottish Churches Parliamentary Officer representing the 
mainstream Churches in Scotland. Keating’s (2010: 94-95) short contribution analyses the 
political advocacy structure of ACTS, noting that it seeks to represent the different position 
of the Churches to the legislature and executive, in much the same way as was discussed by 
Davies (2008) in the case of Cytûn in the previous section. Hill et al (2014: 112) note that 
ACTS’ Parliamentary Officer briefs churches and Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) 
on issues of concern, Keating (2010:95) also notes the way in which the churches clashed 
with the Scottish Government over Section 28 in the first Parliament, but does not go into 
detail regarding the strategies utilised in this case, or the Church’s effectiveness. As regards 
Wales, Hill et al (2014: 112) reference the faith structure sponsored by the Welsh 
Government, the ‘Faith Communities Forum’, which they note has provided an opportunity 
for ‘dialogue’ on issues such as citizenship and leisure activities on a Sunday. 
Watts’ (2007) study on pressure groups in the UK dedicates a chapter to their 
engagement with devolved legislatures in the UK. The sections on Scotland and Northern 
Ireland highlight the engagement of an assortment of different pressure groups, and gives a 
short but prominent example of the Evangelical Alliance in Northern Ireland and Christian 
Action Research and Education (CARE) in Scotland (Watts 2007: 151-152, 162-163). It briefly 
discusses their political advocacy structures, how they have adapted to the sub-state level 
and their strategies. The discussion on CARE and the Evangelical Alliance further underlines 
the way in which UK organisations have increased their capacity by devolving authority and 
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appointing staff to the sub-state level (Watts 2007: 151, 162-163). While Keating’s (2010: 
94-95) work highlights how a territorial FBO has adapted its structures to engage with the 
devolved institutions, Watts (2007: 162-163) notes that UK organisations have devolved 
autonomy from the central state level to the sub-state level. Watts’ (2007: 151-152) study 
provides more detailed attention to the strategies utilised by the FBOs. He notes how CARE 
produces its own research and uses it to respond to consultations. Likewise, Watts (2007: 
162-163) notes that the Evangelical Alliance in Northern Ireland lobbies Members of 
Parliament (MPs), Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), Assembly committees and 
civil servants. CARE staff also meet with ministers and other decision makers. The author 
also refers to its influence, referenced as influencing bills such as the proposed ‘Dying with 
Dignity’ Bill and the final wording on the Section 28 legislation (Watts 2007: 151-152).  
These studies do not produce a detailed analysis of FBO strategy or their 
effectiveness and do not examine FBO adaptation in theoretical terms, pointing to the need 
for further study. However, these contributions note that FBOs have been active at the sub-
state level, with Watts (2007) in particular noting their lobbying activity. Despite the lack of 
detailed study of FBOs, the fact that Watts (2007) discusses FBO engagement in both the 
Scotland and Northern Ireland cases further underlines the way in which they are seen to 
play an active role at the sub-state level in the UK. The studies also point to the role of 
devolved government sponsored faith structures for FBO engagement, such as the Faith 
Communities Forum. Watts (2007), Keating (2010) and Hill et al (2014) highlight the way in 
which both territorial and UK based FBOs have adapted structurally in response to 
devolution. These findings raise pertinent questions regarding the extent to which other 
FBOs have heightened their capacity in response to political devolution.  
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2.2.2 The opportunity structures available for FBO engagement post-
devolution.  
While the main criticism of the literature on FBO engagement post 1998/9 so far is that it 
does not go into enough detail regarding FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK, 
there are a number of studies which do examine this in more detail. However, not all of 
these studies are directly focused on analysing FBO engagement. Instead, Chambers and 
Thompson (2005a, 2005b, 2006) and Chambers (2015) in the case of Wales and Steven 
(2008) in the case of Scotland and Ganiel (2008a, 2008b) in the case of Northern Ireland 
analyse the opportunities for FBO engagement with the Assembly post-devolution. 
Chambers and Thompson (2005a, 2005b, 2006) note the opportunities made available for 
FBO engagement by the devolved political institutions. They note the role of the 
government in providing FBOs with an opportunity to engage on a wide range of policy 
areas. Chambers and Thompson (2005b: 345) underline the opportunity the Forum provides 
for minority FBOs, which otherwise would not have this level of access. They also note the 
role of the Third Sector Partnership Council which includes FBOs as third sector 
organisations (Chambers and Thompson 2005a: 37, Chambers 2015: 217). Steven’s (2008: 
188-193) article notes how devolution has created an ‘improved opportunity structure’ for 
organisations such as the Catholic Church in Scotland. It points to the greater access to a 
number of social policy issues post-devolution which they wish to influence and to the way 
political devolution enables the organisations to change their party allegiance from the 
Labour Party to the Scottish National Party (SNP) if they wish, in order to provide a greater 
opportunity to implement their moral agenda. For Northern Ireland, Ganiel (2008a: 114-
116) notes that evangelical organisations have realised they no longer have a privileged 
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position, leading to using levers made available by the Belfast agreement to their 
advantage. An example of this is the way in which traditional evangelical organisations have 
begun to utilise Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act, which enshrines equal rights for all 
communities (Ganiel 2008a: 115-116). 
Demonstrating how devolution has created opportunities for FBO engagement, re-
engagement and a change in engagement is the purpose of these studies. However, they 
also point to ways in which FBOs have responded to these opportunities. Chambers and 
Thompson (2005a: 39, 2005b: 344, 347-348, 2006: 220) refer the way in which organisations 
traditionally organised at the UK level have adapted by devolving power to new branches 
and departments to the sub-state level in Wales. They note how each of the mainstream 
Christian denominations now have a board of social responsibility structure of some kind 
and have re-invigorated their efforts through these structures to overcome the ‘the 
marginalization of religion into the private sphere’ (Chambers and Thompson 2005a: 36). 
They remark that this can be seen in the way FBOs have advised the Assembly on the faith 
dimension of issues such as health and education (Chambers and Thompson 2005a: 43). 
Going beyond Christian denominations, some attention is given to the mobilisation of the 
Muslim Council of Wales in the early 2000s (Chambers and Thompson 2005b: 345, 
Chambers 2015: 217). Chambers and Thompson (2005a: 38) also make the argument that 
FBOs appear to be trying to set the agenda rather than directly influencing policy. 
Likewise with respect to Northern Ireland, Ganiel (2008a: 111-113) notes the way in 
which a fundamentalist Christian FBO, the Caleb Foundation, has increased its political 
participation since 1998, attempting to influence education policy through a strategy of 
engaging with MLAs, the Northern Ireland Office, and the the Community Relations Council, 
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an organisation created by The Belfast Agreement. Ganiel (2008a: 116-118) argues that 
traditional evangelical organisations have consequently learnt the language of 
marginalisation and discrimination, and have used it to make their case and gain influence. 
More mainstream evangelical organisations have also engaged politically with the Assembly 
through their political liaison officers as well as through ‘discrete relationships’ with 
government ministers and a favourable relationship with the media (Ganiel 2008a : 123, 
127-128). They also underline how evangelical FBOs have responded to the structures 
created by the Belfast Agreement in 1998 and use multiple routes for advocacy purposes. 
To sum, these studies underline the way in which FBO engagement can be shaped by 
structures and levers associated with devolved institutions, such as the Faith Communities 
Forum in Wales, the electoral system in Scotland and equality legislation in Northern 
Ireland. However, the literature is not attempting to focus on how FBOs have engaged 
themselves in the sub-state political systems. 
2.2.3 FBO Engagement with the devolved institutions at the sub-state level 
The literature that focuses specifically on FBO engagement at the sub-state level post-
devolution is far more detailed, and uses theoretical frames to analyse how FBOs have 
engaged politically since 1998/9. This literature is not vast and is limited in focusing largely 
on Scotland and representative FBOs and Christian FBOs. 
Both Steven’s (2003, 2007, 2011) work on the political influence of the Church of 
Scotland and the Catholic Church in Scotland and Gillan’s (2008) work on family policy in 
post-devolution Scotland are the only studies in the literature which systematically analyse 
FBO engagement in one of the UK’s devolved regions, utilising theoretical frames in order to 
examine the strategy and effectiveness of the FBOs in specific policy areas. Steven’s works 
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(2003, 2007, 2011) seek to understand whether the Church of Scotland and Catholic Church 
are influential in post-devolution Scottish politics by studying policy areas such as Home 
Rule, sectarianism, the War on Terror, Section 28, human genetics, gambling and drinking 
and social care for the elderly (see Steven 2003: 40-71-96). Gillan’s work (2008) comes from 
a different angle, as FBOs are studied amongst other pressure groups in an attempt to 
understand the different facets that influence the formation of family policy in Scotland. 
Because of this, Gillan (2008) utilises a range of theoretical frameworks such as pressure 
group theory in order to analyse group engagement and civil society theory in order to 
analyse the pressure groups within wider civil society in Scotland and public policy theory in 
order to analyse policy change. Steven’s (2003) thesis focuses on the Church of Scotland’s 
political engagement and includes a comparison with the Catholic Church. Gillan (2008) on 
the other hand studies the Christian Institute and the Catholic Church as the most active 
FBOs engaging with the Family Law Bill and the Scottish Sexual Health Strategy. Despite 
their different outcomes, both studies provide important pieces of the jigsaw for 
understanding FBO engagement at the sub-state level, discussing FBO structures, strategies 
and effectiveness.   
Gillan’s (2008) work therefore does not analyse the political advocacy structures of 
the groups under study and this is likely because the angle she takes focuses on policy 
outcomes rather than the FBOs themselves. However, Steven’s work (2003, 2007, 2011) 
discusses the political advocacy structure of the Church of Scotland in greater detail than 
other works (e.g. Forrester 1993). He raises questions regarding the structures of 
representative FBOs and their flexibility for engaging politically at the sub-state level more 
widely. Steven (2003: 43) indicates that the Church has created a new committee for 
Holyrood, denoting the Church’s eagerness to engage with the new institution on a par with 
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others. The study also introduces the political role of the Board of Social Responsibility and 
notes its engagement on traditional moral issues (Steven 2003: 72-96). The work’s most 
important contribution regarding political advocacy structures is the discussion surrounding 
the role of the moderator. Examples signal that the Church’s democratic structure which 
elects a moderator for one year leads to weak leadership, particularly because the Church 
and State committee and the Board of Social Responsibility might give a different line to the 
moderator (Steven 2003: 78-79, 118-119, 2007:105). The weak moderator is contrasted 
with the role of Cardinal and Archbishop in the Catholic Church which can build a profile 
over time and provide a consistent position on behalf of the Church (Steven 2003:118). 
However, while the political advocacy structure of the Church is discussed, a theoretical 
frame is not applied for understanding how it has adapted to the sub-state level. 
Despite not using a theoretical frame for analysing the Church’s structural 
adaptation, Steven’s (2003) analysis of the Church’s strategy is greatly strengthened by 
studying it through the lens of pressure group theory.  A less detailed analysis of the 
Catholic Church’s strategy is also presented. Utilising the insider/outsider distinction gives 
nuance to the author’s analysis of strategy, enabling the work to indicate the various 
strategies used. They include a detailed discussion regarding the use of public 
pronouncements, giving evidence to Holyrood committees, and developing influential 
reports (Steven 2003: 40-96). Utilising the insider/outsider distinction enables Steven (2003, 
2007) to generalise the strategies used so as to better understand the role of FBOs at the 
sub-state level. For instance, using the distinction, Steven (2003, 2007) recognises that the 
Church of Scotland’s political engagement is divided between the Church and Nation 
Committee and the Board of Social Responsibility which utilise insider and outsider 
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strategies depending on the policy area. While the Church and Nation committee’s 
pronouncements are often outside of the mainstream of politics, the Board of Social 
Responsibility utilises its position as a service provider in order to gain access to debates on 
issues such as Section 28 and social care for the elderly (Steven 2003: 43). There is also 
reference to the Church working in coalition with other third sector organisations, but this is 
not analysed in a theoretical manner (Steven 2003: 51-57).  
Gillan’s (2008) analysis of FBO strategy is very detailed, shedding light on how FBOs 
engage with each step of the policy process. Gillan’s (2008) use of both public policy theory 
and pressure group theory enables her to generalise the strategies utilised by the FBOs, 
rather than simply offer a description of their activities. For instance, by analysing FBO 
engagement at each stage of the legislation, Gillan (2008) is able to show how the Christian 
Institute and the Catholic Church balance a strategy which attempts to directly influence the 
legislation, while also working to frame the wider debate. By noting this dual strategy, Gillan 
(2008) offers a nuanced perspective on the short term and long term strategies FBOs 
employ. For instance, the main strategy discussed by Gillan (2008: 93-94) is the way in which 
the FBOs ‘re-frame’ the agenda during the policy process, so that the discussion is in their 
favour.  The author notes how the Christian Institute managed to frame discussions 
regarding marriage and divorce as a ‘moral issue’ in the consultative stage of the policy 
process (Gillan 2008: 93-94). This re-framing was then strengthened through persuading a 
sympathetic Member of the Scottish Parliament (MSP) to propose an amendment at the 
committee stage (2008:102). Gillan (2008: 123-125, 132-133) then notes how this 
influenced the debate in the Scottish Parliament. Likewise, with the Sexual Health Strategy, 
the Catholic Church succeeded in framing the debate as a moral issue through a proactive 
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and high profile media strategy (Gillan 2008: 167). The relationship between the Catholic 
Church and the Labour Party is also noted (Gillan 2008: 17). The author also points to the 
way in which devolution has brought the Catholic Church and evangelical groups to work 
together, leading them to surpass their sectarian history, for the purposes of influencing 
moral issues (Gillan 2008: 126-127, 212-213). 
Pressure group theory also allows the authors to measure effectiveness and influence 
in a rigorous manner. Using typologies from the pressure group theory as a basis, Steven 
develops a measurement to understand whether the Church of Scotland is an effective 
pressure group. The measurement includes these questions: 
1. Was the [Church of Scotland] fully consulted by the Scottish Executive, or 
relevant Government Department, in order to establish its opinion on the 
issue? 
2. Did the [Church of Scotland] speak out in a consistent and clear way on the 
issue? 
3.  Did the [Church of Scotland] achieve its ultimate objectives concerning the 
issue? 
(Steven 2003: 45). 
This is an important contribution, because it allows Steven to develop a decisive 
measurement of whether a FBO’s engagement is effective. This adds a dimension to the 
study of FBOs, as many of the pre-devolution studies and the post-devolution studies do not 
attempt to measure effectiveness (Lynch 1998, Davies 2008, Hughes 1999, Walker 2002, 
Watts 2007, Keating 2010) while the studies which do (Forrester 1993, McGrath 2000, 
Brewer et al 2013) provide a vague notion of effectiveness, which is not grounded in a 
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measurement which the reader can assess against the empirical evidence presented. 
Moreover, Steven (2003) also tackles the issue regarding the difficulty of measuring 
effectiveness, raised by Lynch (1998: 62). Instead of attempting to indicate a precise 
measurement of the Church’s influence, Steven (2003: 7) provides a measurement of 
whether the Church of Scotland is equipped to act as an effective pressure group. This 
allows the author to offer a conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the Church of 
Scotland, without getting stuck in debates regarding causation. 
Even so, Steven’s (2003: 45) measurement has some limitations as it focuses on FBO 
activity but does not factor in the way in which the organisation is received by decision 
makers (government ministers, and civil servants etc). The thesis’ analysis of the 
effectiveness of the Church of Scotland could also be more nuanced. While the Church has 
not influenced the wording of every Bill with which it then engaged with, it is not fair to 
expect it to do so in the pluralist and secular context in which it engages. The fact that the 
Church has influence in some areas, but does not in others, deserves a fairer hearing. In 
fairness, Steven (2007, 2011) does offer a more nuanced account of the Church of 
Scotland’s effectiveness in his published article and book chapter. In his 2007 article on the 
post devolution engagement of the Church of Scotland and the Catholic Church in Scotland, 
he notes that the Church’s decision to re-arrange its structure in 2005 has led to more ‘co-
ordinated’ engagement, evidenced by the moderator speaking out much more forcibly on 
same sex adoption (Steven 2007: 104-105). Steven (2011: 101) also notes that the mutual 
benefit of the Church and political parties working together is recognised by politicians. 
Here, Steven (2007, 20011) takes a more nuanced stance, recognising that the Church’s role 
isn’t all powerful, but neither is it inconsequential in Scottish politics. 
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A nuanced approach towards effectiveness and influence is evident in Gillan’s (2008) 
analysis of the Catholic Church and the Christian Institute’s influence on family law in 
Scotland. Gillan’s (2008) analysis goes further than Steven (2003) because she analyses both 
the strategies selected by the FBOs and the way decision makers perceive the FBOs. This 
more nuanced view comes from focusing to a greater extent on Maloney et al’s (1994) 
insider/outsider distinction, which examines both the strategies of FBOs and the way they 
are received by decision makers. 
Gillan’s (2008) theoretical framework also allows her to present the bigger picture 
with regards to influence. Mackay et al’s (2005: 10) continuum of influence which includes 
‘recognition of a legitimate voice, provoking reconsideration of the way others think, 
changes in the terms of public debate, and concrete changes in policy outcomes’ as the 
range of ways one might identify influence is utilised. Using this continuum allows Gillan to 
go beyond an understanding of influence as directly pursuing, stopping or changing a policy 
position, to one that understands influence as a longer term strategy. The ability of FBOs to 
influence the climate in which debates are discussed is cited as an example. Gillan (2008: 
282) notes that the influence of FBOs in Scotland is not always seen in changing the wording 
of bills, but in the longer term effects they may have on Scottish politics. This takes us back 
to Mitchell’s (2011: 55) argument that FBOs influence the tone of the debate but not policy 
itself. Gillan (2008) notes that the two are not necessarily isolated from one another as this 
bigger picture is very important, indicating the necessity of going beyond a traditional 
understanding of influence, realising that policy is developed in a much wider context which 
FBOs and other organisations can shape over time. Steven’s (2003: 45) measurement, 
together with a nuanced understanding of what might be understood as influence as 
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utilised by Gillan (2008), is an important contribution to analysing whether FBOs at the sub-
state level are effective. 
2.2.4 The Limitations of the Literature 
Despite Steven (2003, 2007, 2011) and Gillan’s (2008) important contribution, the literature 
has its limitations. Firstly, the literature is limited to a study of a single case; Scotland. There 
is therefore a need for detailed attention to FBO engagement in Wales and Northern 
Ireland, and to compare FBO engagement in more than one sub-state region in the UK. 
Secondly, the literature focuses on a limited range of FBOs. Between Steven (2003, 2007, 
2011) and Gillan (2008), only the Church of Scotland, the Catholic Church of Scotland and 
the Christian Institute are analysed. Hence, while representative FBOs do receive reasonable 
attention in these studies, socio-political FBOs do not. The Christian Institute, examined by 
Gillan (2008) is quite a small socio-political FBO of a particular fundamentalist theological 
orientation and cannot necessarily be used to illustrate how socio-political FBOs engage in 
Scotland or in other sub-state political systems. Attention to both representative and socio-
political FBO engagement at the sub-state level is lacking in order to illustrate as wide a 
picture of FBO engagement as possible, rather than simply one subdivision of the faith 
sector.      
More broadly, the literature focuses on Christian FBOs alone, giving little attention 
to non-Christian FBOs. As noted previously, Chambers (2015) and Chambers and Thompson 
(2005a, 2005b, 2006) do point to non-Christian FBO engagement in Wales. The authors note 
the mobilisation of the Muslim Council of Wales (MCW) in the early 2000s (Chambers 2015: 
217, Chambers and Thompson 2005b: 345) and the activity of the Hindu and Sikh 
community (Chambers 2015: 217, Chambers and Thompson 2005a: 35-36, 2005b: 345 and 
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2006: 222). Likewise, Whittaker (2015) discusses the MCW’s engagement in his study of 
black and minority ethnic participation in Wales’ 2011 referendum on primary law making 
powers, suggesting that its involvement indicates its eagerness to adopt a sense of a Welsh 
national identity by identifying with the devolved institutions. His findings also concur with 
Chambers and Thompson (2005a, 2005b, 2006), regarding the eagerness of the Muslim 
community  to engage in Wales’ sub-state political system, using the referendum as a way 
of positioning themselves in the political sphere (Whittaker 2015: 18). Whittaker (2015: 23) 
tentatively argues that the Muslim community has been accepted as a legitimate part of 
Welsh civil society, and their voices were utilised in the campaign. As regards the literature 
on Northern Ireland, Marranci’s (2003, 2004, 2005 2006) anthropological studies of the 
Muslim community make some reference to its public profile but does not examine its 
political engagement. The only other study which focuses on FBO engagement in Northern 
Ireland is a study by Trotman (2007), commissioned by the Northern Ireland Executive’s 
Department for Social Development. The report discusses the backgrounds of the FBOs, 
their civil society activity and their engagement with government. The main conclusion is 
that many of these organisations wish to engage politically, mainly in the area of education, 
but lack the capacity to do so, and access is limited (Trotman 2007: 27, 37, 52, 70).  
While these studies offer some insight into non-Christian FBO engagement, it is not 
discussed in great detail. As noted before, Chambers (2015) and Chambers and Thompson 
(2005a, 2005b, 2006) are not attempting to understand how FBOs engage politically in 
Wales, so much as show that devolution has created the opportunity for engagement. 
Likewise, the purpose of Whittaker’s article is to highlight how MCW’s engagement with the 
2011 referendum has shaped both Welsh society and the Muslim community in Wales. For 
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Northern Ireland the literature is quite descriptive, and its lack of theoretical grounding 
means the report lacks depth. 
In sum, the chapter has to date critically analysed the literature on FBO engagement 
post devolution. First and foremost, it is evident that the literature in this area is limited, 
particularly when it comes to in-depth studies which utilise a theoretical framework to 
understand FBO engagement. Much of the literature is general and brief, but does offer 
some insight into the sub-state level. Furthermore, a number of studies underline how 
devolution has created an opportunity for FBOs to engage, re-engage and develop a new 
form of engagement at the sub-state level. 
The literature that focuses directly on FBO engagement utilises pressure group 
theory. Steven (2003) and Gillan’s (2008) use of this theoretical framework for 
understanding strategy and effectiveness leads to an in-depth and nuanced analysis of FBO 
engagement. While Steven’s (2003: 45) measurement of effectiveness has its limitations, it 
is important in exemplifying how FBO effectiveness can be measured to gain a fuller picture 
of FBO engagement at the sub-state level. Utilising a measurement such as Steven’s (2003: 
45), together with a nuanced understanding of influence, as is used in Gillan’s (2008) thesis, 
offers a rigorous way of analysing effectiveness. The chapter also noted limitations to the 
literature. The in-depth studies have only been conducted in the case of Scotland, 
emphasise representative FBOs, negating the study of socio-political FBOs, and only focus 
on Christian FBOs. 
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2.3 An evaluation of the theoretical frameworks used in the 
literature 
An assessment of the literature has drawn attention to a number of theoretical frameworks 
used to analyse FBO engagement at the sub-state level. This third section of the chapter 
evaluates the frameworks utilised in this literature, and in literature beyond the sub-state 
level, in order to establish the most powerful explanatory framework for studying FBO 
engagement in Wales and Northern Ireland. A number of the studies utilise civil society 
theory and pressure group theory with fewer using social movement theory. Each of these 
theoretical frameworks will be discussed in turn in order to underline both their strengths 
and limitations. It is argued that while each of these has something to offer, pressure group 
theory is the most powerful explanatory framework for the study of FBO engagement at the 
sub-state level.  
The literature makes some limited use of social movement theory as regards to 
theoretical frameworks for analysing FBO engagement at the sub-state and UK levels. 
Steven (2008: 188-193) utilises social movement theory to analyse the ‘improved 
opportunity structure’ created by devolving responsibility over social policy to Scotland in 
1999 and as a result of a proportional electoral system. While Steven (2008: 189-190) does 
not greatly develop this theoretical framework, he underlines the possibility of 
understanding FBO mobilisation to try and influence the agenda of political parties so as to 
influence a political system. Likewise, Hunt’s (2003, 2011) study of what he refers to as the 
‘Christian Right’ in the UK utilises social movement theory to indicate joint working between 
FBOs at the UK level to challenge the LGBT rights agenda (Hunt 2011: 311). Hunt’s work 
illustrates how these FBOs mobilise the support of fundamentalist Christians and the 
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resources which explain the partial success of these ‘anti-gay lobbies’ (Hunt 2003: 1.3). 
While social movement theory can explain how FBOs engage politically, its emphasis is on 
the way in which social mobilization occurs, rather than the FBO engagement itself.    
A framework used to a greater extent in the literature is civil society theory. Brewer 
et al (2011) and Ganiel (2008a) use civil society theory to analyse how FBOs have engaged 
politically, in order to examine their role in conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. 
Likewise, Chambers and Thompson (2005a) analyse FBOs as civil society groups in order to 
understand the changing role of FBOs in Wales. Furthermore, on the UK level, O’Toole et al 
(2013) study Muslim civil society organisations’ engagement with government, analysing 
Muslim presence, voice and impact in England. While conceptualising the FBO as civil 
society organisations presents a way of analysing FBO political engagement in these studies, 
it does not provide as strong a set of tools for analysing the strategies and effectiveness of 
FBOs in the way that pressure group theory does. Indeed, while Gillan (2008) utilises civil 
society theory in her study of the policy process in post-devolution Scotland, she turns to 
pressure group theory to analyse strategy and effectiveness. Pressure group theory gives 
Lynch (1998), Steven (2003) and Gillan (2008) the tools to go beyond a description of FBO 
activity, and allows them to analyse FBO engagement in a more nuanced fashion. 
Recognising how the Church utilises the insider and outsider strategy at different times 
allows Steven (2003) to develop a much more dynamic explanation of strategy and 
influence. It aids Steven (2003) to recognise the type of strategy the Church pursues, and 
present a typology on which he builds his measurement of effectiveness. Utilising Maloney 
et al’s (1994) insider/outsider distinction, also enables Gillan (2008) to demonstrate that 
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pressure group theory can go beyond analysing the strategy pursued to also analysing the 
FBO’s status in the eyes of decision makers. 
Pressure group theory’s explanatory value is also evident in studies of FBO 
engagement beyond the sub-state level. Steven (2010) extends his conceptualisation of the 
FBO as a pressure group to his research on FBO engagement with the EU institutions. He 
asserts that conceptualising FBOs as pressure groups departs from more traditional ways of 
studying religion and politics, such as church-state relations, voting behaviour and the role 
of Christianity within European values (Steven 2010: 177). Instead, pressure group theory 
serves as a way of researching how FBOs lobby and influence, like other pressure groups, 
rather than focusing on the more privileged relationship between Church and state or 
questions of religious identity and politics. In doing this, he displays the utility of the 
framework for studying FBO engagement in pluralistic and secularised societies where FBOs 
are no longer privileged as churches have moved from engaging as established churches to 
‘one interest group among many’ (Steven 2010: 184). This further underlines its utility for 
studying FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK. Similarly, Warner (see 2000: 5-9) 
uses pressure group theory in her analysis of how the Catholic Church attempts to influence 
politically across European states. Pressure group theory indicates how the Catholic Church 
utilises political parties in order to influence political systems. This points to another aspect 
of FBO engagement which pressure group theory can help in explaining. 
Having assessed the theoretical frameworks evident in the literature on FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level and beyond, it is evident that pressure group theory is 
the most powerful framework for understanding how FBOs engage with devolved political 
institutions. The framework provides pliable theoretical tools for studying FBO engagement 
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in liberal democratic societies in the 21st century, providing a direct focus on FBO 
engagement which is not merely descriptive, but offers a nuanced analysis of FBO strategy 
and status and presents a method by which to measure effectiveness.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the literature on FBO engagement both before and after power 
was devolved to the sub-state level in the UK in 1998/9. It has been argued that while the 
literature offers a number of important insights, it also has limitations. A large proportion of 
the literature does not provide in-depth analysis of FBO engagement, and does not utilise 
theoretical frames. Secondly, a number of the more detailed studies focus on the 
opportunities devolution creates for FBO engagement, rather than focusing on FBO 
engagement itself. Theoretically grounded, in-depth studies, of FBO engagement at the sub-
state level post devolution focus solely on Scotland, with Wales and Northern Ireland 
understudied. The studies also fail to compare both representative and socio-political FBOs 
and focus on Christian FBOs, thus leaving non-Christian FBOs understudied. Consequently, 
there is a need for a theoretically grounded comparative study of FBO engagement at the 
sub-state level which includes the study of both representative, socio-political, Christian and 
non-Christian FBOs. Finally, a number of theoretical frameworks used for analysing FBO 
engagement were examined, with pressure group theory providing the strongest 
explanatory framework for studying FBOs at the sub-state level. In light of the findings of 
this chapter, the thesis now proceeds in the next chapter to critically assess pressure group 
theory as a theoretical framework for the purpose of analysing FBO engagement at the sub-
state level in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
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Chapter 3: The Theoretical Framework. 
Introduction 
Chapter 2’s critical assessment of theoretical frameworks evident in the literature on FBO 
engagement at the sub-state, national and supra-national levels resulted in asserting that 
pressure group theory is the more appropriate theoretical framework for analysing how 
FBOs engage with the devolved institutions at the sub-state level. This chapter focuses on 
establishing pressure group theory as a theoretical framework for this thesis by identifying 
the necessary tools for analysing FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK. The 
theory stands out as enabling a study to move beyond describing FBO engagement to 
providing an in-depth analysis of FBO strategy and a nuanced measurement of FBO 
effectiveness. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section justifies the use of 
the term ‘pressure group’ before defining it. Following this, an argument as to why the FBO, 
as defined in Chapter 1, should be conceptualised as a pressure group is presented. The 
second section critically assesses pressure group theory in order to build a theoretical 
framework which this thesis can use to empirically study how FBOs have engaged at the 
sub-state level in the UK. Three main strands of the theoretical literature are examined: 
political advocacy structure, strategy and effectiveness. As regards political advocacy 
structure, pressure group mobilisation, the make-up of the political advocacy structures and 
their adaptation are assessed. Following this is the discussion of strategy, particularly the 
insider/outsider distinction, leading to the conclusion that Maloney et al’s (1994) version of 
the distinction is strongest. The theoretical literature regarding coalition formation is then 
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assessed, noting the different factors which lead to the use of coalition as a strategy. Finally, 
in examining pressure group effectiveness the chapter argues that while it is difficult to 
measure influence on policy, it is worth pursuing. The thesis incorporates Steven’s (2003) 
measurement, which attempts to ‘build a picture’ of effectiveness. The third section of this 
chapter evaluates the theoretical framework as a mode of analysing FBO engagement at the 
sub-state level. It argues that each theoretical concept presented in section 2 is relevant for 
analysing FBOs in their specific context at the sub-state level.  
3.1 The FBO as a Pressure Group 
3.1.1 Justifying the use of the term Pressure Group 
There are contrasting positions within the literature as to whether ‘pressure group’ or 
‘interest group’ best describes the organisations which attempt to influence government 
with scholars tending to use either term without lengthy justification for their choice. 
However, the term pressure group is a more appropriate term for understanding FBO 
political engagement. The term ‘interest’ suggests that the function of the group is simply to 
defend or promote a group’s interest. This may be true of some organisations (see Halpin 
2006: 924), but this is not the sole purpose of FBO engagement. As Stewart (1958: 25) 
notes, there are two main types of groups, the sectional group and the cause group. He 
argues that the sectional group defends the interests of its members, while the cause group 
promotes a particular cause (Stewart 1958: 25). The groups in the ‘cause’ category are 
based upon a specific concern, not strictly upon the interest of the group’s membership or 
constituency (Stewart 1958: 25). FBOs are concerned with defending their own interests, 
but they also have a wider concern for society as a whole. This is often referred to by FBOs 
as their concern for the ‘common good’ (see Wallis 2013: 3-24). Truman’s (1951: 33) 
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definition of ‘interest group’ defines groups as being based upon ‘shared attitudes’ which 
make certain claims upon other groups. This refers to a group’s attitude towards its 
interests rather than a particular concern such as the environment or for society in its wider 
sense. His definition gives the impression that political engagement is about one group’s 
interests over another rather than particular causes. In this context, ‘interest group’ does 
not satisfactorily incorporate cause groups, and hence a large number of FBOs within its 
meaning (Finer 1966: 3).  
Truman (1951: 39) argues that the term ‘pressure’ simply defines a ‘stage’ of group 
activity rather than a definition of the group, and hence believes this to be the term’s 
weakness, but it can also be perceived as a strength. Unlike ‘interest group’, ‘pressure 
group’ incorporates both sectional and cause groups because it denotes the mode of action 
being used by the group, rather than that which the group engages in or with. The term’s 
commending characteristic is the way in which it indicates the ambition of both the 
sectional and cause groups and denotes the way in which the groups attempt to put 
pressure on government in order to promote its interest or cause. In light of this, the term 
‘pressure group’ rather than ‘interest group’ will be utilised in the thesis. 
3.1.2 Defining the Pressure Group 
Now that the use of the term ‘pressure group’ has been justified, it is possible to define it. In 
brief, Grant (2000:14) defines the pressure group as: 
an organization which seeks as one of its functions to influence the formulation 
and implementation of public policy, public policy representing a set of 
authoritative decisions taken by the executive, the legislature and the judiciary 
and by local government and the European Union. 
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Defining the term pressure group is difficult, but Grant’s definition goes a long way to 
explaining what a pressure group is and does. The definition underlines a number of key 
aspects regarding the pressure group and each will be critically assessed in turn below.  
Grant notes that a pressure group is an ‘organisation’ and hence signals that pressure 
groups are structured and formalised groups. Rush’s (1990: 8) definition agrees with this 
assertion, arguing that an individual or an unorganised group of individuals cannot be 
regarded as a pressure group, but that it is vital that the group is structured and organised 
to apply pressure. Grant therefore disagrees with Alderman (1984: 21) who includes ‘units’ 
which exist within the democratic process whether they are organised or not. This definition 
is too broad, as it could include wealthy individuals who because of their status and power 
are able to gain access to government. 
A related question is the extent to which a group must be organised if it is to be 
deemed a ‘pressure group.’ Grant (2000: 8) argues that a defined membership is one of the 
characteristics of these groups. It is however a little limiting to insist that all entities with the 
title ‘pressure group’ have defined memberships. Jordan and Richardson (1987: 15) are keen 
to stay clear of a membership based interpretation, arguing that there are pressure groups 
which represent constituencies within society which do not make up its membership. As 
noted previously, some groups do not attempt to represent their membership, but instead 
act in ‘solidarity’ with a group, issue or cause (Halpin 2006: 924). Grant (2000: 8) is right to 
argue that defined membership is a characteristic of many pressure groups, but it is 
important to keep in mind that while a pressure group is structured and formalised so as to 
be deemed an ‘organisation’, not every pressure group will have a defined membership. 
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Grant’s (2000: 14) definition also draws attention to the notion that a group does 
not necessarily have the primary objective of influencing government in order to be 
regarded a pressure group. Indeed, he (Grant 2000: 15-17) notes that influencing the 
formulation of public policy can be just one of a group’s functions. By doing this, Grant 
widens his definition to include groups which might only engage politically from time to 
time, but nevertheless will do so if they feel the need to influence political decisions. By 
defining the ‘pressure group’ in this way, it is possible to include groups such as the 
Automobile Association which offers a service to its customers, but also seeks to influence 
public policy when it is in its interest to do so (Grant 2000: 15-16). Likewise, many FBOs, 
particularly representative FBOs, engage politically in a secondary capacity and hence 
Grant’s definition incorporates a wide range of FBOs. Grant (2000: 15-17) successfully 
makes space for both the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ pressure groups, which is quite unique 
to his definition.  
Another important feature of Grant’s definition is that the pressure group’s objective 
is to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy. This corresponds with 
the definition offered by many pressure group theorists (Pross 1986, Jordan and Richardson 
1987, Rush 1990, Grant 2000, Coxall 2001). Grant (2000: 7-8) is clear that he is most 
concerned with groups which seek to change public policy rather than groups which exert 
pressure within companies or social groups. Unlike scholars such as Mackenzie (1955: 137) 
and Stewart (1958: 1), Grant (2000: 14) contextualises the pressure group as part of the 
policy process. By doing this, Grant notes the objective and agenda of pressure groups. They 
do not simply attempt to influence public opinion but seek legislation for their interest or 
cause. Grant’s use of the term ‘public policy’ allows the definition to refer to the breadth of 
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access points that exist for pressure groups to utilise, without extending the pressure 
group’s objective to every public body. In contrast to Stewart (1958: 1), Grant notes that a 
pressure group seeks to influence not only the executive but also the legislature. He also 
recognises the judiciary, local government and the European Union as access points. 
However, it is important to note that Grant’s use of the term ‘public policy’ is not simply 
referring to policy outcomes but refers to a group’s ability to influence the ‘authoritative 
decisions’ made by the executive and the legislature. 
By emphasising the pressure group’s focus on public policy outcomes, Grant (2000: 
10-12) distinguishes between pressure groups and other organisations such as social 
movements and political parties which engage in wider methods of political engagement. 
The objective of both social movements and pressure groups is to exert influence, but the 
type of influence pressure groups seek is only one part of the wider social movement’s 
agenda. Social movements attempt to engage politically without engaging directly with 
public policy. Grant (2000: 10-11) notes for instance, that the feminist movement can vary 
from people simply reading feminist literature to feminist pressure groups which lobby 
government. Therefore, while engaging with public policy is a part of a social movement’s 
engagement, it’s not its whole sum. Likewise, Grant (2000: 12) argues that there is a clear 
distinction between a pressure group and a political party and this is supported within the 
public policy literature (Baggott 1995: 26, Coxall 2001: 3). The political party attempts to 
influence voters, public opinion and stands for office, while the emphasis within a pressure 
group’s agenda is the policy process. Grant (2000: 13) also notes that a pressure group is not 
expected to have a view on every political position in the same way as a political party which 
hopes to form a government.   
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It is a harder task however to determine whether a think tank can be labelled as a 
pressure group. A think tank carries out research and hence at first glance does not appear 
to be a pressure group. If however the think tank uses research in order to influence 
politically, it can also operate as a pressure group. A think tank with a clear agenda for 
influencing public policy in a particular fashion, rather than simply informing policy makers, 
can be deemed a pressure group therefore. Grant’s (2000:14) definition does not explicitly 
make reference to the fact that a pressure group is external to government, but he does not 
consider a government department to be a pressure group (2000: 12). Grant (2000: 12) does 
however include non-departmental bodies as pressure groups. However, the control a 
government is likely to have over these bodies means it is difficult to define it as a pressure 
group because it is unlikely to be able to criticise or put pressure on the organisation which 
funds and governs it, but it can act as a pressure group in influencing government.  
3.1.3 Conceptualising the FBO as a Pressure Group 
Chapter one defined the FBO and presented a case for studying representative and socio-
political FBOs in this thesis. It illustrated that representative FBOs and socio-political FBOs 
have clear political roles of representation and mobilisation, and hence their behaviour 
corresponds with that which the central research question endeavours to understand. This 
section argues that the representative and socio-political FBO can and should be understood 
as a pressure group. 
There are obvious overlaps between the pressure group characteristics in Grant’s 
(2000: 14) definition of the pressure group and the representative and socio-political FBO. 
Firstly, one of the functions of both the socio-political FBO and the pressure group is to 
engage politically. Clarke (2008: 25) notes that the socio-political FBO is ‘in pursuit of 
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broader political objectives’. The socio-political FBO therefore mirrors the pressure group’s 
ambition ‘to influence the implementation and formulation of public policy’ (Grant 2000: 
14). Secondly, an important characteristic of the socio-political FBO is that it is organised 
and that it mobilises ‘social groups on the basis of faith identities’ (Clarke 2008: 25). In the 
same way as a pressure group, the socio-political FBO is also organised and structured and 
often has a defined membership.  
Similarly, the representative FBO, or Apex Body (Clarke 2008: 25-26), discussed in 
Chapter 1, can also be understood as a pressure group. These are hierarchically structured 
organisations which represent the faithful to other actors. The representative FBO ‘governs 
the faithful and represents them through engagement with the state’ (Clarke 2008: 25). This 
will often be done through a subsidiary group within the representative organisation (Clarke 
2008: 26). The fact that these FBOs engage with the state mirrors pressure groups, which 
seek to engage with a wide range of political actors. In addition, these groups ‘govern the 
faithful and represent them’ (Clarke 2008: 25) and hence have a defined membership, which 
is also a key characteristic of many pressure groups.  
Indeed, Grant’s (2000: 16) work exemplifies the way in which representative FBOs can 
be understood as pressure groups in discussing the Church of England: 
Its main purpose is that of a religious organization: to provide facilities, buildings 
and clergy for the worship and the administration of the sacrament in 
accordance with its doctrinal beliefs, and to propagate its interpretation of the 
Christian gospel. However, it acts both as a sectional pressure group in relation 
to its own particular interests and as a cause group on wider social issues.   
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We can see here that the Church of England is a representative FBO due to the fact 
that it is hierarchically structured, rules on doctrinal matters, governs the faithful and 
represents them through engagement with the state and other actors. The Church is also a 
pressure group because it attempts to influence public policy as one of its functions. Its 
main function is a religious organisation, but if it is in the Church’s interest or concern, it will 
act as a secondary pressure group.  
Both socio-political and representative FBOs are organised groups which, as one of 
their functions, seek to influence the formulation and implementation of public policy by 
influencing authoritative decisions made by the executive, the legislature and other decision 
makers. We can therefore argue, that the representative and socio-political FBOs are 
encapsulated in Grant’s (2000: 14) definition of the pressure group.  
3.2 A Critical Assessment of Pressure Group Theory 
Building on conceptualising the FBO as a pressure group, this section critically assesses the 
pressure group theory literature. It examines the literature regarding political advocacy 
structure, strategy and effectiveness in turn, as a basis for evaluating the utility of the main 
concepts within pressure group theory for the study of FBO engagement in Wales and 
Northern Ireland in the final section.  
3.2.1 Political Advocacy Structure 
The literature on the political advocacy structures of FBOs will be assessed in three sections. 
First, the literature on pressure group mobilisation will be examined. Following this, the 
components which make up the political advocacy structures discussed in the literature will 
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be assessed and finally how political advocacy structures adapt to engage with political 
institutions in different political arenas, such as the sub-state level, will be investigated.   
3.2.1.1 Pressure Group Mobilisation 
The literature discusses how political advocacy structures come about by discussing 
pressure group mobilisation to great length. This literature can be divided into three main 
strands; the role of the ‘entrepreneur’, the ‘patron’ and ‘disturbances’. It will be argued that 
the entrepreneur and the patron appear to have greater explanatory value than disturbance 
theory, but that political disturbances also have a role to play in explaining pressure group 
mobilisation. 
According to Salisbury, group mobilisation comes about in connection with the work 
of the ‘entrepreneur’ (organiser/leader): ‘The entrepreneurs/organizers invest in capital to 
create a set of benefits which they offer to a market of potential customers at a price’ 
(Salisbury 1969: 11). The entrepreneur will offer selective benefits to members and in 
exchange, will receive the benefits of being able to lead the pressure group (Salisbury 1969: 
25-31). Salisbury (1969: 15-16) uses Clarke and Wilson’s (1961) definition of incentives 
which includes material, solidary and purposive/expressive benefits. In doing this, Salisbury 
(1969: 16) indicates that individuals join pressure groups for ideological or ‘expressive’ as 
well as material gains.  
Walker on the other hand argues that ‘patrons’ are key in explaining pressure group 
mobilisation because they supply the group’s initial finances and ensure the long term 
survival of the group through funding (Walker 1983: 396-397, 400). Patrons can be 
corporations, government or churches, but are mainly individuals (Nownes and Neeley 
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1996: 130-131). Again, this theory explains how a wide range of pressure groups can be 
mobilised, and connects the concept of entrepreneur and patron together.     
Another cause of pressure group formation, found in the work of Truman (1951: 52-
108), is in the form of disturbances. Truman (1951: 59) theorised that a disturbance might 
change the equilibrium of a group with other elements of society and that this would lead to 
groups mobilising so that a new equilibrium might be reached. However, while he gives 
some examples of disturbances, he does not define the term and hence it is difficult to 
know which external factors might give rise to mobilisation (Berry 1978: 382). Truman’s 
(1951) examples of external factors: business cycles, war and increased government activity, 
also give the impression that his theory is more relevant for understanding economic 
pressure groups (Berry 1978:382). Even so, Truman’s (1951) theory should not be 
disregarded because Nownes and Neeley’s (1996) empirical work has connected the role of 
the entrepreneur and disturbances by demonstrating that pressure group leaders can be 
spurred into action due to particular ‘disturbances’. They also note the role of political 
disturbances in mobilising pressure groups, pointing to political events such as Watergate or 
Roe vs. Wade (Nownes and Neeley 1996: 135). In doing this they underline the importance 
of the entrepreneur, but also emphasise the role of disturbance theory.  
To sum, the entrepreneur and the patron appear to have more explanatory values 
than disturbance theory. Even so, all three theories play a role in explaining the wide range 
of factors that can lead to pressure group mobilisation and hence should be kept in mind 
when studying this phenomenon. 
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3.2.1.2. The components that make-up the political advocacy structure 
The literature also discusses the make-up of the political advocacy structure. Political 
advocacy structures were traditionally understood by distinguishing between the 
sectional/cause distinction which offers a way of understanding the different types of group 
membership (Grant 2000: 18-19). It was argued that the sectional group represents a 
section of society while the cause group represents a cause and has a membership which is 
supportive of the cause (Stewart 1958: 25). However, while the distinction does to a certain 
degree offer an explanation of pressure group membership and aims, it does not offer a 
clear picture of different political advocacy structures. It does not explain the way in which 
group membership, activism, staff and democratic mechanisms relate to produce a pressure 
group’s political advocacy structure.  
It is possible however to come to an understanding of the different ways in which 
pressure groups are structured for the purposes of advocacy from the perspective of the 
literature.  It does not offer an explicit typology of the different political advocacy 
structures, but it offers an insight into the factors that makeup a pressure group’s political 
advocacy structure. These factors include whether an organisation’s political advocacy 
structure is elite driven or democratic, staff or voluntary based and whether, and how, the 
organisation’s political advocacy structure is located across different political arenas. Each of 
these factors is discussed in turn. 
3.2.1.2.1 The Elite Driven / Democratically Driven political advocacy structure 
The literature indicates that pressure groups have differing levels of elite and democratic 
decision making within their political advocacy structures. Some groups ‘favour 
decentralised, informal networks rather than corporate, top-down structures’ (Coxall 2001: 
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143) and hence allow their members an extensive role in decision making. This is illustrated 
in groups such as Friends of the Earth which encourage local groups to undertake 
‘environmental initiatives’ of their own (Coxall 2001: 143). In doing this, Friends of the Earth 
encourages local activism, without its staff members dictating an agenda to its members 
(Coxall 2001: 143). Groups with this political advocacy structure often favour activism and 
democratic participation for ideological reasons (Coxall 2001: 143). At the other end of the 
scale, pressure groups can be entirely elite-run with no role for the membership in the 
decision making process. This is a trend whereby the decision making structure of pressure 
groups have ‘supporters’ rather than members (Jordan and Maloney 2007:33-34). Here, 
supporters contribute to the pressure group financially, but do not shape the group’s 
agenda or take part in group activism. Jordan and Maloney (1997: 190) term this the 
‘protest business’. It was traditionally argued that cause groups were less likely to rely on 
this type of model, utilising membership activism instead (Grant 2000: 18). However, this no 
longer seems to be the case, with cause groups using this model as much as sectional 
groups (Maloney and Jordan 1997:188, Jordan and Maloney 2007:12). For instance, 
Greenpeace has a ‘small core of frontline troops’ with ‘a fee paying mass of non-participant 
supporters’ (Coxall 2001: 143, Grant 2014: 15).  
Finally, some pressure groups are located midway, with their political advocacy 
structures providing a partial decision-making role for members. Here, the pressure group 
takes the position of its members into account and then represents the membership to 
decision makers. For instance, Halpin (2006: 929-930) gives the example of the National 
Farmers’ Union of Scotland which engages with government civil servants on agricultural 
policy, but only lobbies on positions that its membership support and which have been 
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endorsed through democratic means. These groups may use the democratic function within 
their political advocacy structure to signal to government that the organisation is 
representative. Some democratic mechanisms may be used in order for the pressure group 
leadership to ensure that its agenda is endorsed, rather than shaped by the membership 
(Jordan and Maloney 2007: 32). In this case, the group attempts to create and organise as 
large a membership or network of supporters as possible so as to signal representativeness. 
The pressure group literature argues that this is more likely to be done by sectional groups 
which represent a certain section of society rather than a cause group which engages on a 
particular issue (Coxall 2001: 146-147). However, the rationale for this is not clear. A cause 
group could allow some level of democratic participation from its members while entrusting 
the advocacy work to its staff.     
3.2.1.2.2 Staff Based / Voluntary Based political advocacy structure 
Another important aspect of the political advocacy structure discussed in the literature is 
whether organisations utilise volunteers in their political engagement, or utilise a staff 
based political advocacy structure. Some pressure groups have a political advocacy structure 
which empowers the membership. In order to achieve this, many groups seek out an active 
membership rather than a mass membership (Coxall 2001: 147). Where member activism 
can be utilised as a resource, such resources can be used in a number of different ways from 
writing letters to decision makers, to demonstrating and leafleting and by engaging in direct 
action (Coxall 2001: 147). Membership participation can also enrich group activity through 
offering specialist skills, local knowledge and particular expertise (Coxall 2001: 147). Coxall 
(2001: 143) argues that while this political advocacy structure can often lead to 
‘disorganisation’, it also ensures that members’ energies are unleashed on behalf of the 
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issue at hand. If a pressure group does not utilise membership in its activism it is likely to 
place greater importance upon leadership and professional staff within its political advocacy 
structure. In this context, the staff will have a greater level of control over the organisation’s 
agenda (Jordan and Maloney 2007: 175). According to Grant (2014: 15), pressure groups are 
utilising professional staff members over volunteer activism more and more. Diani and 
Donati (1999) also note, in the case of environmental pressure groups, that groups move 
away from the voluntary activist based political advocacy structure to the professional staff 
based political advocacy structure over time.  
3.2.1.2.3 Centralised / Devolved political advocacy structure 
The final factor regarding the make-up of political advocacy structures of pressure groups 
discussed in the literature is how a pressure group’s political advocacy structure is located 
across different political arenas. The multi-level governance literature asserts that pressure 
groups will adapt their political advocacy structures in order to engage in a range of arenas. 
This is evidenced in the way that pressure groups have extended their political advocacy 
beyond the domestic sphere in response to European integration (Eising 2004: 224). 
Pressure groups which are well established and which have large internal resources are able 
to choose different access points easily (Coen 2007: 337) as they ‘venue shop’ between the 
different levels of governance, looking for the access point where they will receive the most 
favourable hearing (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 35). If a pressure group is dissatisfied with 
the way in which its issue has been received on the domestic level, it can seek a hearing on 
the European level or vice versa (as discussed by Princen and Kerremans 2008: 1138). Some 
groups simply engage at the domestic level, other groups only engage at the European level, 
while multi-level groups engage at both (Eising 2004: 225).  
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The literature also notes that pressure groups adapt to the sub-state level, leading to 
a range of organisations engaging in this political arena.  While the next sub-section will 
assess how this adaptation comes about, the extent to which a pressure group’s political 
advocacy structure is wholly autonomous at the sub-state level, the central level or is 
divided between arenas is discussed here. Keating et al (2009) categorise four main types of 
pressure groups at the sub-state level in the UK. These include ‘purely territorial 
organisations’ which are located at the sub-state level and have full autonomy over their 
political engagement. Then there are territorial organisations with an affiliation to 
UK/British groups. These groups are autonomous in their political engagement at the sub-
state level, but have some affiliation to a group at the central level. Then there are 
territorial branches of UK/British organisations. In this context, the pressure group is already 
engaging at the national level, but sets up a branch office at the sub-state level, devolving 
autonomy from the centre to the region. Finally, there are purely British/UK groups which 
are wholly based at the national level, but still engage at the sub-state level in some 
capacity 
Keating et al’s (2009) categorisation is insightful, but it is important to remember 
that political advocacy structures may be more flexible than the categorisation suggests. 
Some organisations may only have autonomy to engage with devolved issues, or only some 
devolved issues, while other organisations might be affiliated to an organisation at the 
central level while taking a distinct position on devolved and non-devolved issues. Likewise, 
it may have only one member of staff based at the sub-state level, creating only a partial 
territorial branch. Furthermore, some UK organisations may second staff to the sub-state 
level for a period of time to work on a particular piece of legislation, with the member of 
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staff returning to the central level once the legislation has been withdrawn or enacted. Even 
so, Keating et al’s (2009) categorisation provides a useful template for understanding an 
important component of the political advocacy structures of pressure groups.     
The discussion above outlines the range of factors which make up the political 
advocacy structures of pressure groups. Key issues which derive from the above discussion 
include whether pressure groups have democratic or elite led political advocacy structures, 
whether the pressure group’s political advocacy is staff or voluntary based and whether the 
pressure group’s autonomy is at the sub-state level, the central level or is divided across 
these arenas. 
3.2.1.3 Rescaling interest representation 
The pressure group theory literature also discusses how groups adapt their political 
advocacy structures to engage in different political arenas. For instance, pressure groups 
can adapt structurally to the sub-state level, and in some circumstances, to echo Nownes 
and Neeley (1996), the devolution of power from the centre to the sub-state level could be 
the ‘disturbance’ which leads to this adaptation. Keating (2013: 118) notes that this can lead 
to several possible outcomes. Either pressure groups do not adapt structurally and their 
interest articulation and mediation remain at the national level, or ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ happens, by which the pressure groups ‘assume the same territorial form as 
government, with their internal division of responsibilities matching it’.  
Keating (2013: 119) also underlines a number of forces which drive adaptation. 
These include institutional drivers, whereby a strong regional government with broad 
regulatory, policy and spending powers ‘define the relevant territory in a more constraining 
way, enclosing it strongly and inducing groups to follow suit’. It is likely that these factors 
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will affect most pressure groups, as the more powerful a sub-state government becomes, 
the less the pressure group will feel the need to venue shop in other arenas. It might also 
indicate that a pressure group will adapt to the sub-state level to a greater extent the 
stronger a sub-state government becomes over time. Keating’s (2013: 119) second driver of 
adaptation is economic, noting that strong economic regions are likely to attract pressure 
groups to the region. Keating’s (2013: 119-120) third driver is ‘identitarian’ factors, whereby 
members of the groups ‘have an affective attachment to the region and the groups have 
decentralist tradition and philosophy’. Keating (2013: 120) also notes that pressure groups 
which do not have this type of connection to the sub-state level might have to respect the 
territorial level if the government associates itself with a territorial identity. It is likely that 
cause groups may find themselves particularly susceptible to identity factors, with pressure 
groups with more nationalist roots finding themselves drawn more naturally towards the 
region than groups which have political leanings more in line with the centre.  The final 
driver is party political, as pressure groups may shift arenas in order to engage with a more 
favourable government. However, Keating (2013: 120) also suggests that ‘path dependency’ 
could also pay a role, with some groups’ adaptation influenced by their local or central 
origins.  
This analysis provides a clear framework for understanding pressure group 
adaptation, but it is important to remember that the process of pressure groups adapting to 
a disturbance such as political devolution is not wholly predictable. Some pressure groups 
might adapt immediately, but structural change will come about over time for other 
organisations. Keating et al’s (2009) work indicates that many pressure groups will adapt 
structurally in response to devolution, while others will not. It is also important to bear in 
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mind that this adaptation can manifest itself in many forms, with some pressure groups 
taking longer than others to adapt their structures. Territorial pressure groups will not 
change their structure so much as their capacity in response to the devolution of power. A 
territorial organisation, already located at the sub-state level could increase its capacity to 
engage by creating new structures and committees and/or appointing members of staff or 
mobilise greater support at the sub-state level in response to political devolution. Keating’s 
(2013) drivers of adaptation further underscore the variety of reasons for this adaptation, 
which further indicates the many varied forms of adaptation. 
3.2.2 Strategy 
This section assesses pressure group strategy. This includes an analysis of the 
insider/outsider distinction and the literature regarding coalition formation.  
3.2.2.1 The insider/outsider distinction  
It was traditionally argued that the sectional/cause distinction could explain pressure group 
strategy. Finer (see Grant 1978: 1) argued that as a rule, sectional groups would first contact 
the executive, then the legislature, then political parties and finally public opinion while the 
cause group’s strategy would be the opposite. Some scholars argue that cause groups are 
more likely to rely on outsider strategies (Walker 1991: 117-119, Binderkrantz 2005: 711), 
but this cannot be regarded a firm rule. For instance, a cause group such as Greenpeace is 
often consulted by government, but does not shy away from influencing public opinion 
through protest (Grant 2000: 31).  
Because of Grant’s (1978: 1) dissatisfaction with the sectional/cause distinction’s 
ability to explain pressure group behaviour, he developed the insider/outsider distinction. 
The distinction has become widely used, but has also been criticised and enhanced. This 
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section shows that the insider/outsider distinction effectively explains how pressure groups 
behave, with some pressure groups utilising a more direct strategy, with others taking a 
more indirect strategy. However, it will be argued that Grant’s (1978: 4-7) original 
distinction is too binary a categorisation and that Maloney et al’s (1994: 30) development of 
the distinction offers a more nuanced explanation of pressure group behaviour.  
According to Grant (2000: 19), insider groups are regarded as legitimate by 
government and are consulted on a regular basis while outsider groups either do not wish 
to be involved in government consultation or are unable to gain official recognition. Grant’s 
(1978: 4-7) typology of insider and outsider groups is broken down into sub-categories 
which explain the different ways in which groups engage as insiders and outsiders: 
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Figure 4: Grant’s (1978) insider/outsider distinction 
(Grant 1978:4-7)  
 
Grant (1995: 20) notes that a group might be a prisoner insider due to the fact that it 
is funded by government and hence cannot legitimately challenge it. Grant’s (1978: 4) ‘low 
profile’ insider consults government and works behind the scenes while the ‘high profile’ 
insider might cultivate public opinion to supplement their engagement with the executive. 
The outsider category breaks down into the ‘potential insider’, ‘outsider by necessity’ and 
the ‘outsider by ideology’. This distinction outlines the different strategies which pressure 
groups might adopt as well as the government-group relationship. 
The insider/outsider distinction offers an insight into group strategy, but it also has 
its limitations. The main criticism of the distinction has been initiated by Maloney et al 
(1994: 30) who argue that it is a confusing typology because it conflates the strategy which 
the group chooses with the status it receives from decision makers. Maloney et al (1994: 28) 
argue that being a ‘prisoner group’ is not a choice of strategy but instead is a status that 
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may be bestowed upon it. The ‘high’ and ‘low profile’ category on the other hand is 
suggestive of a choice of strategy. The groups choose either a behind the scenes strategy or 
a more public role to complement engagement with government (Maloney et al 1994: 28). 
Maloney et al (1994: 30) have asserted the need to separate strategy from status and have 
developed a typology which achieves this. It includes the ‘insider group’, the ‘outsider 
group’ and the ‘thresholder group’. Including the thresholder group3 recognises the way 
that some groups oscillate between both the insider and outsider strategies (Maloney et al 
1994: 28). 
The thresholder category is important as further empirical research (Binderkrantz 
2005: 704) has shown that groups often compliment insider strategies with responsible 
outsider strategies by ‘navigating between direct interaction with decision makers and 
indirect methods like media campaigns and member mobilisation’ (Binderkrantz 2005: 711). 
For instance, an organisation might utilise an outsider strategy so as to ‘place an issue on 
the agenda’ (Binderkrantz 2005: 703). Groups may combine strategies, using outsider 
strategies, and simultaneously approach decision makers directly (Binderkrantz 2005: 703). 
For instance, organisations might utilise an outsider strategy through the media in highly 
politicised policy areas (Binderkrantz 2005: 706-707). There is also evidence that different 
strategies are used at different times in different political arenas (Dudley and Richardson 
1998: 746-747).  
Maloney et al (1994: 30) have elaborated a separate typology for group status which 
recognises the role of government in offering access to pressure groups:  
                                                     
3
 The concept of the ‘thresholder group’ was first developed by May and Nugent (1982). 
86 | P a g e  
 
Figure 5: Maloney et al’s (1994) insider/outsider distinction 
(Maloney et al 1994: 30)  
 
The typology includes the ‘core insider’ and ‘specialist insider’ which have a 
privileged relationship with government, and the ‘peripheral insider’. It is unclear as to 
exactly the difference between the core and specialist insider status, however it would 
appear that it is to do with whether a group is given insider status in a more specialised area 
of policy (specialist) or in wider policy areas (core) (Maloney et al 1994: 30-32). 
Nevertheless, they are both privileged in comparison to the ‘peripheral insider’ which has 
insider status but in reality is only engaged in ‘cosmetic consultation’ (Maloney et al 1994: 
32). This development is important, because it overcomes the accusation of scholars such as 
Page (1999: 210), that the insider/outsider distinction lacks explanatory power because the 
majority of groups utilise an insider strategy. Maloney et al’s (1994: 30) distinction outlines 
that while this might be the case, individual insider groups are perceived differently by 
decision makers, and hence the distinction, which includes status as well as strategy, has the 
ability to show that the way in which pressure groups are received by government 
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influences their behaviour. The outsider typology includes outsider groups by ‘goal or 
ideology’ which cannot be offered insider status because its issue is incompatible with the 
decision makers’ ideology, and the outsider by ‘choice’ which fundamentally disagrees with 
government-group insider relationships. 
As noted by the work of Gillan (2008) discussed in Chapter 2, utilising a typology that 
distinguishes between strategy and status enriches an understanding of group engagement 
by offering a wider view of the policy process. Such a typology highlights the strategy that 
groups pursue as well as the role that the government plays by offering privileged access 
and status to certain groups and denying it to others. According to Maloney et al (1994: 29), 
a group receives specialist or core insider status if it possesses resources decision makers 
desire. According to Maloney et al (1994: 36), the group-government relationship is 
‘exchange based’. Binderkrantz concurs with this and distinguishes between internal 
resources and ‘specific resources’ desired by decision makers. She notes: ‘General resources 
such as members, financial resources and staff are important, but in addition, some groups 
control more specific resources valued by decision makers’ such as ‘specialized knowledge 
of value’ (2005: 697). Maloney et al (1994: 29) give more detail on the role of resources, 
noting that ‘economic power, knowledge (normally technical expertise), representative 
base, implementation power, compliance power’ are important in the exchange based 
relationship. Organisations must also be able to bargain with decision makers and hence 
must be prepared for a level of compromise (Maloney et al 1994: 37). By taking Maloney et 
al’s (1994: 30) distinction into account, a clearer picture of pressure group engagement with 
government is presented which provides a stronger basis on which to analyse the realities of 
pressure group politics. 
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3.2.2.2 Coalition Formation 
The insider/outsider distinction explains the type of strategy a group engages in and the way 
it is received by decision makers. How pressure groups build coalitions and utilise them as 
part of these wider strategies is now investigated. Some scholars argue that it is in a 
pressure group’s interests to work alone (Browne 1990), but many groups choose coalition 
as a strategy. Some coalitions are made up of similar groups while ‘strange bedfellow’ 
coalitions bring groups together, which would otherwise be at odds (Scholzman and Tierney 
1986: 49). This section analyses the main factors which lead to coalition formation.  
Coalitions are not without their financial costs, but they allow pressure groups to 
share internal resources (Mahoney 2007: 368) and can be particularly valuable for 
organisations looking for a ‘low cost’ strategy (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004: 2). 
Furthermore, Whitford (2003:45) notes that coalitions are a good opportunity for minority 
interests to ‘build more powerful blocks’. Even so, Mahoney’s (2007: 378-379) empirical 
research on the USA and EU political systems has found that resource rich groups are more 
likely than resource poor organisations to form coalitions. Hula notes that the incentives can 
be both financial and purposive (1999: 23). A pressure group might join a coalition because 
it believes it can lead to a desired policy outcome (Hula 1999: 25-26). Other factors include 
information sharing (Pijenburg 1998: 306-307) and a group without core or specialist insider 
status benefitting from an organisation with a more favourable status (Pijneburg 1998: 310 
and Mahoney 2007: 369). Empirical research suggests that pressure groups are more likely 
to join coalitions if powerful pressure groups are already members (Hojnacki 1997: 83). 
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Other scholars argue that ‘issue-context’ is the driving factor in coalition building. 
Because some scholars have argued that groups are likely to pursue issue ‘niches’ which 
allow them to differentiate themselves from other groups (Browne 1990: 491), the 
argument has followed that pressure groups are likely to choose coalition as a strategy in 
‘instances where there is a greater need than usual to signal to leaders the breadth of 
support for a position and a greater need to pool resources’ (Mahoney 2007: 370). This has 
led scholars to argue that both issue saliency and opposition to an issue can lead to coalition 
building. However, the literature suggests that context is important, with some scholars 
finding opposition as a key factor leading to coalition building, with others finding little 
correlation in this area. Both Mahoney and Baumgartner’s (2004: 18) study of pressure 
groups in Washington and Mahoney’s (2007: 381) study of groups in the US and the EU have 
argued that pressure groups tend to form coalitions on salient issues. The question of 
whether strong opposition to a cause leads to coalition building is more contested however. 
Mahoney’s (2007: 378) study of pressure groups in the US and the EU finds that issue 
conflict leads to coalition building, and Heinz et al (1993: 358) find that the degree of 
conflict and stability and the use of coalitions are positively related. However, Webster’s 
(2000: 18) study of environmental pressure groups in the EU and Mahoney and 
Baumgartner’s (2004: 17-18) study of Washington pressure groups do not find a correlation. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence indicates that a strong opposition can in some contexts 
lead to coalition building, but does not in other contexts. As a result of this, it is important to 
examine the role of conflict when examining the causes of coalition in different contexts 
without assuming that it drives or reduces coalition activity. Issue saliency appears to lead 
to coalition, but the jury is out on the influence of conflict and opposition.     
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As noted above, the context in which pressure groups engage can influence whether 
they build coalitions. Therefore, it is likely that institutional factors also play a role in the 
creation of this context. Mahoney (2007: 368) states that the legislatives and executives 
which pressure groups are attempting to influence can have an effect on the group’s 
likelihood to form a coalition. Mahoney (2007: 375-77) argues that pressure groups are 
more likely to form coalitions when lobbying in Washington than the European Commission 
because decision makers in Washington are careful to ensure that policy decisions do not 
lead to a loss of votes. However, Webster’s (2000: 9) research on environmental pressure 
groups in the EU suggests that closed institutions, like the Commission, can indirectly 
encourage pressure groups to form coalitions, as the lack of transparency in the Commission 
‘stimulated’ the groups to begin talking to one another (Webster 2000: 19). It is not possible 
to create a firm rule therefore, but there seems to be evidence that institutions can shape 
coalition formation.  It is important to assess the role of institutional factors in different 
contexts, and to be aware that both representative and non-representative contexts are 
both ripe for coalition formation. 
Overall, there is a larger consensus in the literature regarding the role of 
organisational influences and saliency in leading to coalition formation. As regards to the 
role of conflict and opposition, there is less consensus. It is likely that opposition to an issue 
and the type of institution a pressure group is engaging with also leads to coalition building 
in some contexts. In light of these findings, each factor is worthy of investigation in an 
empirical study of pressure group strategy. 
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3.2.3 Effectiveness. 
Building on the discussion of the political advocacy structure and strategy of pressure 
groups, this section assesses the extent to which pressure group theory can offer a way of 
analysing pressure group effectiveness. Both Whiteley and Winyard (1987: 114) and Grant 
(2000: 195) offer typologies that attempt to understand pressure group effectiveness. 
Whiteley and Winyard’s (1987: 125-131) typology  is based upon what pressure group 
respondents and civil servants, interviewed by the authors, believe make a pressure group 
effective (1987: 111). The typology is split into three sections, and includes the environment 
in which the group engages, group strategy and group resources.4 Grant’s (2000: 195-206) 
typology includes resources,5 external factors and the ‘proximate environment of groups 
and the domains they seek to organise’. Likewise, Rose (1974: 254-255) notes the role of 
cultural values, arguing that a pressure group’s agenda which coincides with the ‘cultural 
norms’ of society is much more likely to be effective. These factors are important to 
understanding effectiveness, but the typologies do not present a framework for measuring 
effectiveness. 
However, Steven (2003) goes a step further and develops a measurement by which 
this picture can be built. As noted in Chapter 2, Steven (2003: 45) measures effectiveness by 
asking whether the group was consulted by government, whether the group spoke out 
consistently and clearly on the issue and whether the group achieved its ultimate objective 
concerning the issue. Steven (2003: 7) is careful to note that he is not attempting to 
measure ‘political influence precisely’, as much as present an ‘overall picture’ of a pressure 
                                                     
4
 Whiteley and Winyard (1987: 131-135) note that the use of the term resources is not referring to financial 
resources but membership, attractiveness of the cause, research capabilities and information, ability to co-
operate.    
5
 This includes a combination of internal resources such as financial, staffing and membership as well as 
sanctioning capability and choices of strategy. 
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group’s effectiveness.  This is an important contribution, because it provides a way of 
decisively measuring pressure group effectiveness, allowing for a more in-depth study. 
As noted in Chapter 2, despite being an important contribution, the measurement is 
not without its weaknesses. Firstly, it only evaluates strategy, without assessing whether the 
political advocacy structure is appropriate for the political system in which the pressure 
group engages. Secondly, it is unclear to what extent an objective must be met in order to 
be a success. Thirdly, Steven’s (2003: 45) measurement also fails to take into account the 
way in which decision makers receive pressure groups. The importance of distinguishing 
between the strategy which a pressure group selects and the status that is conferred upon it 
was discussed previously in the chapter in light of Maloney et al’s (1994) research. It is 
important that this is reflected not only in an analysis of strategy, but also when analysing 
effectiveness. Including both sides in a measurement of effectiveness can greatly enrich the 
picture being built. 
As noted in Chapter 2, in addition to examining the strategy pursued and the status 
bestowed on the pressure group by decision makers, it is also important that the 
measurement incorporates a nuanced understanding of influence. On this basis, any 
question regarding a group’s ‘outcome’ can be answered in a broad sense. There is a 
consensus within the literature that a precise measurement of influence is difficult, but it is 
still important to have a nuanced understanding of influence when attempting to apply a 
measurement of effectiveness to pressure group engagement. As discussed in Chapter 2, a 
continuum of influence, such as Mackay et al’s (2005: 10) identifies influence as ‘recognition 
of a legitimate voice, provoking reconsideration of the way others think, changes in the 
terms of public debate, and concrete changes in policy outcomes’. Keeping in mind this 
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broad understanding of influence can aid in ensuring a nuanced reading of pressure group 
effectiveness when applying a measurement of the effectiveness of their engagement. 
Likewise, a pressure group might not always succeed in opposing a bill in its entirety, but 
might succeed in influencing part of a bill.  Consequently, this may not be the initial desired 
outcome, but it does not mean the pressure group should be regarded as ineffectual in its 
engagement. 
In summary, Steven’s measurement of effectiveness provides a framework for 
analysing FBO effectiveness, which attempts to present a picture of effectiveness rather 
than directly measuring influence. While it has its weaknesses, a developed measurement 
could offer a suitable way in which to analyse FBO effectiveness.    
3.3: Utilising the theoretical tools for the study of FBO engagement 
at the sub-state level in the UK 
Now that the pressure group theory literature has been critically assessed, this final section 
discusses the utility of the theoretical tools analysed in section 2 for examining FBO 
engagement in Wales and Northern Ireland. In doing this, the section draws together the 
tools to be utilised for the empirical study in Chapters 5 and 6.  
The theory of pressure group mobilisation is important for the study of FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level in Wales and Northern Ireland. While many scholars 
argue that Truman’s disturbance theory has less explanatory value than Salisbury’s (1969) 
theory of the ‘entrepreneur’ and Walker’s (1983) theory of the ‘patron’ it could have some 
explanatory value in the context of FBOs at the sub-state level in the UK. Devolution may 
have had the impact of a ‘political disturbance’, with FBOs mobilising in response to it. The 
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literature discussed in Chapter 2 intimated that organisations such as the MCW, and other 
non-Christian FBOs, only mobilised after 1999 (see Chambers and Thompson 2005b: 345, 
Chambers 2015: 217). The ‘political disturbance’ could therefore be significant to a full 
understanding. Likewise, the importance of leaders and elders within faith communities 
(Dinham 2009: 180-181) could mean the concept of the ‘entrepreneur’ is also valuable for 
the study of FBO mobilisation. 
The different components which shape the political advocacy structures of pressure 
groups are also significant for understanding the political advocacy structures adopted by 
FBOs for engaging with the devolved political institutions in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Keating et al’s (2009) categorisation of how autonomy within the political advocacy 
structures of pressure groups can be located across different political arenas could be 
particularly salient for this political context. Utilising Keating et al’s (2009) categorisation of 
pressure groups at the sub-state level in Wales and Northern Ireland enables the thesis to 
identify where the FBO’s autonomy lies, providing a fuller picture of the FBO’s political 
advocacy structure. However, an important element which is missing from Keating et al’s 
(2009) categorisation, which must be evaluated in this thesis, is that not all organisations in 
Northern Ireland necessarily look to the UK as the central state level, but might instead look 
to the Republic of Ireland in this respect. For instance, Keating et al (2009: 11) refer to trade 
unions being divided between ‘UK and all-Ireland bodies’ and hence it is important that 
Ireland is included alongside the UK/Britain as a central state/national level.  
Keating’s (2013) theory of rescaling interest representation is also particularly useful 
in the case of Wales and Northern Ireland. Both the explanation of how FBOs adapt, and the 
drivers which lead to their adaptation, are useful tools for understanding whether FBOs 
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have adapted their political advocacy structures to engage with the devolved political 
institutions, or whether they have remained at the central level. However, it is important to 
remember that many FBOs at the sub-state level were territorially based prior to political 
devolution in 1998/9, and will not have adapted their structures from the central level in 
response to devolution. For instance, the literature on FBO engagement pre 1998/9 noted 
that a number of FBOs in Wales and Northern Ireland were active in the region (Hughes 
1999, McGrath 2000, Davies 2008, Mitchell 2011, Brewer et al 2011). Territorial 
organisations will not experience structural adaptation in the same way as organisations 
devolving autonomy from the central state to the sub-state level, but it is possible that they 
may increase their staff capacity to engage with the devolved political institutions. This 
change in capacity could be as fundamental as the concept of ‘institutional isomorphism’, 
whereby pressure groups adapt their political advocacy structures so as to engage with the 
devolved institutions, in demonstrating how pressure groups adapt to the sub-state level, 
and are therefore significant theoretical concepts for this research. This also underlines how 
important it is to remember that Wales and Northern Ireland have their own experience of 
devolution prior to the establishment of the devolved assemblies when examining how the 
political advocacy structures of FBOs have adapted since 1998/9. 
The insider/outsider distinction also has utility for analysing FBO strategy at the sub-
state level. Maloney’s (1994) insider/outsider distinction is potentially more suitable for 
analysing FBO strategy at the sub-state level than Grant’s (2000) distinction. Page (1999: 
210) has argued that a large number of organisations in the UK receive insider status, and 
we might expect the level of insider access to be even wider in Wales and Northern Ireland 
due to the specific context of devolution to the regions. As noted in Chapter 1, the devolved 
96 | P a g e  
 
political systems were designed to be open and transparent, encouraging the engagement 
of third sector organisations (see McAllister 2000, Chaney and Fevre 2001, McEvoy 2006a, 
Cairney and McGarvey 2013: 11-12). Furthermore, Cairney (2008: 361) has noted an open, 
‘Welsh way’ of consultation while Chaney (2011: 263-264, 268) has referred to the apparent 
emphasis on partnership working and consultation in both Wales and Northern Ireland. A 
theoretical tool which provides a way of distinguishing between different types of insiders is 
therefore important. Maloney et al’s (1994) distinction provides the tools which allow this 
research to dissect the different types of insiders, and to distinguish between insiders on the 
periphery, and those with real access to decision makers and policy decisions. In this 
respect, Maloney et al (1994) present an appropriate framework for analysing FBO strategy, 
which is potentially well suited for the study of FBO engagement at the sub-state level in 
Wales and Northern Ireland.  
The theoretical literature also presents a way in which coalitions can be analysed and 
the role of FBOs within these coalitions can be explained. This is important for this thesis in 
light of the examples of FBOs working together noted in the literature review (McGrath 
2000, Brewer et al 2011) prior to 1998/9. Similarly, utilising a developed version of Steven’s 
(2003) measurement of effectiveness, with MacKay et al’s continuum of influence, will also 
allow this study to go beyond the literature that currently exist on Wales and Northern 
Ireland, providing a more in-depth study of FBO effectiveness. In summary, each of the tools 
analysed in section 2 provide a way of studying FBO engagement at the sub-state level in 
Wales and Northern Ireland, with each utilised in Chapters 5 and 6.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter has justified and defined the use of the term pressure group and has presented 
a case as to why FBOs should be conceptualised as pressure groups in this thesis. The 
chapter also critically assessed pressure group theory and examined its utility as a 
theoretical framework for researching FBO engagement at the sub-state level. It argues that 
each of the theoretical concepts discussed in section 2 are relevant for this thesis’ study. As 
a theoretical framework for the thesis has been established, the next chapter presents the 
thesis’ research design and methodology.  
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 drew attention to the lack of detailed study of Wales and Northern Ireland in the 
literature on faith-based organisation (FBO) engagement at the sub-state level in the UK. 
This drew attention to the potential to develop an in-depth comparative study of FBO 
engagement in Wales and Northern Ireland. Drawing on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
and the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, this chapter outlines the research 
design of the thesis and the methodology used to carry out the empirical research in Wales 
and Northern Ireland discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis. First, the secondary 
research questions are presented. Secondly, the dependent and independent variables 
derived from the theoretical framework are used to develop testable hypotheses. Following 
this, the chapter justifies two case studies, Wales and Northern Ireland and outlines the 
selection of FBOs examined in detail in each case. The second section presents the case 
study strategy, including the policy areas selected for study and the method of data 
collection and analysis. The section concludes by discussing the issues of bias, reliability, and 
the generalizability of the research.  
4.1 Research Design. 
This section presents the secondary research questions, variables and hypotheses which are 
utilised in the second half of the thesis for studying FBO political engagement at the sub-
state level in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
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4.1.1 The Secondary Research Questions 
Chapter 1 pointed to the scant attention given to the sub-state level in the literature on FBO 
political engagement and Chapter 2 noted that the only in-depth studies of FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level focus on Scotland. On this basis it was argued that FBO 
political engagement at the sub-state level in the UK was under-studied, and that a 
systematic study of FBO engagement in Wales and Northern Ireland was required. In light of 
this, this thesis’ central research question asks: 
‘In what ways have faith-based organisations engaged with devolved political institutions at 
the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
The central research question presents a way for the thesis to consider how a range of 
FBOs, representative and socio-political as well as Christian and non-Christian, have engaged 
with the devolved political institutions at the sub-state level in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The research question enables the thesis to examine both the activity of the FBOs and how 
the devolved institutions have responded and engaged with the FBOs, providing a picture of 
how they have interacted with one another. It also permits the study to consider whether 
FBOs are active at the sub-state level, how they go about engaging and whether they have 
succeeded in influencing the decision making process. In order to explore the central 
research question in detail, three secondary research questions are developed using the 
three main strands of pressure group theory, discussed in Chapter 3; political advocacy 
structure, strategy and effectiveness. 
The first secondary research question asks: 
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‘What type of political advocacy structures have faith-based organisations adopted to 
engage with political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
This secondary research question provides a way of analysing the political advocacy 
structures adopted by FBOs and whether FBOs have adapted their political advocacy 
structures in response to political devolution. Chapter 2 illustrated that some discussion has 
taken place of FBOs developing their political advocacy structures in response to political 
devolution, though this has not been analysed in a detailed manner. When assessing which 
political advocacy structure a FBO has adopted the thesis will consider the factors identified 
in Chapter 3 which includes whether the political advocacy structure is elite or 
democratically driven, staff or voluntary based and whether the organisation’s political 
advocacy structure is located across different political arenas. Utilising the mobilisation 
literature and Keating’s (2013) theory of rescaling interest representation, it is also possible 
to analyse whether FBO political advocacy structures have adapted in response to political 
devolution and if so, the extent to which they have done so. This can include adaptation 
from the central level to the sub-state level, or territorial adaptation whereby FBOs already 
active at the sub-state level might increase their capacity or change their internal political 
advocacy structures to engage with the devolved political institutions. This research 
question enables this thesis to assess whether FBO capacity differs between Wales and 
Northern Ireland in the context of different constitutional arrangements and any changes in 
political advocacy structures as constitutional arrangements evolve.  Understanding the 
political advocacy structures of the FBOs, and analysing their appropriateness for engaging 
at the sub-state level contributes to building a picture of FBO effectiveness. 
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The second secondary research question is associated with the theoretical literature 
on pressure group strategy, asking: 
‘What type of strategies have faith-based organisations adopted to engage with the political 
institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
This secondary research question enables the thesis to study the strategies utilised 
by FBOs and the status conferred upon FBOs by the devolved institutions.  As noted in 
Chapter 2 and 3, utilising Maloney et al’s (1994) insider/outsider distinction enables a 
detailed response to the secondary research question because it highlights both the 
strategy pursued by FBOs and the status bestowed upon them. Separating strategy and 
status in this way ensures a much fuller picture of FBO engagement at the sub-state level. 
Likewise, the coalition formation literature will further aid in explaining FBO strategy by 
demonstrating whether FBOs jointly develop strategies together and/or with secular 
organisations with a similar agenda. Comparing the strategies pursued and the status 
conferred upon FBOs by the devolved institutions in Wales and Northern Ireland can also 
provide some indication of how religion and FBOs are received in the different regions, 
including the extent to which FBOs receive access to the decision making process. The 
findings from this secondary research question also contribute to building a picture of FBO 
effectiveness. 
The final secondary research question builds upon questions regarding FBO structure 
and strategy in order to ask: 
‘Are faith-based organisations at the sub-state level in the UK well placed to act as effective 
pressure groups in the decision making process?’ 
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Drawing on the discussion in chapters 2 and 3, the criterion of effectiveness utilised in this 
thesis is as follows:  
1. Has the FBO developed its political advocacy structure effectively for engaging with 
the devolved political institutions? 
2. Has the FBO been fully consulted by decision makers?  
3. Are the FBO’s policy positions coherent? 
4. If the FBO pursues an insider strategy, has it received peripheral, core or specialist 
insider status? 
5. Has the FBO met its objectives? 
Chapter 3 demonstrated that Steven’s (2003: 45) measurement offers a way to build a 
picture of FBO effectiveness. However, limitations to the measurement were also noted, 
and hence the above criterion incorporates two extra questions. It includes questions on 
political advocacy structure and the status bestowed upon FBOs by decision makers. These 
extra questions ensure that the measurement includes whether the political advocacy 
structure of the FBO is suitable for the context in which it is engaging, and takes into 
account that selecting an insider strategy does not necessarily mean the organisation 
receives the access or attention which it needs to act as an effective pressure group. 
Another adaptation made is to the question regarding whether a FBO has met its objective. 
The question is examined in light of Mackay et al’s (2005: 10) continuum, which understands 
influence as: ‘recognition of a legitimate voice, provoking reconsideration of the way others 
think, changes in terms of the public debate, and concrete changes in policy outcomes’. In 
light of this, objectives met can be understood in a wider sense than simply changes in 
policy outcomes. 
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With this adapted criterion of effectiveness, the secondary research question asks 
whether the FBO is well placed to act as an effective pressure group, rather than whether 
the FBO directly influences policy. Rather than identifying influence directly, this research 
question asks whether the FBO’s structure, strategy and status positions it in a way where it 
is likely to be effective. This allows the thesis to examine FBO structures and strategies and 
then assess whether they are appropriate for the context in which the FBO is engaging, 
providing a picture of FBO effectiveness.  
4.1.2 Variables 
Dependent and independent variables have been selected to build testable hypotheses. The 
table indicates which independent variables are expected to affect which dependent 
variable.    
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Figure 6: Dependent and independent variables 
 
The dependent variables selected are based upon the secondary research questions, 
which are grounded in the theoretical literature. The project’s dependent variables are 
‘political advocacy structure’ and ‘strategy’. The political advocacy structures and strategies 
utilised by FBOs can, in tandem with an examination of pressure group effectiveness, 
illustrate how FBOs have engaged with the devolved political institutions. The data collected 
on FBO political advocacy structure and strategy can also contribute to evaluating FBO 
effectiveness. 
The first independent variable, ‘sub-state autonomy’, relates to the claim made in 
Keating’s (2013:121) work that suggests the greater the levels of devolved autonomy the 
more likely a pressure group is to adapt. Consequently, the level of devolved autonomy in 
the region under study is likely to affect the political advocacy structures and strategies of 
the FBOs.  
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The second variable relates to Maloney et al’s (1994: 36) argument that specific 
resources influence the strategy pursued by the pressure group and the way in which it is 
received by decision makers. In light of this, the variable examines the effect a FBO’s roots 
within society can have on its strategy and political advocacy structure. It is likely that strong 
roots in society provide FBOs with a range of specific resources which will influence its 
choice of strategy and the way in which it is perceived by government. Resources here refer 
not only to financial resources, but to the resources noted by Maloney et al (1994: 36) in the 
theoretical literature: ‘knowledge, technical advice or expertise, membership compliance or 
consent, credibility and information and implementation’. These are likely to be more 
associated with well rooted organisations because they have been formed for a longer 
period of time; they are likely to have cultural and social recognition and credibility 
throughout wider society, and the elites within these organisations may have stronger 
contacts amongst political elites. The third variable relates to the argument in the 
theoretical literature (Maloney et al 1994: 23, Rose 1974) that the palatability of a pressure 
group’s agenda influences the strategy it pursues. While ‘ideology’ and ‘theology’ do not 
have the same meaning, theology has been used to signify the place from where a FBO’s 
agenda derives, similarly to how the ideology of a pressure group influences its agenda. 
4.1.3 Hypotheses 
The variables have framed the basis for hypotheses which can be used to understand how 
the independent variables influence the dependent variables. Hypotheses 1-4 are based on 
the ‘sub-state autonomy’ variable with hypotheses 5-7 and 10 based on the ‘roots within 
society’ variable, and hypotheses 8, 9 and 11 based on the ‘theological orientation’ variable.   
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H1: ‘As the devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
higher the levels of capacity within the political advocacy structures of FBOs’. 
H2: ‘Regions with greater levels of sub-state autonomy will have FBOs with a greater 
capacity in their political advocacy structures’. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 are based on the ‘sub-state autonomy’ variable and connect to 
secondary research question 1. Keating (2013: 19) suggests that pressure groups can, in 
response to political devolution, ‘assume the same territorial form as government, with 
their internal division of responsibilities matching it’. This can manifest itself in a number of 
ways. The political advocacy structure of an organisation could change, if for instance it 
created a branch at the sub-state level. A territorial organisation already located at the sub-
state level could increase its capacity to engage by creating new structures and committees 
and/or appointing members of staff or mobilising greater support at the sub-state level in 
response to political devolution. In light of this, we would expect to see FBOs increase their 
level of capacity as the powers devolved become more extensive and entrenched (H1). 
Keating (2013: 19) also notes that stronger governments ‘define the relevant 
territory in a more constraining way…inducing groups to follow suit’ and hence sub-states 
with greater levels of autonomy are more likely to have FBOs with a greater level of capacity 
in their political advocacy structures. It is therefore likely that the region with the greater 
level of sub-state-autonomy will also have FBOs with greater levels of capacity in their 
political advocacy structures (H2).   
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H3: ‘As devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the more 
likely it is that the region’s FBOs develop a distinct strategy for political engagement at the 
sub-state level’. 
H4: ‘Regions with greater levels of sub-state autonomy are more likely to have FBOs with 
distinct strategies for political engagement at the sub-state level’.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are also based on the ‘sub-state autonomy’ variable and are 
connected to secondary research question 2. Keating (2013: 119) notes that as pressure 
groups develop their political advocacy structures in response to political devolution, 
‘regional level interest politics might look much like the national level, at a smaller scale’. 
Conditions where powers are devolved and become more entrenched at the sub-state level, 
make it more likely that FBOs will focus on engaging with sub-state governments, and 
develop distinct strategies for this purpose. This may develop when an organisation at the 
sub-state level develops its own autonomy to demarcate its own strategy, away from the 
state-wide organisation. As Keating (2013: 130) notes, state-wide organisations will often 
leave ‘provincial affairs to the provinces’. Likewise, a territorial organisation might develop a 
distinctive strategy for the sub-state level if more access points and opportunities open up 
in response to greater levels of sub-state autonomy as more power is devolved, or if these 
powers become entrenched and they learn how to engage with them. The greater the level 
of sub-state autonomy, the more likely we are to see FBOs with distinct strategies for the 
sub-state level (H3) and therefore the region with a greater level of sub-state autonomy is 
more likely to have FBOs with distinct strategies for engaging at the sub-state level (H4).  
H5: ‘The stronger the FBO’s roots within the devolved region, the more likely it is to have a 
staff based political advocacy structure’. 
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Hypothesis 5 is based on the ‘roots within society’ variable and connected to 
secondary research question 1. As noted in Chapter 2, a number of organisations in Wales 
and Northern Ireland been engaged at the sub-state level for many years prior to 1999 and 
had some level of a staff based political advocacy structure. The FBOs with stronger roots 
within society are likely therefore to have developed their staff based political advocacy 
structures further in response to political devolution. We also know from Diani and Donati’s 
(1999: 19-25) empirical research that environmental groups adapted to more professional 
political advocacy structures over time, and consequently we might expect to see FBOs 
which have existed for a longer period of time similarly developing more towards staff 
based political advocacy structures. A weakly rooted organisation could also have a staff 
based political advocacy structure if it has the financial donors to support the organisation, 
but it is less likely in general to have developed a staff based political advocacy structure.  
H6: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is to 
utilise an insider strategy’. 
Hypothesis 6 is based on the ‘roots within society’ variable and is connected to 
secondary research question 2. Maloney et al’s (1994: 30) insider/outsider distinction notes 
that organisations ‘which have limited and non-controversial aims can expect to advance 
them by insider means’. On the basis of this assertion, we would expect to see organisations 
with stronger roots opting for an insider strategy. FBOs which have strong roots within the 
society could be seen as important stakeholders, which enjoy a sense of legitimacy within 
society. These FBOs are also likely to possess specific resources such as ‘knowledge, 
technical advice or expertise, membership compliance or consent, credibility, information 
and implementation guarantees’ which Maloney et al (1994: 36) argue are needed in order 
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to pursue an insider strategy. In some political contexts this may differ significantly as it is 
possible that some FBOs with strong roots within society could be perceived as controversial 
or an anathema to decision makers. In such cases, the hypothesis could be falsified.  
H7: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is that 
devolved institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
Hypothesis 7 is similarly based on the ‘roots within society’ variable and connected 
to secondary research question 2. Chapter 3 outlined that the type of insider status a 
pressure group achieves is based upon the decision makers’ perception of the group 
(Maloney et al 1994: 30). Maloney et al (1994: 30) argue that the relationship between 
decision makers and organisations is a ‘bargaining’ process. If a pressure group has the right 
resources to offer to decision makers, and is able to engage on an incremental basis 
(Maloney et al 1994: 36), then the group can achieve core or specialist insider status. 
Groups with stronger roots within devolved regions may be regarded as more useful by 
decision makers because they are more likely to be able to offer government these specific 
resources. This may be based on various factors including their role in society either 
historically or at the present time, a collective memory connected to the FBO as an 
institution, the FBO’s influence upon identity either in the present or the past, or the FBO 
might represent a large membership.  
Even so, it is important to take account of political context. Different groups will 
have the type of resources required in particular political contexts and at different times. It 
must also be remembered that some more recently established groups, or which do not 
have strong roots within the devolved region, might also be able to offer ‘implementation 
guarantees’ (Maloney et al 1994: 36) which the government cannot otherwise access. Some 
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more newly established groups could represent large memberships by virtue of being one of 
the few FBOs from within the faith community. Because of this, it is important to give 
particular attention to the way in which decision makers confer core or specialist insider 
status upon FBOs. FBOs with strong roots in society will possess specific resources with 
which it can bargain, but groups with weaker roots within society could also have specific 
resources, some of which might be unique to the faith community which it represents. 
H8: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is to pursue an insider 
strategy’. 
Hypothesis 8 is based on the ‘theological orientation’ variable and connected to 
secondary research question 2. Maloney et al (1994: 37) note that an organisation which 
wishes to pursue an insider strategy is required to take part in what has been termed 
‘bargainable incrementalism’ (1994: 37). From this perspective, being able to give and take 
within the policy process is therefore key to pursuing an insider strategy. We would expect 
that theologically moderate FBOs would have the ability to take part in this bargaining 
process as they will find it easier to compromise on their positions than more conservative 
FBOs. A theologically conservative organisation is expected to be more likely to hold to 
‘absolute truth’ and ‘scriptural inerrancy’ than a more moderate organisation. Indeed this 
was noted by Warner (2000) in her study of the Catholic Church’s role as a pressure group 
across Europe: ‘Whereas the essence of democracy is compromise, many of the Church’s 
demands are not negotiable’ (2000: 7). Rose (1974: 255) also argues that groups which hold 
to ‘absolute values’ will find it difficult to accept ‘partial accommodation’. A more moderate 
group which espouses theologically liberal values is more likely to reject biblical literalism 
and hence could find it easier to compromise and embrace ‘progressive social and political 
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initiatives’ (Nash 2007:202). Furthermore, some pressure groups opt for outsider strategies 
because of membership expectations, even though their goal is ‘realisable through 
bargaining’ (Maloney et al 1994: 32). In the same way, members of theologically 
conservative FBOs might not be happy if a theological position is compromised upon. It is 
therefore possible to expect that more theologically moderate FBOs are more likely to 
pursue insider strategies.  
H9: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is that the devolved 
institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
Likewise, Hypothesis 9 is based on the ‘theological orientation’ variable and 
connected to secondary research question 2. As noted in Chapter 3, the type of insider 
status a FBO receives is based on the way in which it is perceived by decision makers 
(Maloney et al 1994: 30). Maloney et al (1994: 36) note that core and specialist access is 
offered in return for specific resources which the government requires. Political debate in 
twenty-first century liberal democracies often espouse secular and liberal ideals. 
Consequently, more moderate FBOs would be expected to be more likely to have more 
appropriate resources to offer decision makers than conservative organisations. It will be 
expected that more moderate organisations can offer credibility to the policies of decision 
makers, because they are more likely to agree and endorse more secular and liberal policies. 
Some theologically conservative organisations might have large memberships, but it is more 
likely that in sub-states within the UK they will have smaller, yet more committed 
memberships than moderate groups. They are therefore likely to represent less people. 
Because of this, more conservative organisations are less likely to be able to offer 
membership compliance, consent or implementation guarantees. Rose (1974: 253-254) 
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notes that wider ‘cultural norms’ can influence a group’s ability to gain access to decision 
makers. If a group’s position goes against cultural norms or the public are culturally 
indifferent to their position, government is less likely to perceive the organisations as useful. 
More conservative groups are more likely to find themselves riding against cultural norms in 
this way. Even in less secular contexts the meaning of the term ‘moderate’ will be relative 
and hence will in all likelihood fit with the norms and values of decision makers. The norms 
and values of conservative groups are likely to be even more conservative than that of 
decision makers in a less secular context. Therefore, more moderate organisations are more 
likely than conservative organisations to have core or specialist insider status conferred 
upon them, because they are more likely to have the specific resources that Maloney et al 
(1994: 36) have noted as needed for a ‘bargaining/exchange based relationship’ with 
decision makers. 
H10: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the better placed it is to 
act as an effective pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
Hypothesis 10 is based on the ‘roots within society’ variable and connected to 
secondary research question 3. The information gained from studying a FBO’s structure and 
strategy (secondary research question 1 and 2) can be used to analyse whether FBOs are 
effective. It has been expected that FBOs with stronger roots in society are more likely to 
have staff-based political advocacy structures. While non-staff based political advocacy 
structures can also lead to a FBO being effective in its engagement, the sub-state political 
systems might offer greater access to consultation, and hence it might also necessitate a 
staff based political advocacy structure if an organisation is to make the most of this 
opportunity. In light of this, a staff-based political advocacy structure appears more 
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appropriate if a FBO wishes to be well placed to act as an effective pressure group (relating 
to question 1 and 2 of this thesis’ measurement of effectiveness). A staff based structure 
also ensures the FBOs have the capacity needed to develop coherent policy positions 
(relating to question 3 of this thesis’ measurement of effectiveness). Furthermore, it has 
also been hypothesised that strongly rooted FBOs are more likely to pursue an insider 
strategy and have a core or specialist insider strategy bestowed upon it (relating to question 
4 of this thesis’ criterion of effectiveness). All of these factors lead to the hypothesis that 
stronger rooted FBOs are better placed to act as effective pressure groups. 
H11: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the better placed it is to act as an effective 
pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
Hypothesis 11 is based on the ‘theological orientation’ variable and is also connected 
to secondary research question 3. It has been argued that theologically moderate FBOs are 
more likely to pursue an insider strategy and to have a core or specialist insider status 
bestowed upon them (relating to question 4 of this thesis’ measurement of effectiveness). 
This leads to the hypothesis that theologically moderate FBOs are better placed to act as 
effective pressure groups. 
Overall, the above hypotheses are not absolute and some of the statements could be 
challenged. However each hypothesis offers a way of examining FBOs in the devolved 
political sphere and identifying the extent to which the level of autonomy at the sub state 
level, an organisation’s theological orientation and its roots within society influence political 
advocacy structure, strategy and effectiveness. 
  
114 | P a g e  
 
4.1.4 Case Study Selection 
This section presents and justifies the two sub-states selected as case studies in this thesis 
and the four FBO case studies selected in Wales and Northern Ireland. The two case studies 
have been selected using the independent variable ‘sub-state autonomy’, with the FBO case 
studies in Wales and Northern Ireland selected using the independent variables; ‘roots 
within society’ and ‘theological orientation’.  
4.1.4.1 Wales and Northern Ireland 
As noted in Chapter 1 and 2, one of the greatest weaknesses of the literature on FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level in the UK is that the lack of research on FBO engagement 
in Wales and Northern Ireland. Consequently, this thesis utilises the case study method to 
develop detailed findings in both cases that subsequently provide a basis for a comparative 
analysis of FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK. A systematic comparison of 
two sub-state regions of the UK will provide an empirical basis for building and refining 
broader conclusions regarding FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK (Burnham et 
al 2008: 70). The case studies are selected on the basis of the difference in the extent of 
‘sub-state autonomy’ within each case. The difference in their religiosity also strengthens 
the case study selection.  
As devolved regions of the UK, Wales and Northern Ireland operate within the same 
national policy framework. Furthermore, power was devolved to both regions in 1998/1999 
as part of the same package of constitutional reform within the UK. Both Wales and 
Northern Ireland are advanced economies and yet are two of the weaker performing 
economic regions of the UK (see Harari 2016). However, while Wales and Northern Ireland 
have their similarities, the contrast between them strengthens the case for their 
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comparison. Looking in further detail at each case selected, Wales has less autonomy than 
Northern Ireland, as sub-state regions of the UK6 and hence they are a suitable comparison 
for examining how the ‘sub-state autonomy’ variable impacts on FBO political advocacy 
structure and strategy. 
    
Legislative and administrative devolution’s roots run much deeper in Northern 
Ireland than in Wales. From 1921 to 1972, Northern Ireland had a unique system of 
executive, legislative and administrative devolution over a set of devolved powers from the 
UK (Birrell 2009: 1). The executive was also served by the Northern Ireland Civil Service, 
independent of Whitehall (Mitchell 2009: 77). The Northern Ireland Act of 1920 transferred 
a range of powers to Northern Ireland, but it also specified a list of reserved and excepted 
matters maintained as the responsibility of the UK Government (Birrell 2009: 1). Political 
devolution ended in Northern Ireland in 1972 when the British Government took action to 
transfer all statutory and executive responsibility for law and order to the UK Government 
due to rising violence and political turmoil in the region. The Northern Ireland Government’s 
subsequent decision to resign led to the transfer of devolved powers from the Stormont 
Government and Parliament to the United Kingdom Government and Parliament (Birrell 
2009: 1). This led to Northern Ireland’s ‘direct rule’ from Westminster with an aspect of 
administrative devolution in the creation of the Northern Ireland Office in 1972 with 
responsibility for political and constitutional matters, security policy and operations, public 
                                                     
6 Hooghe et al (2010: Appendix B) give Wales and Northern Ireland the same score in the Regional Authority 
Index for ‘self-rule’ (8.0), as Northern Ireland’s general purpose administration is subject to a central 
government veto while Wales’ general purpose administration is not. While this veto does exist, the remainder 
of this section suggests that when one looks behind the data, Northern Ireland has a higher level of autonomy 
in practice than Wales. This was particularly so when considering the first period of devolution between 1999-
2006.  
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expenditure and broad economic questions and for overseeing the whole legislative 
programme in regards to previously transferred matters (Birrell 2009: 21-22). Direct rule 
was only supposed be temporary, but lasted until 1998. The Northern Ireland Assembly was 
established in 1998, but a period of suspensions consequently continued between 2000 and 
2007 (Birrell 2009: 1). Northern Ireland’s history, which has led to the Assembly’s 
consociational design, marks it as unique amongst the UK’s devolved regions (Wilford 2000, 
Knox 2010: 13-14). In contrast, Wales has a more limited experience of devolution. While 
administrative devolution on policy areas such as education existed in Wales from the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the Welsh Office was not formed until 1964. (see 
Mitchell 2009: 40-66). A major difference between Wales and Northern Ireland is that 
administrative devolution was not conferred upon Wales following a suspension of a 
previously existing devolved government or parliament. What’s more, prior to 1999, Wales 
did not have a tradition of wide ranging separate legislative and administrative differences 
as did Northern Ireland (Birrell 2009: 2). Instead, Wales’ first taste of political devolution in 
the modern era came in 1999 with the creation of the National Assembly for Wales.    
Not only does political devolution have deeper roots in Northern Ireland than in 
Wales, but Northern Ireland and Wales’ constitutional settlements differ substantially. 
Despite proposals for Wales to move to a reserved powers model in the Draft Wales Bill 
(2016-17) (Bowers 2016), Welsh devolution currently operates on a conferred powers 
model (Rawlings 2003: 7), specifying, and thus constraining, the areas of Welsh autonomy. 
From 1999, the UK parliament retained all primary legislative powers with secondary 
legislative powers devolved in 18 areas. Therefore, while Northern Ireland received primary 
law making powers from 1998 (Birrell 2012: 11), Wales only had powers over statutory 
instruments and secondary legislation to repeal or amend UK legislation for the purpose of 
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enacting it in Wales (Rawlings 2003: 5-6). It was not until 2006, at least partly in response to 
the Richard Commission, that the Government of Wales Act (2006) then gave the Assembly 
the power to pass Measures in 20 fields through LCOs, initiated by the Welsh Assembly and 
then approved by the Assembly and both Houses of Parliament (Birrell 2012: 18). However, 
it was not until an affirmative referendum in 2011 that the National Assembly aligned with 
Northern Ireland, receiving primary legislative powers in 20 areas (Birrell 2012: 20). Even so, 
Wales does not constitute a distinctive legal jurisdiction (Le Sueur et al 2013: 565) 
In contrast, Northern Ireland has had primary law making powers since 1998 (Birrell 
2012: 11) and its reserved powers model bestows upon the Assembly legislative 
competence in a greater number of policy portfolios, many of which are of interest to FBOs. 
These include areas which are common to Wales such as education, health and social care 
(Birrell 2012:15). However, policy areas such as marriage law, reproductive rights and 
welfare (see Bloomer and Fegan 2014, Birrell and Gray 2014) have been devolved to 
Northern Ireland but not to Wales. Furthermore, policing and justice was devolved to 
Northern Ireland in 2010 on the basis of the progress made under the St. Andrew’s 
Agreement brokered in 2006 (see Perry 2011, Birrell 2012: 16). Not only do these policy 
competencies confer a greater level of constitutional autonomy on Northern Ireland in 
comparison to Wales, but these are also a range of additional policy areas of concern to 
FBOs. Historically, FBOs in Northern Ireland have been involved in welfare provision (see 
O’Corráin 2006), engaged with questions of sexuality and re-productive rights (see Connolly 
1990: 118, O’Leary 2009: 124) and policing has traditionally been a policy area of great 
concern to both the Catholic and Protestant communities, and hence of concern to the 
churches who act as their representatives (Mitchell 2011: 40). The Draft Wales Bill, 
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responding to the Silk Commission’s 2014 report, proposes the devolution of further powers 
to Wales such as energy and road transport policy (Bowers 2016), but this still leaves Wales 
trailing behind Northern Ireland in terms of the policy areas on which the Assembly can 
legislate. Therefore, notwithstanding the significant changes to strengthen the autonomy of 
the National Assembly for Wales since 1999, the Northern Ireland Assembly continues to 
enjoy a greater level of constitutional autonomy. 
Northern Ireland also enjoys a greater level of fiscal autonomy than Wales. The 
Northern Ireland Assembly has had an increased right to borrow for capital expenditure 
since 2002 (Hazell 2003: 3), with Wales only receiving the power to do so in 2014 (UK 
Parliament 2014). Despite the Wales Act 2014 devolving some fiscal powers in response to 
the Silk Commission’s 2012 report, such as stamp duty, landfill taxes and aggregates levy 
(UK Parliament 2014),7  this is not comparable to Northern Ireland’s power to set 
corporation tax rates (UK Parliament 2015).8  
In addition to being valuable case studies for analysing how the variable ‘sub-state 
autonomy’ impacts on political advocacy structure and strategy, the level of religiosity in 
each region also strengthens the value of the comparison. Comparing two regions which 
have historically had high levels of religiosity, but have experienced differing levels of 
secularisation enables the study to examine how FBOs are engaging politically in these 
contrasting circumstances. 
The 2011 census demonstrated a decline in those identifying as ‘Christian’ in Wales, 
as it dropped from 70% in the 2001 census, to 57.6% in the 2011 census (Davie 2015: 102). 
                                                     
7
 These taxes are to be devolved in 2018 
8
 These taxes are to be devolved in 2018 
119 | P a g e  
 
According to the 2011 census, Wales is also the region of England and Wales with the most 
respondents (32%) identifying as having ‘no religion’ (Davie 2015: 46). On the other hand, 
the census data show that religious identity is strong in Northern Ireland, with 93.5% of the 
population identifying with either Catholicism or one of the Protestant denominations. 
Furthermore, Church attendance in Northern Ireland is much higher than in Wales. Between 
1980 and 2000 Church attendance in Wales dropped dramatically from 455,432 to 296,853, 
but Northern Ireland’s Church attendance experienced a slight increase from 937,463 to 
959,002 (Brierly 1997: 2.6). In 2008 the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey recorded 
that one third of the adult population of Northern Ireland were attending Church regularly 
(see Ganiel and Mitchell 2012:68-69) while the Tearfund Church attendance report recorded 
as many as 45% in 2007 (Ashworth and Farthing 2007: 10). This is in comparison with just 
12% attending regularly in Wales (Ashworth and Farthing 2007: 10).9 This is in contrast to 
over 50% of the Welsh population who were recorded to have attended Church in the 1851 
religious census (see Davies 1981: 33-34).10 This dramatic decline leads Ollerton to describe 
Wales as ‘post-Christian’ (2015: 74).  
Religiosity may be much higher in Northern Ireland than in Wales, but secularisation 
is not an alien concept in Northern Ireland. Weekly church attendance has dropped from 
two thirds of the adult population in the late 1960s (Ganiel and Mitchell 2012: 68-69). This 
suggests that while religiosity is high in Northern Ireland, the region has felt a change in 
religious adherence, commitment and attendance since the early 20th century. It is also 
important not to understate the connection between religion in Northern Ireland and its 
                                                     
9
 Tearfund’s church attendance report and the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey are the most recent 
studies on Church attendance in Wales and Northern Ireland.  
10
 Davies provides a breakdown of attendance by ‘poor law district’ in Wales. While an accurate national figure 
of attendance is difficult (see Gill (1993: 23-26) for a discussion on this), it is over 50% in every district in 
Wales.  
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conflict between 1968 and 1998. The relationship between the conflict and religious ideas 
and symbolism (Mitchell 2011: 4-20) means that it will inevitably influence the way in which 
FBOs engage with Northern Ireland’s political system, creating another distinction between 
the two regions. 
As is evident from the literature review in Chapter 2, selecting Wales and Northern 
Ireland as case studies is also strengthened by the fact there is currently a greater amount 
of research on FBO engagement in Scotland than there is in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Steven (2003, 2007, 2011) and Gillan’s (2008) work greatly outweigh the research on FBO 
engagement in the other regions. However, the existing studies on Scotland can be used to 
triangulate the findings from the empirical chapters in the comparative chapter at the end 
of the thesis. Furthermore, Wales and Northern Ireland are also understudied generally in 
comparison to Scotland. Since 1999, a much larger body of literature analysing the 
development of social and public policy in Scotland has developed in comparison to the 
literature on policy in Wales and Northern Ireland. Moreover, Birrell and Heenan (2013: 
767) have noted that Northern Ireland has often been excluded from comparative research 
on devolution in the UK because of the suspensions between 2000 and 2007 and because of 
political complexities of devolved governance in the region.  Consequently, this thesis can 
provide valuable empirical research on the sub-state political systems in Northern Ireland 
and Wales. 
This section has outlined key relevant features regarding Wales and Northern Ireland 
that justify their value as case studies. This includes differences in constitutional and fiscal 
autonomy and in levels of religiosity.  
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4.1.4.2 FBO Case studies 
Now that the comparison of Wales and Northern Ireland has been justified, this section 
presents the FBO case studies selected for detailed examination in each case. The matrix is 
used to select the FBO case studies to ensure a good cross section of FBOs drawing in 
particular on the ‘roots within society’ and ‘theological orientation’ independent variables. 
Selecting a case study from each cell of the matrix enables selecting case studies which can 
point to the role that theology and roots within society have on the strategies FBOs pursue 
and the status they have conferred upon them by decision makers. This enables the findings 
to illustrate whether an organisation’s roots within society or theological position change 
the strategy they pursue and whether it impedes or improves the status they have 
conferred upon them. 
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4.1.4.2.1 Wales 
Figure 7: Wales case study matrix 
 
- 4.1.4.2.1.1 The Church in Wales 
 
The Church in Wales has been selected in the ‘strong roots within society / theologically 
moderate’ location of the matrix. The Church in Wales is a representative FBO with the 
General Synod, the Board of Social Responsibility and the Bishops acting as apex groups 
which engage politically on behalf of the Church. As the largest Christian denomination in 
Wales (Institute of Welsh Affairs undated), it forms a key part of the region’s Christian faith 
community. It is regarded to have strong roots within Welsh society, because of its nearing 
century old role within the region. The Church in Wales has an oxymoronic relationship with 
Welsh society being described as both ‘yr hen fam’ (the old mother) and ‘yr hen estrones’ 
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(the old alien) (Harris and Startup 1994: 102). Its disestablishment in 1921 meant that the 
institution was no longer a Church ‘of’ Wales, but another Christian denomination ‘in’ 
Wales. The Church is no longer established, but it has strong roots in Welsh society in terms 
of numbers of communicants, clergy, buildings and in its role within the Welsh public sphere 
(Harris and Startup 1994). As regards its educational role, the Anglican Church has been 
informally providing education in Wales since the eighteenth century and formally since 
1811 (Ap Siôn and Francis 2014: 265).11 The Church is politically active, represented by the 
General Synod, the Board of Social Responsibility and with the Archbishop as a figurehead. 
As regards its theological orientation, it is quite literally a broad church theologically, but is 
dominated by a more moderate theological perspective. This can be seen in the Church’s 
early steps to ordain female Bishops in Wales (BBC News Wales 2013a). Another indication 
is the past two Archbishops of Wales, Rowan Williams and Barry Morgan, who have been 
theologically liberal and have both supported the full communion of homosexuals (Morgan 
2011a: xiii, 276). 
- 4.1.4.2.1.2 The Catholic Church in England and Wales 
 
The Catholic Church is located within the ‘strong roots within society / theologically 
conservative’ locus in the Wales FBO case study matrix. Wales is not a distinct region within 
the organisation of the Catholic Church, but Cardiff is rather a ‘province’ (representing 
Wales) along with Birmingham, Liverpool, Southwark and Westminster. The Church is a 
representative FBO, with the Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales acting as an apex 
group which represents it politically (Chambers and Thompson 2005b: 38). Despite its 
                                                     
11
 The Anglican clergyman Griffith Jones Llanddwror organised circulating schools all over Wales in the 
eighteenth century. Schools were formally run by the Anglican Church through the National Society, 
established from 1811 (Ap Siôn and Francis 2014: 265). 
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centralised structure, the Catholic Church has been included as a FBO with strong roots 
within Welsh society because it is a visible institution and is numerically strong in members. 
Wales has not been easy terrain for the Catholic Church since the Protestant reformation, 
with Protestantism having ‘generally triumphed in Wales’ (Morgan 2004: 121) by the end of 
the 16th century. Nevertheless, it is a key part of the wider Christian faith community within 
Wales today. The Church enjoyed growth in Wales during the 20th century (Morgan 2011a: 
196-197,264) and by the 1980s had become the second largest ecclesiastical body in Wales 
(Morgan 2011a: 264) giving it influence and prominence within Welsh society. The Church 
has provided education in Wales since 1847 (Ap Siôn and Francis 2014: 265).12 As regards its 
theological position, the Church is a theologically conservative FBO with teaching orientated 
within a more conservative biblical hermeneutic tradition, particularly relative to other 
Welsh Christian denominations such as the Church in Wales. 
- 4.1.4.2.1.3 Cytûn: Churches Together in Wales 
 
Cytûn is located within the ‘weak roots within society / theologically moderate’ locus in the 
Wales FBO case study matrix. Cytûn is a socio-political FBO with the primary aim of 
furthering ecumenical relationships amongst Wales’ Christian denominations (Cytûn 
undated). Its membership is made up of a number of Christian denominations, from the 
Catholic Church, to the main nonconformist denominations, the Church in Wales and many 
smaller Christian FBOs (Cytûn undated). Cytûn is therefore the main ecumenical body within 
the Christian faith community in Wales. Part of Cytûn’s work is to represent these 
denominations politically (see Davies 2008: 95-98). As noted in Chapter 2, Cytûn does not 
take its own political position, but instead seeks to facilitate the denominations in coming to 
                                                     
12
 This was provided through the Catholic Poor Schools committee for the education of Catholic children (Ap 
Siôn and Francis 2014: 265). 
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their own position (Davies 2008:95). Despite having member denominations which are well 
rooted in Welsh society, Cytûn itself, as a socio-political FBO, has weaker roots within Welsh 
society. Cytûn has only existed since 1990, while its forbearer, the Council of Churches in 
Wales only formed in 1956 (Davies 2008: 1). Despite Cytûn’s ecumenical and political work, 
it is unlikely that many of the members of the denominations which make up Cytûn’s 
membership are fully aware of its work, and likewise, members of the general public are 
very unlikely to know about its existence, unlike other FBOs such as the Catholic Church or 
the Church in Wales, of which they are likely to have a cultural or social knowledge. 
Theologically, Cytûn’s ecumenical nature means that it has a moderate theological 
orientation. As an organisation which seeks to find unity amongst its members, encouraging 
inter-denominational and inter-faith work (see Cytûn 2015-16), it lends itself to a more 
moderate theological orientation.    
- 4.1.4.2.1.4 The Muslim Council of Wales 
 
The Muslim Council of Wales (MCW) is located within the ‘weak roots within society / 
theologically conservative’ locus in the Wales FBO case study matrix. The MCW is a socio-
political FBO which is an affiliate branch of the Muslim Council of Great Britain and which 
seeks to represent the Muslim faith community in Wales. The MCW has a clear political role, 
with its website stating that it ‘seeks to represent the Islamic perspective on issues of 
importance to the Welsh public…through political and social activism’ (Muslim Council of 
Wales undated a). Representing a wide range of mosques, Islamic charities, institutions, 
partners and individuals, the MCW is a key organisation within the wide ranging Islamic faith 
community in Wales. With regards to the roots within society axis, the Muslim community 
in Wales is arguably one of the oldest Muslim communities in Great Britain (Chambers 2008: 
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90), but its formal political representation through the MCW is a relatively recent 
development and hence it is weakly rooted within Welsh society. The Muslim community 
was traditionally represented politically through Imams and Sheykhs (Gilliat-Ray 2010, 
Gilliat-Ray and Mellor 2010 and Seddon 2014), and it was not until prior to political 
devolution (around 2000) that the community developed organised political representation.  
As regards the theological axis, the MCW is a theologically conservative FBO with 
conservative positions on social and ethical issues. For instance, the MCW’s document 
‘Dispelling Myths about Islam’ (Siddiqui 2005: 26-27), displays a rather conservative stance 
on social issues such as pre-marital sex and inter-marriage. The MCW’s parent organisation, 
the Muslim Council of Britain, has also been accused of claiming to be Britain’s ‘moderate 
face of Islam’ while at the same time pursuing a conservative agenda (Bright 2005). 
4.1.4.2.2 Northern Ireland 
Figure 8: Northern Ireland case study matrix 
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- 4.1.4.2.2.1 The Presbyterian Church in Ireland 
 
For the ‘strong roots within society / more theologically moderate’ category, the thesis has 
selected the Presbyterian Church in Ireland in the Northern Ireland FBO case study matrix. 
The Church is a representative FBO with its Council for Church in Society acting as an apex 
body which engages politically from within the denomination (Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland undated c). As the largest of Northern Ireland’s Protestant denominations (see 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency 2014), it forms a key part of the Protestant 
faith community, and the wider unionist community in Northern Ireland. The Presbyterian 
Church has greatly influenced Protestant identity in Northern Ireland and still greatly 
influences Northern Ireland society today (Morrow 2004).  Due to the Church’s numerical 
strength and public visibility, it is regarded as a FBO with strong roots within Northern 
Ireland society.  
Theologically, the Presbyterian Church has a moderate theological orientation. 
Theological differences have been some of the main divisive issues in the Church, as it has 
attempted to retain unity within the denomination. As far back as the 1830s there was 
division amongst the more liberal and conservative wings of the denomination (Ford 2004: 
126). Indeed, the belief that the Presbyterian Church had become too liberal initiated the 
Rev. Ian Paisley to lead those disaffected by the denomination’s ‘ecumenism and liberalism’ 
to form the Free Presbyterian Church in 1951 (Ford 2004: 128). In light of this, the Free 
Presbyterian Church’s claim that the Presbyterian Church in Ireland has become 
theologically liberal must be contextualised. The Free Presbyterian Church’s understanding 
of liberal theology would differ greatly to the use of the term in Wales. Consequently, it is 
possible to view the Presbyterian Church in Ireland as a denomination with a more 
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moderate theological orientation, relative to more fundamentalist Protestant 
denominations that exist in the region (such as the Free Presbyterian Church or the 
Reformed Presbyterian Church in Ireland). 
- 4.1.4.2.2.2. The Catholic Church in Ireland 
 
The Catholic Church in Ireland is located in the ‘strong roots within society / less 
theologically moderate’ locus in the Northern Ireland FBO case study matrix. The Catholic 
Church is a representative FBO which covers both the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland. The Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference, based in Maynooth, and the 
Northern Ireland Council on Social Affairs (NICCOSA), an apex body within it, represent the 
Church politically in Northern Ireland (see Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference undated). The 
Church has been a key institution within the Catholic community since the creation of 
Northern Ireland. Without political representation, the Church was for many years the main 
representative of the Catholic community (Mitchell 2011: 45-48) and is therefore the key 
FBO within the Catholic faith community and the wider nationalist community in Northern 
Ireland. There are fewer Catholics than Protestants in Northern Ireland,13 but the unity of 
the Catholic Church as an ecclesiastical body makes it the largest denomination in Northern 
Ireland. Theologically, the Catholic Church in Northern Ireland is located in the theologically 
conservative locus because it holds to a teaching orientated within a more conservative 
biblical hermeneutic tradition.  
- 4.1.4.2.2.3 The Belfast Islamic Centre 
 
                                                     
13
 The 2011 Census shows that 41.56% of the Northern Ireland population identify as Protestant, however, 
only slightly less (40.76%) identify as Catholic (this is with 10.1% not identifying with a religion) – see 
<http://www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/census/2011/results/key-statistics/summary-report.pdf>  
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The Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC) is located in the ‘weak roots within society / theologically 
moderate’ locus of the Northern Ireland FBO case study matrix. The Centre is a socio-
political FBO and as the older of only two Mosques/Islamic centres in Northern Ireland is the 
key Islamic FBO within Northern Ireland’s Muslim faith community. While the BIC is a Belfast 
based mosque, it claims a national role which is representative of Muslims across Northern 
Ireland (see Belfast Islamic Centre 2010: 1). Unlike the other large Islamic organisation 
based in Northern Ireland, (the ‘Northern Ireland Muslim Family Association’ (NIMFA)), the 
BIC has an interest in engaging politically as it endeavours to work with ‘statutory bodies’ 
(Belfast Islamic Centre undated). The BIC is the most active of Islamic FBOs in Northern 
Ireland, but it has relatively weak roots within society because it does not have ties to 
Northern Ireland society in the same way as the Catholic Church and the Protestant 
denominations, which are deeply entrenched in the social, political and cultural psyche of 
Northern Ireland (Mitchell 20011: 5-6). For instance, Marranci (2004: 20) has noted that it is 
only since the embedding of the Peace Process in Northern Ireland that Muslims in the 
region have felt confident to become a visible part of society. 
The BIC is located as a theologically moderate FBO because of its unique context. 
The theologically moderate position of the BIC is illustrated by the way that it ensures that 
its worship is accessible to Muslims of 42 different nationalities (Marranci 2004: 20) rather 
than dividing its worship by ethnicity as in many European countries (Marranci 2003: 63). 
Worship at the BIC is also conducted in English rather than in Arabic, unacceptable to many 
scholars (Marranci 2003: 65-68). 
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- 4.1.4.2.2.4. The Caleb Foundation 
 
The Caleb Foundation is located in the ‘weak roots within society / less theologically 
moderate’ locus in the Northern Ireland FBO case study matrix. The Caleb Foundation is a 
socio-political FBO, established in 1998 (Ganiel 2008a: 111). The organisation represents 
smaller evangelical churches which pertain to a particular fundamentalist theology, such as 
the Evangelical Presbyterian Church, the Free Presbyterian Church and the Elim Pentecostal 
Church (Ganiel 2008a: 111) and hence makes up only a small part of Northern Ireland’s 
Protestant faith community. Caleb’s short existence and composition of relatively small 
evangelical churches means that it has weak roots within Northern Ireland society, 
particularly in comparison to other Protestant FBOs. Theologically, the foundation’s 
creationist agenda (Jones 2012), its belief in biblical inerrancy (see The Caleb Foundation 
undated a) and its rejection of same-sex marriage (Caleb Foundation 2014) puts the Caleb 
Foundation solidly in the theologically conservative locus of the case study matrix. The Caleb 
Foundation is the most conservative of the Christian FBOs studied in this thesis, and this 
reflects Northern Ireland’s more conservative baseline.  
This section outlined the FBO case studies selected in both Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Basing the case studies on the independent variables using the case study matrix 
provides a wide cross section of FBOs engaging at the sub-state level and reduces case study 
selection bias. Now that these case studies have been outlined, the final section of this 
chapter presents the methodology for carrying out the empirical research. 
  
131 | P a g e  
 
4.2 Methodology 
This section discusses the thesis’ case study strategy, which includes justifying the policy 
areas studied in each case study and how the data was collected and analysed. Following 
this, the issue of bias and reliability of the data and the generalizability of the research is 
discussed.  
 
4.2.1 Case Study Strategy 
4.2.1.1 Policy Areas 
The three policy areas were identified for the study of FBO strategy and effectiveness, and 
hence were used for studying secondary research question 2 and 3. The policy areas 
selected included education, the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act, same-sex marriage in 
Northern Ireland and constitutional affairs. Each policy area is justified in turn. 
4.2.1.1.1 Education 
This policy area was selected as a result of its ability to indicate how FBOs have engaged 
with the devolved institutions since 1998/9 owing to the FBOs’ interest in this policy area 
prior to the establishment of the Assemblies. Furthermore, the extent of policy divergence 
in education in the regions, both historically and since 1998/9, also underlines its utility. 
Chapter 2 discussed FBO engagement with education policy in Wales and Northern Ireland 
prior to 1999. The way in which the Catholic Church lobbied Local Education Authorities for 
the right to Catholic education and its state funding in Wales prior to devolution was noted 
(Hughes 1999: 131-157). The Catholic Church in Ireland’s campaign for fully funded Catholic 
education in Northern Ireland during the twentieth century was also discussed (McGrath 
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2000, Ó Corráin 2006). The Protestant denominations do not deliver education in Northern 
Ireland, having transferred their schools over to the state in the twentieth century 
(McKelvey 2006: 155), but Chapter 2 underlined their engagement with education policy 
prior to political devolution (McGrath 2000: 5, 9). 
Post-devolution, FBOs engage with education policy as providers, and in their attempt to 
influence education policy (Donnelly et al 2006, Chambers and Thompson 2005: 43, Birrell 
and Heenan 2013: 778). Furthermore, FBOs which do not have an historical connection to 
education, such as the Caleb Foundation and minority FBOs in Northern Ireland have also 
shown an eagerness to engage with the policy area (Trotman 2007: 72, Ganiel 2008a: 111-
113). The role of FBOs in education, the future of faith schools and their funding, as well as 
the curriculum, are areas which FBOs are likely to have attempted to influence post 1999.  
Education is also an appropriate policy area for study because of the policy divergence 
found in education in both Wales and Northern Ireland both historically and since 1998/9. 
Wales has seen policy divergence in education since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Mitchell 2009: 40-66). The creation of the Assembly in 1999 furthered education’s 
divergent path as the Secretary of State for Wales’ powers were put under the democratic 
control of the Assembly, leading to further divergence and a raft of distinct policy initiatives 
(see Reynolds 2008, Power 2016). Likewise, Northern Ireland has a history of policy 
divergence, with education policy separately administered in Northern Ireland between 
1922 and 1972 and with the continuation of divergent education policies under direct rule 
between 1972 and 1998 (Birrell 2009: 230, 235). Despite political instability in Northern 
Ireland since 1998, this policy divergence has continued since the establishment of the 
Assembly (see Osborne 2006, Birrell and Heenan 2013, Gardner 2016).  Historic and post-
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devolution divergence in education makes it likely that FBOs have engaged with education 
policy as it is a mature policy area in both Wales and Northern Ireland and hence is a 
suitable policy area for study in this thesis. Policy divergence has also led to the 
development of distinct policy initiatives, and this provides an opportunity to study how 
FBOs have engaged with these policy developments. As a key policy area in Wales and 
Northern Ireland historically which has been influenced by the regions’ culture, religion and 
linguistic differences, education will also be a strong signifier of whether roots within society 
and theological orientation influence FBO strategy and effectiveness. Studying this divergent 
policy area can also highlight the specific nature of FBO engagement at the sub-state level in 
Wales and Northern Ireland. 
4.2.1.1.2 Moral policy areas 
The asymmetrical devolution of the UK makes it difficult to study the same moral policy area 
in two cases that are likely to have sparked FBO engagement. Marriage law is a devolved 
competence in Northern Ireland, but this is not the case in Wales, making a study of how 
FBOs have engaged with the issue of same-sex marriage in Wales of limited use. Moreover, 
Wales has pursued legislation altering its organ donation model, but the Northern Ireland 
Executive has not pursued similar legislation. A similar bill was proposed to the Northern 
Ireland Assembly as a Private Members Bill in 2012, but did not progress any further (see 
O’Hara 2014). Therefore, instead of making a direct comparison, a comparison examining 
different moral areas provides valuable perspectives into FBO strategy and effectiveness at 
the sub-state level. 
In the Welsh case, the Welsh Labour Government first proposed a white paper for 
The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act in 2011 and it was passed into law in 2013. The 
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legislation allows government to presume that an individual’s organs can be donated on 
death unless the individual had opted out of organ donation (Ap Gwent 2013: 64). The 
question of organ donation is controversial amongst many faith communities with a range 
of FBOs in favour and others against the legislation for moral reasons (see Blake 2015). 
Consequently, it is likely that FBOs have actively engaged the executive and legislature on 
this issue. 
In Northern Ireland, same-sex marriage legislation has been instigated by a number 
of Private Member’s Bills within the Assembly, sponsored on different occasions by a 
combination of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) from the Green Party, Alliance, 
Sinn Féin and the Socialist Democratic and Labour Party (see NI Assembly Hansard 2012, 
2014, 2015a, 2015b). The first four bills did not receive enough votes to pass, but the fifth 
bill received majority support. As with each of the bills, the Democratic Unionist Party 
utilised a ‘petition of concern’, which is a lever that vetoes legislation that is seen as 
problematic by one of the two communities (see McDonald 2015). None of these bills were 
ever likely to bring same-sex marriage into law in Northern Ireland due to a lack of majority 
unionist support, but the debates and votes surrounding the legislation are symbolically 
important for both those in favour and those opposing the legislation. The Northern Ireland 
church’s tradition of engaging with issues of sexuality (see O’Leary 2009: 124) makes it likely 
that they have engaged with the Assembly on this issue.  
The often controversial nature of moral policy areas means that analysing FBO 
engagement in these areas can underline the strategies utilised, the government’s 
perception and approaches to working with FBOs which disagree with its positon, the 
question of whether saliency leads to coalition formation, and whether the FBOs and/or 
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government compromise on the issues. These policy areas also have the potential to point 
to divergence between the position and strategies utilised by more theologically moderate 
and more theologically conservative FBOs. The way in which the FBOs have been received 
by decision makers in respect of these policy areas can also offer an insight into the role of 
FBOs at the sub-state level.  
4.2.1.1.3 Constitutional Issues 
Constitutional matters were at the forefront of Wales and Northern Ireland’s politics during 
most of the 20th century. The way in which the FBOs have engaged with the constitutional 
commissions which have acted as important milestones in both Wales and Northern Ireland 
are central to the study of constitutional issues in this thesis. In the case of Wales, this 
mainly pertains to how FBOs have engaged with questions regarding institutional design, 
powers to legislate, and the areas which the devolved institutions have autonomy to 
legislate on. These aspects will also be examined in the case of Northern Ireland. Attention 
will also be given to a wider range of ‘constitutional’ issues in Northern Ireland which are 
more distinctive to this case owing to the political conflict and continued political instability. 
These are areas which include policing, parading and flags and community cohesion. These 
are not strictly constitutional issues, but Northern Ireland’s volatile history means that these 
factors are intimately connected to the constitutional stability of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly and will be examined in tandem with the other constitutional questions noted 
above.  
The literature review in Chapter 2 also underlined that FBOs were active in this area 
prior to 1998/9. As noted in Chapter 2, the Council of Churches in Wales, and later Cytûn, 
was involved in the debate regarding self-government for Wales (Davies 2008: 90-95), and 
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literature by Mitchell (2011) and Brewer et al (2011) underline the intrinsic role FBOs in 
Northern Ireland played in constitutional debates, both as representatives and voices for 
their communities, as well as playing a role in brokering the peace itself. However, it is 
important to note that civil society organisations, such as the Churches were much more 
active in Northern Ireland than in Wales, where civil society’s weakness has been noted 
(Wyn Jones and Patterson 1999: 181). Even so, constitutional issues is an appropriate area 
to study because it has been at the forefront of Wales and Northern Ireland’s politics and 
because FBOs in Northern Ireland were active in this area prior to 1999, despite FBOs in 
Wales playing a more limited role. 
4.2.1.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
Now that the case studies have been presented and justified, the process of data collection 
and analysis is discussed. The main qualitative methods utilised in this thesis have been 
semi-structured interviews and analysis of primary and secondary literature. As is evident 
from Chapter 2, the secondary literature on FBOs in Wales and Northern Ireland is limited, 
but literature pertaining to Cytûn, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the Catholic 
Church in Ireland did offer some background to the organisations under study. However, 
primary sources proved to be much more important, as they provided context to the 
organisations under study. These sources included promotional materials, press releases, 
annual reports and the minutes of councils and assemblies. This documentation was readily 
accessible via the FBOs’ websites, apart from the case of the MCW. In this case, the 
researcher received promotional materials via the organisation’s office. The National Library 
of Wales archive also provided key publications by Cytûn which were not online. The 
researcher also received some ‘internal’ organisational documentation from the 
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organisations on request. This was particularly valuable in the case of the Catholic Church in 
Wales where the researcher received a number of key documents which were not publicly 
accessible. The final primary source that informed the study was the press coverage of 
different organisations and their engagement with the policy areas examined.  Both the 
analysis of FBO engagement with the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act and the issue of 
same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland benefitted most from these online media sources. 
Documentation relating to the policy areas selected for study was also extremely 
beneficial. White papers, consultation documents and committee evidence and reports 
provided a way of tracing influence in the policy process. This was particularly useful when 
examining FBO engagement with the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act where the FBOs 
gave oral and written evidence on more than one occasion. Hansard also proved a valuable 
source of information, particularly when analysing same-sex marriage legislation in 
Northern Ireland. In general, there was a high level of accessibility to primary resources 
regarding both the FBOs and the policy areas examined. Most of the documentation was 
accessible via the internet, with other materials retrievable in hard copy.   
The semi-structured interviews were the most important source of information 
regarding the case studies. Elite interviews were employed so as to gain knowledge only 
available through particular actors. The interviews provided insights into the participants’ 
experience of lobbying government and provided more detailed and in-depth information 
regarding the political advocacy structure and strategy of FBOs. Topic guides were used to 
compare findings across case studies. The topic guides were made up of open ended 
questions so that the researcher could probe the respondent further, enabling them to 
expand on areas, leading to richer data (McEvoy 2006b: 185). Attending a ‘Depth 
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Interviewing Skills’ course at the National Centre for Social Research provided an 
opportunity to improve the interview guides and the researcher’s interviewing technique. 
For the purpose of consistency, 20 interviews were conducted in Wales and 21 were 
conducted in Northern Ireland. 
FBO respondents with responsibility for political engagement were selected for 
interview. Interviewees consequently included policy officers, key members of the clergy 
with responsibility for political engagement and the chairs of councils or committees with a 
political role. Once initial contact had been made, it was possible to use the ‘snowballing 
technique’ to identify further respondents. Utilising this technique ensured that the 
research included as wide a range of suitable respondents as possible. Assembly Members, 
Members of the legislative Assembly, government ministers and civil servants were also 
interviewed to corroborate the accounts of both the FBOs and decision makers, thus 
strengthening the authenticity of the data. Interview respondents from the relevant FBOs 
were very accessible in Wales, as were interview respondents in Northern Ireland, once 
initial gatekeepers had been passed. Government ministers were more open to interview in 
Northern Ireland, than in Wales, where a number of civil servants were interviewed instead. 
Interviewing past and retired members of staff and informal conversations with journalists 
and members of the clergy (as advised by Burnham et al 2008: 239) were both helpful for 
corroborating the data collected from the formal interviews, allowing for triangulation. 
The interviews were recorded electronically and a journal was also kept so as to 
record perceptions, insights and data that were not recordable through an electronic device, 
providing further context to the data collected (Rudestam and Newton 2007: 111). The 
journal was particularly helpful for recording what was not said, but was intimated through 
139 | P a g e  
 
silence and facial expressions (Schutt 2011: 331) and which comments were spontaneous 
and which were more forced (Schutt 2011: 330). 
Aberystwyth University’s ethical guidelines were met at all times when conducting 
this empirical research. The data was collected in an ethical manner with each interview 
conducted with the informed consent of the participant. The data have been used in the 
research with the agreement of the interview respondent and has been referenced 
anonymously, with the job title referenced on occasion when it adds weight to the claim 
made, while still ensuring anonymity to the respondent. Once the data had been collected, 
it was stored safely with password protection.            
Interviews were transcribed and the data analysed with a coding method. It 
consisted of highlighting themes in the transcripts which corresponded to political advocacy 
structure, strategy and effectiveness. This allowed for cross-referencing between different 
interviews. From this it became possible to build the argument of the thesis.  
4.2.2. Research Bias, Reliability and Generalizability 
Bias is a concern for all qualitative researchers. There is always the danger that the 
researcher might be looking for a particular outcome and therefore might, sometimes 
without realising, pursue a particular route of enquiry at the expense of others (Yin 2014: 
73-76). Because of this, the researcher took precautions throughout the research process to 
try and eliminate bias. Firstly, the case study matrix served to ensure that the FBO case 
studies were selected using as rigorous a method as possible. Because the researcher comes 
from Wales, and Wales is a case study, the issue of subjective bias was also a possibility 
(Pierce 2008: 81). This could pertain to a number of issues, such as the researcher having a 
better knowledge of Wales than Northern Ireland, and hence focusing to a greater extent on 
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the Wales case study. In order to avoid this, while interviewing the same number of 
respondents in Wales and Northern Ireland, the researcher spent a longer period of time in 
field work mode in Northern Ireland, than in Wales. This allowed the researcher time to gain 
a better social, political, cultural and geographical knowledge of Northern Ireland in order to 
better inform the interview process. As an individual with political and theological concerns, 
there was also the possibility that this could have influenced the research process. The 
researcher made every effort to check and double check the findings are purely based on 
the data and not on any preconceived ideas or opinions.   
Furthermore, the possibility of bias is particularly acute when conducting interviews 
in a divisive society, on a topic that has been the cause of disharmonious political and social 
relations (McEvoy 2006b). Interviewing FBOs in the context of Northern Ireland meant that 
the researcher had to choose his language carefully and be cautious of the information 
provided by respondents. Identity is an extremely important issue in Northern Ireland, and 
hence it was important when interviewing to be aware not only of the way in which the 
respondent understood himself/herself but also the way in which the respondent would 
identify the researcher (McEvoy 2006b: 186). Because of this, the researcher did everything 
possible to remain neutral. Even so, there is little one can do to avoid the respondent 
making assumptions about the interviewer’s ethnicity, nationality, religion or political 
leanings which could influence the way in which questions are answered (McEvoy 2006b: 
186). The researcher carefully took this into account when analysing the interview data. The 
researcher had experiences during interviews in Northern Ireland where a strong line or 
narrative was being pushed from a particular ideological perspective and hence a number of 
methods were applied so as to try and overcome this. By triangulating the information 
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provided from a number of different interviews, along with primary and secondary 
documents, it was possible to try and deduce what was biased and what was a fairer 
account. Probing was also employed in order to ascertain the respondents’ views on certain 
positions with the hope of receiving a more nuanced account (McEvoy 2006b: 188). 
A number of methods have been utilised to safeguard the reliability of the data 
collected. As regards the interviews, the use of open-ended questions ensures that the data 
collected is reliable and it allowed the respondents freedom to take whichever angle they 
chose on the question asked. The use of triangulation, which has already been discussed, 
has also helped increase the reliability of the data. Corroborating the findings in the 
interviews with other sources such as primary and secondary documents and literature has 
allowed the researcher to ensure that the data is consistent. Having outlined the case study 
strategy in detail, it should be possible for readers to follow how the research has been 
carried out. This should also contribute in demonstrating the reliability of the research (Yin 
2014: 45-49). 
It might not be possible to draw generalisations from this qualitative research in the 
same way as with quantitative studies, but studying a wide range of FBOs, selected using 
the case study matrix, with both weak and strong roots within the devolved societies and 
more and less theologically moderate makes it possible to draw generalisations regarding 
FBOs in Wales and Northern Ireland. The thesis also draws some broader insights into FBO 
engagement at the sub-state level in the UK by triangulating this thesis’ findings with 
scholarship on FBO engagement in post-devolution Scotland.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and justified the thesis’ secondary research questions, variables 
and hypotheses, the selection of the two cases of Wales and Northern Ireland and the FBO 
case studies selected in each case according to the case study matrix. The chapter has also 
discussed the case study strategy utilised for this thesis and discussed the issue of bias, 
reliability and generalizability. The findings of this empirical research are now discussed in 
the second part of the thesis. 
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Chapter 5: The Case of Wales 
Introduction 
This Chapter investigates the three secondary research questions guiding the thesis in the 
case of Wales. The first section outlines the historical role of religion in Wales and discusses 
the potential opportunities political devolution has created for Faith-based Organisations 
(FBOs). Section 2 presents and analyses the findings in response to the three secondary 
research questions. In relation to the political advocacy structures of the FBOs, it finds that 
each of the FBOs have increased their capacity to engage with the devolved political 
institutions in Wales to differing extents. In response to the second secondary research 
question regarding FBO strategy, it finds that each FBO examined pursues an insider 
strategy, but supplements this with a responsible outsider strategy when their position is 
more controversial, or they foresee opposition from other interests. Each FBO has identified 
specific resources it can exchange with government decision makers, resulting in specialist 
or core insider status in return. Finally, examining findings with respect to the third 
secondary research question on FBO effectiveness, it illustrates that each FBO in the Wales 
case study are well placed to act as effective pressure groups. However, the weakly rooted 
FBOs are more reliant on the executive than the strongly rooted FBOs. Section three 
examines the findings in light of the hypotheses. It suggests that in the Wales case study 
devolved autonomy influences the political advocacy structure of FBOs, but roots within 
society do not influence their strategies or effectiveness as hypothesised. Theology does not 
appear to influence FBO strategies or effectiveness in this case.  
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5.1. The historical role of religion in Wales, and the potential 
opportunities for FBOs in post-devolution Wales. 
This section briefly outlines the historical significance of religion and the relationship 
between religion and politics in Wales. It indicates that religion has played a key role in 
Welsh politics historically and, despite secularisation, plays a continuing role in Wales’ 
political and public life. Following this, the opportunities the political devolution settlement 
in Wales affords FBOs will be discussed, serving as a backdrop to the chapter’s empirical 
findings of FBO engagement in Wales’ devolved political system. 
5.1.1 Religion and politics in Wales. 
In the introduction to his history of Christianity, the Oxford theologian Diaramid MacCulloch 
(2010: 7) gives a generous amount of attention to Wales and its Christian experience, 
highlighting the significance of the Christian religion and the greater than proportional role 
of Wales in the Christian story. The Christian tradition in Wales can be traced back to the 
early centuries AD (Walker 1976: 5-6). During the reformation, Protestantism became the 
national faith, and this manifested itself in nonconformity by the 1630s (Morgan 2004: 121). 
A distrust of state religion and a radical expression of faith meant that practising 
nonconformist religion was always a political act. However, over time the nonconformists 
travelled from being a persecuted sect to a respected establishment (Tudur 1992) making 
up what Davie (1994: 95) has referred to as ‘established dissidence’. This new establishment 
greatly influenced Welsh national identity and culture (Morgan 1999) and acted as the great 
benefactor of the Welsh language well into the twentieth century (Chambers 2011: 274).  
145 | P a g e  
 
It was also at this time that religion played its most formidable part in Welsh politics. If at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century the landed elite were the sole organisers of Welsh 
politics, by the middle of the century, the centre of political activity was located in the 
chapels (Cragoe 2004: 173). By the 1880s, the Liberal party had adopted a swathe of 
nonconformist issues such as land reform, tithe abolition, the plea for a non-sectarian 
scheme of general education and the disestablishment of the Church of England (Morgan 
1999: 329). The next generation of Liberal MPs fought hard to disestablish what they saw as 
the alien Anglican Church in Wales, arguing that nonconformity was ‘unambiguously Welsh’ 
(Morgan 1999: 330). They were successful in their campaign and by 1914 the Liberal 
government passed a bill to create an independent Anglican Church in Wales (Morgan 1999: 
330). It is impossible to separate the religion from the politics in this highly symbolic piece of 
legislation. 
If the Liberal party enjoyed the loyal support of nonconformists during the Victorian 
and Edwardian period, it was the Labour Party’s turn by the twentieth century (Morgan 
1999: 331). Socialism, known in many contexts for its disregard of organised religion, was 
closely associated to the chapels in Wales. Preachers such as Silyn Roberts and Keir Hardie 
presented a theology which tied the nonconformist faith to a socialist creed (Morgan 1999: 
332). This led to the development of a liberal theology, ‘inherently social in character’ (Pope 
1999: 105). However, for every man that nonconformity won, another was lost because of 
the incompatibility of his faith with socialism (Morgan 1999: 332-333, Ap Gwynfor 2014: 34-
35). Christianity also played an important part in the development of Welsh nationalism at 
this time. Catholic social teaching and its emphasis on subsidiarity greatly influenced Plaid 
Cymru’s founder Saunders Lewis (Sandry 2011: 146-147) and it was by aligning itself with 
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nonconformity that Plaid Cymru became a political force in Welsh life (Wyn Jones 2007: 
183).  
However, the latter half of the twentieth century was a difficult time for religion in 
Wales. As noted in Chapter 4, Wales has experienced deep secularisation with Church 
attendance dropping from over 50% of the population in 1851 (see Davies 1981: 33-34) to 
12% by 2007 (Ashworth and Farthing 2007: 10). Secularisation and decline is not the only 
story however. Wales has also seen a change in its religious makeup due to increased 
immigration. The Muslim community which originated in Cardiff’s Butetown has been 
steadily increasing (Chambers and Thompson 2005a: 34-35) and has become more active in 
the public sphere (Chambers 2006: 330-333). It has also been joined by a vibrant Hindu and 
Sikh community (see Office of National Statistics 2011, Chambers and Thompson 2005a: 38). 
There are also examples of churches demonstrating inventive ways of being church through 
social action and community engagement (Chambers 2011: 276-278).  
As regards the role of religion in society, in the latter half of the twentieth century, 
religious leaders have also played important public roles. This was seen when religious 
leaders acted as intermediates between the miners and the National Coal Board in 1984 
(Ballard 2008: 74) in an episode which left a permanent mark upon Welsh life. This incident 
was an important opportunity for church leaders to highlight their social and political worth 
to a society becoming less and less reliant upon religious leaders. As was noted in the 
literature review in Chapter 2, Wales’ faith leaders also played a role in the campaign for 
self-government for Wales. As early as 1969, the Union of Independents, the Baptist Union 
of Wales and the Presbyterian Church in Wales all showed their support for self-government 
in the evidence they gave to the Crowther Royal Commission on the Constitution in the 
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United Kingdom (known as the Kilbrandon Commission) (Davies 2008: 88-89). This support 
was to continue and intensify throughout the twentieth century. By 1972 the Council of 
Churches in Wales agreed on a resolution on devolution. Faith communities and FBOs were 
seen as stakeholders in Welsh society, playing a part in the 1997 referendum on devolution 
for Wales (Andrews 1999). Chambers and Thompson’s (2005a) research has also suggested, 
as discussed in Chapter 2, that FBOs which were undergoing a process of privatisation, have 
attempted a comeback in the guise of the devolved political sphere. 
5.1.2 The potential opportunities created by political devolution. 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that the devolution of power from Westminster to the sub-state 
level in Wales provided an opportunity for FBOs to engage politically in a way that had not 
before been possible. The National Assembly had limited powers conferred upon it in 1999, 
but as the Assembly’s arrangements have developed, the potential for FBOs to engage with 
devolved decision making has also evolved. This section investigates these opportunities in 
greater depth by examining in chronological order a number of important milestones which 
have provided potential access and opportunities for FBO engagement since 1999.  
As noted in Chapter 4, the Government of Wales Act (1998) transferred eighteen 
policy competencies from the Secretary of State for Wales to the National Assembly for 
Wales (Rawlings 2003: 62). FBOs engaged with the Welsh Office on a number of these policy 
areas under administrative devolution and hence while FBOs were not new to engaging with 
political institutions in Wales, political devolution set the basis for increasing the access 
points available to them. This democratisation might have reduced the ease with which 
certain privileged pressure groups could gain access to decision makers, but it also widened 
the possibility of access for organisations which were not a part of the tight-knit territorial 
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policy community based in the ‘Cathays Park village’ prior to 1999 (Deacon 2002: 160-176). 
Deacon (2002) does not dub any FBO as a key player in the Wales territorial policy 
community during the Welsh Office period. This is in contrast to the churches in Scotland 
and in Northern Ireland which are documented to have played key roles in their respective 
territorial polities prior to 1999 (Connolly 1990: 118-119, Keating 2010: 19). The widening of 
access brought about through political devolution in Wales may therefore have been a 
positive development for FBOs. For instance, an emphasis on policy consultation in Wales 
(Cairney 2008: 361, Chaney 2011: 268) has greatly increased the possibility of FBOs 
presenting their point of view to decision makers, something the more closed Westminster 
system did not always ensure (Watts 2007:160). 
In 1999, the National Assembly for Wales had executive devolution conferred upon it 
under a reserved powers model. FBOs in Wales were therefore engaging with a devolved 
institution with limited powers. The Assembly’s dependency on the Secretary of State to 
influence legislation at Westminster (Rawlings 2003: 500) and confusion regarding which 
powers lay in the hands of the devolved Assembly (Rawlings 2003: 69-70) may not have 
influenced the perceptions of pressure groups looking to influence policy in Wales. Even so, 
the Assembly’s powers over statutory instruments and secondary legislation potentially 
provided opportunities for FBOs to engage with the Assembly on substantive issues as the 
institution repealed or amended UK legislation for the purpose of enacting it in Wales 
(Rawlings 2003: 5-6). The Assembly’s seven subject committees with responsibility for 
scrutiny and enquiry (Birrell 2012: 100) also presented an access point for FBO engagement.   
The Welsh Government’s statutory duty to consult and encourage participation 
(Chaney 2011: 263) is also a positive aspect of the Welsh devolution settlement for pressure 
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groups such as FBOs. From 1999 onwards, ‘Faith’ received a seat at the Assembly’s 
Voluntary Sector Partnership Council. This body does not generally discuss issues that relate 
to one area of interest (WCVA undated), but FBOs have the opportunity to engage with the 
Minister for Communities on a biannual basis through the partnership’s ‘Faith’ 
representative. There is also some evidence that the Welsh Government’s duty to promote 
equality of opportunity in Wales has provided the prospect for FBOs to engage with the 
devolved political system. For instance, Chaney (2009: 13, 2011: 257) has noted that there 
has been a broadening of the equality strands from the initial standing order which included 
race, disability and gender to incorporate a wider range of equality strands including faith. 
However, Chaney (2009: 13) has also indicated that ‘faith’ has received less attention from 
policymakers than other equality ‘strands’ with those representing faith communities 
lacking the mobilising structures of equality strands such as gender, children and older 
people, making it difficult for them to have their ‘voices heard’ (Chaney 2011: 257). Even so, 
in 2001-2 former First Minister Rhodri Morgan (Morgan undated) established the Faith 
Communities Forum with the specific aim, ‘to ‘facilitate dialogue’ between the Assembly, 
Welsh Assembly Government and the major faith communities ‘on matters affecting 
economic, social and cultural life in Wales’ (Chaney 2011: 225, Welsh Government 2012a). 
The forum is made up of seven faiths, with each of the FBOs studied in the Wales case study 
represented. The forum has consistently been chaired by the First Minister since 2001 
(Welsh Government 2012a) providing an opportunity for FBOs to have their voices heard. 
Not only does this offer face-to-face engagement with the First Minister, it also provides an 
opportunity for informal discussion behind closed doors, ensuring that decision makers are 
fully aware of the FBOs’ position on a range of issues. This may have particularly 
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empowered weakly rooted FBOs, giving them access to the Welsh Government, which 
otherwise might not be possible. 
The Government of Wales Act (2006) furthered the opportunities for FBOs in Wales 
to influence legislation. The Act brought a formal end to the corporate body model which 
had created confusion regarding the internal workings of the Assembly, and was 
detrimental to participation (Wyn Jones and Trystan 2001: 25). The formal separation of the 
legislature and the executive was therefore a positive development for organisations such 
as FBOs wishing to engage politically with the devolved institutions, providing clarity on who 
to approach on which issues. As noted in Chapter 4, the Assembly also received the power 
to pass legislation in the form of Assembly Measures in 20 fields through Legislative 
Competence Orders (LCO), initiated by the National Assembly and then approved by the 
Assembly and both Houses of Parliament (Birrell 2012: 18). Though there were substantial 
problems arising from the complexity of this system, this provided FBOs with the 
opportunity to engage with distinctly Welsh legislation. The committee stage of the 
legislative competence motions (LCOs) and Measures were dealt with by legislation 
committees (Birrell 2012: 100) which FBOs could potentially influence through providing 
evidence. However this process was highly complex. The Assembly’s Public Petitions 
Committee was also established as part of the changes brought about by the Government of 
Wales Act (2006), allowing a ‘diversity of social interests to engage in policy-making’ 
(Chaney 2011: 263). In 2011, an affirmative referendum conferred primary law making 
powers on the Assembly, providing organisations such as FBOs with the opportunity to 
engage with the primary legislative process in twenty devolved areas. Since 2011, the 
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Assembly has passed a number of acts in a range of policy areas of interest to FBOs, such as 
education, health, social care and the Welsh language.   
Another access point specifically for FBO engagement was created through the 
legislature in the formation of the Cross Party Group on Faith in 2008. The Cross Party 
Group on Faith works to highlight the positive contribution of FBOs to communities in Wales 
(National Assembly for Wales undated) and can be used as a vehicle for FBOs to extend their 
agendas, using supportive Assembly Members (AMs) to highlight their interests. This space 
could be particularly useful for FBOs if their policy position is contrary to government, and 
they are looking for allies within the legislature to support their case. 
Overall, devolution has presented FBOs with a number of potential opportunities for 
engagement, but civil society organisations and interest groups have also noted that 
engaging with the petitioning and legislative processes of the National Assembly for Wales 
can be burdensome, requiring extensive staff resources and expertise (Day 2006, Rumbul 
2013: 140). It may therefore be the case that some organisations will be better placed than 
others to make the most of the opportunities provided.   
In summary, this section has shown that religion has played a key part in Wales’ 
politics both now and historically. Further to this, the devolution settlement in Wales has 
provided a number of access points for FBOs to engage with the devolved political 
institutions. As has been indicated above, the opportunity for engagement has expanded 
over time as the powers conferred upon the Assembly have been extended. The remainder 
of this empirical chapter analyses how FBOs have attempted to capitalise on these 
opportunities by engaging with Wales’ devolved institutions. 
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5.1.3 The Cases 
Having discussed religion and politics in Wales and the opportunities political devolution has 
provided for engagement, this section provides the background to the political engagement 
of the FBO case studies prior to 1999. This acts as a backdrop to the post-devolution findings 
in the following sections. Each FBO case study is discussed in turn.  
Since its disestablishment, the Church in Wales has been active in Welsh politics, 
with many of its Archbishops taking a great interest in political issues. This political 
engagement heightened under the leadership of Archbishop Glyn Simon in 1968, who 
campaigned on issues such as the Welsh language and nuclear disarmament (Walker 1976: 
177). The Church in Wales has also used its directors of education in each diocese to engage 
in education policy, as is noted by Jones (1990: 159). The Church also had a member of staff 
who engaged with political issues, before political devolution, with responsibility for what 
was called ‘social responsibility’.14 Education has always been a major area of concern for 
the Church, but it does not seem evident that the Church in Wales had the same status 
within the Wales territorial policy community as the Church of Scotland and Church of 
Ireland had in their respective territorial policy communities prior to 1999.   
As regards the Catholic Church in Wales, Hughes (2014: 75-76) notes that by the 
1960s Catholics had become an accepted part of Welsh life and began to work towards 
creating a ‘Welsh consciousness’ under the leadership of Welsh speaking Archbishop, 
Michael McGrath (Hughes 2014: 76). In terms of pre-1999 lobbying, the Church’s campaign 
for Catholic education and funding has already been noted (Hughes 1999: 131-157). 
However, like the Church in Wales, the Catholic Church does not seem to have possessed 
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 Interview with senior respondent from the Church in Wales (3 March 2015). 
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the status the Catholic Church of Scotland or the Catholic Church of Ireland enjoyed as part 
of their respective territorial policy communities prior to 1999.  
The Council for Churches in Wales and Cytûn were politically active for most of the 
second half of the twentieth century. As noted in the previous sub-section, they engaged 
with the question of self-government for Wales and industrial disputes (Davies 2008: 92, 96-
97, Hibbs 1985). They also engaged on the question of ‘the moral fabric of Welsh society’ 
(Williams and Davies 1996: 1). However, this political engagement was limited as Cytûn only 
had two members of staff prior to 1999, a General Secretary and an administrative assistant 
(Cytûn 1999).15 Cytûn’s political engagement was undertaken by the General Secretary with 
willing volunteers, mainly clergy from Cytûn’s member denominations (see Williams and 
Davies 1996, Hibbs 1985).    
Before the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales, the Muslim 
community engaged politically on an ad-hoc basis through community figureheads. For 
instance, Sheikh Al-Hakimi represented the community to Cardiff’s civic authorities from as 
early as the 1940s, negotiating appropriate burial spaces (Gilliat-Ray and Mellor 2010) as 
well as ensuring a local authority contribution towards the building of the first mosque in 
Wales in 1947 (Chambers 2015: 212). The story of Muslim engagement with local 
government presents an image of community leaders gaining ground on behalf of a small 
Muslim minority. However, while there is evidence of successful engagement with local 
government, little is known regarding the Welsh Office’s engagement with the Muslim 
community prior to political devolution.  
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In sum, each FBO has experience of engaging politically prior to 1999. However, this 
political engagement is mixed, with some FBOs in Wales engaging in a much more active 
manner. 
5.1.4 The Hypotheses 
Before reporting on the findings of how the FBOs have engaged with the devolved political 
system in section 2, 3 and 4, the expected findings, as hypothesised, are outlined. For this 
case, it is possible to test hypotheses 1, 3 and 5-11. 
H1: ‘As the devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
higher the levels of capacity within the political advocacy structures of FBOs’. 
In response to Hypothesis 1, we expect to see a greater level of capacity within the 
political advocacy structures of FBOs as a greater level of autonomy is devolved to Wales 
and as the devolution settlement becomes more entrenched. 
H3: ‘As devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the more 
likely it is that the region’s FBOs develop a distinct strategy for political engagement at the 
sub-state level’. 
In respect to hypothesis 3, we expect so see FBOs in Wales developing more distinct 
strategies as the powers in the region become more extensive and entrenched. 
H5: ‘The stronger the FBO’s roots within the devolved region, the more likely it is to have a 
staff based political advocacy structure’. 
There is an expectation that the Church in Wales and the Catholic Church will have a 
staff-based political advocacy structure owing to their stronger roots in society, while the 
155 | P a g e  
 
Muslim Council of Wales (MCW) and Cytûn will not, owing to their relatively weaker roots 
within society. 
H6: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is to 
utilise an insider strategy’. 
On the basis of Hypothesis 6, there is a greater expectation that the Church in Wales 
and the Catholic Church will pursue an insider strategy than the MCW and Cytûn. 
H7: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is that 
devolved institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
Hypothesis 7 leads to the expectation that the Church in Wales and the Catholic 
Church are more likely to have core or specialist insider status conferred upon them by the 
devolved institutions than Cytûn and the MCW. 
H8: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is to pursue an insider 
strategy’.  
Hypothesis 8 takes us in a different direction. In light of this hypothesis, there is a 
greater expectation that the Church in Wales and Cytûn will pursue an insider strategy than 
the MCW and the Catholic Church. 
H9: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is that the devolved 
institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
Similarly, Hypothesis 9 leads to the expectation that the Church in Wales and Cytûn 
are more likely to have core or specialist insider status conferred upon them than the MCW 
and the Catholic Church. 
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H10: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the better placed it is to 
act as an effective pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
In response to Hypothesis 10, we expect to see the Church in Wales and the Catholic 
Church better placed to act as effective pressure groups than the MCW and Cytûn. 
H11: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the better placed it is to act as an effective 
pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
Hypothesis 11 on the other hand, leads to the expectation that the Church in Wales 
and Cytûn are better placed to act as effective pressure groups than the MCW and the 
Catholic Church.  
5.2. Findings and Analysis 
Section 1 provided an historical context for FBO political engagement and assessed the 
hypotheses in the case of Wales. On this basis, the findings in relation to FBO engagement 
post-1999 can now be presented.   
5.2.1 Political Advocacy Structure: Findings 
This section examines the first secondary research question, which asks:  
‘What type of political advocacy structures have faith-based organisations adopted to 
engage with political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
As noted in Chapter 4, this thesis examines three aspects of FBO political advocacy 
structure; whether it is a centralised or devolved organisation, whether its elite run or 
democratic and whether its engagement is carried out by volunteers or professional staff 
members. Each is considered below in the case of the FBOs selected for Wales. How the 
157 | P a g e  
 
FBOs have adapted to engage with the devolved political institutions in Wales is also 
examined. The section suggests that the majority of FBOs in the case of Wales are territorial 
organisations affiliated to the central level with a high level of autonomy. The Catholic 
Church, as the only non-territorial organisation under study, has devolved some level of 
autonomy from the central level to the sub-state level over education policy. Further to this, 
apart from the MCW, each FBO has increased the capacity of its political advocacy structure 
by appointing staff to engage with the political institutions at the sub-state level. The MCW 
on the other hand has developed a voluntary based political advocacy structure since 2001 
so as to engage with the devolved political institutions in Wales.  
5.2.1.1 The Church in Wales 
The Church in Wales is a territorial organisation which utilises a partially democratic based 
political advocacy structure, although elites are dominant in its day to day engagement. The 
organisation is staff based with limited opportunity for voluntary engagement. The Church 
has increased its staff capacity to engage with the devolved institutions. 
With regards to whether the Church in Wales has a devolved or centralised political 
advocacy structure, it is what Keating et al (2009) refer to as a territorial organisation 
affiliated to the central level. Since its disestablishment in 1914, it has been affiliated to the 
Church of England as one of the 38 member churches of the worldwide Anglican 
Communion (see Anglican Communion undated), but this affiliation is loose, and it enjoys a 
high level of autonomy at the territorial level. For instance, the Church in Wales makes its 
own theological, ecclesiastical and political decisions (Doe 2004: 99-100). The Church has a 
democratic aspect to its political advocacy structure, but is heavily elite dominated. The 
Church’s Governing Body is the democratic organ of the Church in Wales, making decisions 
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regarding the Church’s policy since 1918 (Harris and Startup 1999: 2-3) and is made up of 
laity, clergy and bishops (Church in Wales undated b). This forum enables influencing Church 
policy and political positions through voting and presenting private members’ motions 
(Church in Wales 2014). When a motion is passed, the Church in Wales’ staff pursues the 
issue on behalf of the Governing Body.16 This is an important democratic outlet, but it only 
meets twice a year, with items for the agenda organised well in advance, somewhat limiting 
membership involvement.17 Because of this, the Bishops have considerable power over the 
Church’s political agenda and engagement, as the bishops can take a position together or 
individually, which is often reported in the media.  
The Church in Wales’s political advocacy structure prioritises staff over voluntary 
engagement. The Church has limited voluntary involvement with some lay members sitting 
on the Church’s committees such as ‘Church Action for Sustaining the Environment’. 
However, these committees are sub-groups of the ‘Church and Society’ department and are 
therefore headed by a Bishop.18 Furthermore, much of the Church’s engagement is carried 
out by professional staff members. For instance, the Archbishop and bishops utilise a 
communications officer to communicate political positions on their behalf (see Church in 
Wales undated c). The role of professional staff in the Church’s political engagement has 
also increased since political devolution as the Church has adapted to engage with the 
devolved institution. In 1999, the Church in Wales did not appoint a policy officer, but 
instead decided that Cytûn’s Liaison Officer to the National Assembly would represent the 
Church politically. However, by 2002, the Church decided to appoint a ‘Bishops’ Adviser for 
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 Interview with a senior respondent from the Church in Wales (7
th
 January 2015).  
17
 Interview with a senior respondent from the Church in Wales (7
th
 January 2015). 
18
 Interview with senior respondents from the Church in Wales (19th February 2015 and 3 March 2015). 
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Church and Society’ to engage politically.19 This role includes attending meetings with 
ministers and officials as well as responding to formal consultations.20 The researcher was 
not explicitly told in an interview with Church staff members that the appointment 
responded to the Church’s need to engage with the Assembly, but the way in which the 
respondents discussed their relationship with Cytûn gave this impression. For instance, 
when asked how the Church balanced its engagement with Cytûn’s engagement, the 
respondent noted: 
if you try and get something that everybody can sign up to, it’s going to end up 
being very, very bland. It’s hard, I think it’s probably harder for them (Cytûn) 
than it is for us because we can always say well we’re going to say what we want 
to say no matter what.21 
This suggests that the Church in Wales realised that it needed to ensure that it had a 
distinct voice to engage politically from 2002 onwards through the Church’s Advisor for 
Church and Society. When the Church appointed a new Advisor in 2011, its role was 
outlined as working with the Welsh Government and assisting the Bishops on policy 
development (South Wales Evening Post 2011). The Church was therefore structurally well 
positioned to engage with the Assembly as it received primary law making powers. 
In sum, the Church is a territorial organisation affiliated to an organisation at the 
central state level. Its political advocacy structure has a democratic organ within it, but elite 
decision making plays an important role through its Bishops. The Church’s political advocacy 
structure allows for some voluntary political engagement, but its Bishops do the majority of 
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 Interview with Senior respondents from the Church in Wales (3rd March 2015) 
20
 Interview with a senior respondent from the Church in Wales (7
th
 January 2015). 
21
 Interview with senior respondent from the Church in Wales with responsibility for political engagement (7
th
 
January 2015).  
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the Church’s political engagement. The Church has increased its capacity by appointing a 
member of staff from 2002 onwards to ensure its voice is heard within the sub-state 
political system. 
5.2.1.2 The Catholic Church in England and Wales 
The Catholic Church has an elite run political advocacy structure and utilises professional 
staff over voluntary engagement. Its political advocacy structure is centralised, but has since 
2015 experienced an element of ‘institutional isomorphism’, opening a branch office with 
responsibility for education in response to policy incongruence between Wales and 
Westminster.  
The Catholic Church has an elite run political advocacy structure. Its engagement is 
therefore dominated by elites, whether this is bishops or professional members of staff. Its 
main decision making body is the Catholic Bishop’s Conference of England and Wales, in 
which the laity has no direct involvement. The Welsh Bishops also speak out on distinctly 
Welsh issues (BBC News Wales 2011a). Not only is the decision making process of the 
Church elite dominated, but its political advocacy structure utilises professional staff over 
voluntary activism. The Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales is served by a London 
based secretariat. This includes a range of departments which take part in political 
engagement, including the Catholic Education Service (CES) and the Parliamentary Affairs 
team which act as apex bodies within the Catholic Church. There is some minimal 
opportunity for lay involvement, as members with particular expertise can take part in the 
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work of a Commission. The work of this Commission might then feed into the wider political 
engagement of the Church.22 
As a part of the larger province of the Catholic Church in England and Wales, the 
Church has little autonomy at the territorial level, with the Church acting as an UK 
organisation engaging at the territorial level on most issues. However, since political 
devolution, the Catholic Church in Wales has experienced a partial level of Keating’s 
(2013:119) institutional isomorphism. The Church has provided some autonomy to Wales, 
by opening a branch office of the Bishops’ Conference’s Catholic Education Service and by 
appointing a CES Advisor to engage with the area of education in Wales in January 2015 (see 
Catholic Education Service 2015: 12). This advisor works part time for the CES and part time 
for the Diocese of Cardiff (Catholic Education Service undated b). The advisor is responsible 
for building proactive relationships with the Welsh Government and Assembly, engaging 
with consultation processes and representing the CES at meetings with ministers and other 
relevant bodies (Catholic Education Service undated b). This is only a small level of 
adaptation, but the reasons behind it are insightful. According to respondents from the 
Church with responsibility for education, the CES did not see the development in education 
policy in Wales as divergent enough to justify the need for a regional officer in Wales until 
2015.23 However, he noted that changes to education policy after the establishment of the 
coalition government in Westminster required a regional advisor to engage politically on 
behalf of the Catholic Church in Wales.24 This would suggest that policy divergence between 
Westminster and the Assembly led to the Catholic Church devolving autonomy from London 
to Wales. Respondents from the Church did not rule out devolving further power to Wales if 
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 Interview with respondent involved with the Catholic Church in Wales (26
th
 February 2015). 
23
 Interview with senior respondent from CES (11
th
 February 2015). 
24
 Interview with senior respondent from CES (11
th
 February 2015). 
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policy areas of interest such as justice or ‘life issues’ issues were devolved from 
Westminster.25 The role is still answerable to the London office (Catholic Education Service 
undated b), but, it is worth noting that the advisor’s engagement with the Welsh 
Government and Local Education Authorities in Wales in 2015 was given its own short 
chapter in the CES’ Annual Report (Catholic Education Service 2015: 12), as opposed to a 
sub-section in the previous year’s report (Catholic Education Service 2014: 7). This signals 
that CES now perceives its engagement in Wales to be somewhat separate to its 
engagement in England. 
In summary, the Catholic Church in Wales is elite driven with very little opportunity 
for member involvement in decision-making and prioritises professional staff over volunteer 
engagement. It has partial autonomy at the sub-state level, having increased its capacity in 
Wales in 2015 by appointing a member of staff with responsibility for education in response 
to the policy incongruence which has developed between England and Wales.   
5.2.1.3 Cytûn: Churches Together in Wales 
Cytûn is a territorial organisation with a loose affiliation to the central level. It has a 
democratic political advocacy structure and is staff based, using only limited voluntary 
engagement. Cytûn has increased its staff capacity to engage with the devolved institution.   
As a member of ‘Churches Together in Britain and Ireland’, Cytûn is what Keating et al 
(2009) refer to as a territorial organisation affiliated to the central level. It is a fully 
autonomous body made up of denominations, churches and agencies in Wales (see Cytûn 
undated) and is funded by its members through an annual subscription fee (see Cytûn 2008) 
making it financially autonomous from the central level. Cytûn’s political advocacy structure 
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 Interview with senior respondent from CES (11
th
 February 2015). 
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is democratic. In contrast to its predecessor body, the Council of Churches in Wales, it does 
not take a lead for churches on issues, but encourages discussion and consideration of 
different issues amongst its membership (Davies 2008:95, Cytûn 2015-16). An interviewee 
from Cytûn explained that this principle is extended to the organisation seeking to represent 
the different positions of its member churches to the devolved institutions.26 Therefore, 
Cytûn’s political advocacy structure is such that it consults its members’ views and 
represents these to decision makers, while encouraging common working. Representation is 
therefore always a careful balancing act for Cytûn. For instance, in 1997, Cytûn was accused 
of being biased in favour of devolution by some of its members (Cytûn News 1997), while 
other members criticised Cytûn for not giving enough support for devolution (Davies 2008: 
96). Cytûn’s inability to lead on issues has frustrated some affiliated members.27 
In response to political devolution, Cytûn’s political advocacy structure has become 
more staff focused. As was noted in Section 1, prior to 1999 Cytûn’s political engagement 
was limited by a lack of staff capacity but this has changed in response to devolution. On the 
2nd of July 1998, Cytûn’s Council decided that working with the National Assembly and 
enabling churches to work with the institution would become one of its priorities (Cytûn 
News 1998) and hence Cytûn appointed a political liaison officer to the National Assembly in 
1999 (Cytûn News 1999). Cytûn emphasised that this was for liaising rather than lobbying 
purposes (Cytûn News 1999), but the role was responsible for engaging in the policy process 
(Ballard 2008: 78). Interview respondents from Cytûn gave the impression that it appointed 
this member of staff from 1999 because it was eager to engage with the new institution and 
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 Interview with senior respondents from Cytûn (8
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 Interview with senior respondents from two of Cytûn’s member denominations (January 23
rd
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keen to offer support to the devolution process.28 This makes sense as the appointment was 
also made in the shadow of Cytûn’s involvement with the debate for self-government, the 
Council of Churches in Wales’ support for devolution in 1979, and the support for 
devolution by a number of the nonconformist denominations represented by Cytûn (Davies 
2008: 88-95). Furthermore, the liaison officer appointed in 1999 had campaigned vigorously 
for an Assembly in the referendum in 1997 (Andrews 1999: 162). It is no surprise, therefore, 
that Cytûn appointed a liaison officer from this early point. While this role has subsequently 
become a part time role, the Policy Officer and Chief Executive both engage politically as 
part of their roles (the Chief Executive was the Policy Officer prior to becoming the Chief 
Executive) and hence the impression is that the same level of political engagement 
continues despite this change. 
In sum, Cytûn is a territorial organisation affiliated to an organisation at the central 
state level from which it is wholly autonomous. Its political advocacy structure is 
democratic, consulting its member denominations and representing their position to 
decision makers. Cytûn’s political engagement is staff focused, particularly since it increased 
its staff capacity to engage with the National Assembly for Wales in 1999. 
5.2.1.4 The Muslim Council of Wales 
The MCW is a territorial organisation affiliated to the central level. Its political advocacy 
structure is democratic and voluntary based. It has mobilised as an organisation and 
developed this voluntary based political advocacy structure to engage with the devolved 
institution. 
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 Interview with senior respondents from Cytûn and (8
th
 January 2015) and a senior respondent formerly of 
the Council of Churches in Wales and Cytûn (January 29
th
 2015). 
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The MCW is a territorial organisation affiliated to a UK organisation. The MCW is affiliated to 
the Muslim Council of Britain (Jilani 2014: 223), but it has full autonomy over devolved 
matters (Ahmed 2016) and hence a large amount of autonomy to structure its advocacy for 
the purpose of engaging with decision makers in Wales. However, the MCW also speaks out 
on national and international issues, offering a distinctly Welsh Islamic perspective on issues 
such as the bombings in London in 2005 (BBC News Wales 2005) and the Charlie Hebdo 
shooting in Paris in 2015 (Wightwick 2015). The MCW’s autonomy comes from the fact that 
it is not a branch of the Muslim Council of Britain, but instead was mobilised in Wales in 
response to political devolution, only affiliating to the Muslim Council of Britain after its 
initial mobilisation. In 2001, the community was gathered by the then First Minister, Rhodri 
Morgan, to share its issues with him and his officials.29 The First Minister was keen to ensure 
community cohesion amongst the different faith communities in Wales, particularly after 
the events of September 11th 2001 (Morgan undated). The Muslim community were keen to 
oblige, with 70 representatives from the faith community attending the meeting. With such 
a large number in attendance, it was difficult for the Muslim community to speak with a 
coherent voice and hence the Muslim community considered it necessary to respond to 
political devolution with a ‘local body’.30 Furthermore, Morgan asked the community to 
choose representatives who could speak on their behalf.31 It was from this pivotal moment 
that the MCW began to develop it political advocacy structure so that the Muslim 
community could engage with the political institutions at the sub-state level. A MCW 
interviewee explained that as the devolution process has continued, and become more 
entrenched in the region, the MCW has become more comfortable engaging in the sub-
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 Interview with senior respondent from the Muslim Council of Wales (February 9
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 2015). 
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state political system, as the organisation has become part of the fabric of the devolution 
process.32 
The MCW has a democratic political advocacy structure based on a delegate system. 
The Council is structured so that affiliated members can feed into the process of political 
engagement (Muslim Council of Wales undated b). Affiliated members include mosques, 
Muslim organisations and charities (Ahmed 2016). Each affiliated member nominates a 
delegate to join the MCW’s General Council. From this General Council, an Executive Council 
is chosen. This Executive Board then chooses a General Secretary.33 A small team of 
individuals then represent the affiliated members in a voluntary capacity. The MCW’s 
political advocacy structure is voluntary based. A key figure in the Council, Saleem Kidwai, 
acted as secretary of the MCW for the first five years, and is now the organisation’s General 
Secretary  on a voluntary basis (Jilani 2014: 223). Further to this, the MCW encourages 
member activism, as was evident during the ‘Yes for Wales’ referendum campaign in 2011 
(Reflections 2011b, Whitaker 2014: 14). 
In summary, the MCW is a territorial organisation affiliated to the central level but is 
wholly autonomous in its political engagement. This autonomy comes from having been 
partly mobilised with the support of the First Minister and the Welsh Assembly 
Government, which conferred legitimacy upon the organisation from 2001 onwards. The 
Council has a democratic decision making process based on a delegate system and utilises 
volunteers in its engagement rather than professional staff. 
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5.2.2 Political Advocacy Structure: Analysis 
The case of Wales indicates that the majority of FBOs are territorial organisations, with 
loose affiliation to the central level, enjoying a high level of autonomy. The Catholic Church 
on the other hand has minimal autonomy at the sub-state level over one policy area, 
education, through the opening of a branch office with a Wales adviser for education in 
January 2015. Apart from the Catholic Church, each FBO has an aspect of democracy in their 
political advocacy structures. Cytûn and the MCW use a delegate system to provide a voice 
for their membership in their political advocacy, while the Church in Wales balances an 
aspect of delegated democracy through the Governing Body with elite engagement through 
its bishops. The findings suggest that the Bishops are dominant within the political advocacy 
structure. Each FBO has a staff based political advocacy structure, apart from the MCW 
which adopted a voluntary based political advocacy structure to engage with the devolved 
institutions. Each of the FBOs with a staff based political advocacy structure increased its 
staffing capacity to engage with the devolved institutions. 
As further powers have been devolved and become entrenched, the FBOs increased 
their capacity to engage. These findings are line with Keating’s (2013:119) claim that the 
devolution of power from the centre to the sub-state level can induce pressure groups to 
follow suit and engage politically in the region. The Catholic Church of England and Wales 
has been induced to devolve autonomy to the sub-state level in response to policy 
divergence in education between Wales and England, underlining the effect political 
devolution has had on the organisation’s political advocacy structure. The MCW has been 
mobilised in response to political devolution, developing a territorial, democratic and 
voluntary based political advocacy structure taking advantage of new opportunities to 
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engage politically at the sub-state level. Keating’s (2013: 123) claim that sub-state 
governments encourage and even sponsor pressure groups to adapt to the sub-state level 
has therefore been confirmed in the case of Wales. Furthermore, Cytûn and the Church in 
Wales have increased their capacity to engage with the devolved political institutions.  
It is also possible that Keating’s ‘identiarian’ driver has also played a role in the case 
of Cytûn. As noted in Chapter 3, Keating (2013: 119-120) argues that an attachment to the 
region or a decentralist tradition or philosophy can act as a driver of adaptation at the sub-
state level. The evidence suggests that Cytûn increased its capacity in 1999 because of its 
alignment to the territorial level and its tacit support for political devolution. 
In summary, the FBOs selected for the case of Wales have diverse political advocacy 
structures. The majority of FBOs are territorial organisations with a high level of autonomy, 
while the Catholic Church has minimal autonomy at the sub-state level. Cytûn and the MCW 
are democratic organisations, while the Catholic Church is an elite led organisation with the 
Church in Wales balancing a democratic political advocacy structure with elite decision 
making. Finally, each FBO has a staff based political advocacy structure apart from the 
MCW. Each FBO has increased its capacity to take advantage of the opportunity to engage 
with the devolved political institutions. 
5.2.3 Strategy: Findings 
Following the examination of the political advocacy structures of FBOs in the previous 
section, this section analyses the second secondary research question, which asks: 
‘What type of strategies have faith-based organisations adopted to engage with the political 
institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
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The strategies adopted by the FBOs are investigated using the three policy areas 
presented in Chapter 4; education, the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act and 
constitutional issues. The section indicates that each FBO pursues an insider strategy, and 
supplement it with a responsible outsider strategy. Strongly rooted FBOs make the most 
extensive use of the responsible outsider strategy.  Each FBO has specialist or core insider 
status conferred upon it. The strongly rooted FBOs utilise traditional resources such as 
education provision to secure this status, but the weakly rooted FBOs identify specific 
resources particularly desirable in the devolved context.  Likewise, the Welsh Government’s 
sponsored faith structure has provided access to the MCW which it might otherwise not 
receive.  
5.2.3.1. The Church in Wales 
The Church in Wales pursues an insider strategy in each of the policy areas, supplementing 
this with a responsible outsider strategy where use is made of the media and public events. 
The outsider strategy is most apparent in relation to the Human Transplantation legislation 
and constitutional issues, and much less so in relation to education. The Church in Wales has 
specialist insider status conferred upon it in each policy area. 
5.2.3.1.1. Education 
The Church in Wales provides education for 25,000 pupils in Wales across 172 primary and 
secondary schools (Church in Wales undated a), and is therefore an important part of the 
education landscape in Wales. The Archbishop of Wales speaks out publicly on issues 
associated with education (see WalesOnline 2012), but the bulk of the Church’s engagement 
is pursued by the Church’s Education Department which works with the Welsh 
Government’s internal processes through insider means. There is a perception that at times 
170 | P a g e  
 
the Church receives peripheral treatment from the Welsh Government, but there is also 
evidence that the Church receives specialist insider status.  
The Church’s Education Division consists of the Provincial Education Officer who 
takes responsibility for national education policy, and the diocesan education officers based 
in each diocese (Church in Wales undated c). This Education Division engages by responding 
to government consultations, and giving evidence to Assembly committees.34 The Standing 
Advisory Councils for Religious Education (SACREs) are also important spaces where the 
Church in Wales has access, along with other FBOs set up in each local authority to design 
the religious education curriculum (see Ap Siôn 2014). The Church’s capacity for 
engagement and access is also bolstered by working as part of a wider faith sector. In this 
respect, it has an ally in the Catholic Church with which it can work to defend the principle 
of faith education and lobby to ensure that the sector receives fair treatment from 
government and local authorities. A senior respondent from the Education Division noted 
how important it was for the sector to work together to defend faith schools in Wales.35 By 
engaging on behalf of the sector the Church is able to bolster its position within the 
education landscape in Wales, and lobby for a number of common issues. For instance, the 
faith sector is represented on the Welsh Government’s 21st century schools programme 
board, providing it with an opportunity for the sector to argue for further provision from the 
state in terms of school buildings, on an equal basis with other stakeholders in education 
such as local authorities, further education colleges and government officials (21st Century 
Schools Undated).  
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 Interview with senior respondent, Church in Wales (February 9
th
 2015). 
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The Church in Wales has a number of access points for engaging as an insider, but 
the political environment in Wales has not been as open to faith education as it has in 
England. New Labour pursued an agenda of faith education in England (Gardner 2005: 8), a 
policy continued by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government (Harrison 
2010), but the Welsh Government has not been as open. According to a former senior 
Welsh Government Minister, this was a point of contention that was well aired in the Faith 
Communities Forum in the early years of the devolution process.36 Likewise, the perception 
that faith education needed defending was clear in Archbishop Rowan Williams’ Presidential 
Address on the issue in 2002 (Williams 2002). This averse atmosphere to faith education 
surfaced again in 2009 when Welsh Labour leadership candidate, Edwina Hart, expressed 
her wish for faith education in Wales to ‘whither on the vine’ (Shipton 2009).  
The impression of a sometimes uneasy relationship between the Church in Wales 
and the Welsh Government was further bolstered by a senior respondent from the Church 
in Wales who noted that the Church does not get as close to the Welsh Government’s 
decision making processes as he believed a statutory body should.37 This would suggest that 
the status conferred upon the Church by the Welsh Government is somewhat peripheral. 
However, while this perception exists, the same respondent also gave the impression that 
the relationship between the Church and the Labour Welsh Government in the area of 
education had taken time to gel, with their working relationship improving over time.38  
There is also evidence that the Church’s status is in reality closer to a specialist insider 
status. For instance, in 2011 the Church in Wales and the Catholic Church co-wrote a paper 
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with the Welsh Government titled ‘Faith in Wales’ (Welsh Government 2011a) which clearly 
set out the role of the Church in Wales in education provision and in shaping the curriculum. 
By outlining the role of faith education, and presenting a number of examples of best 
practice found in faith schools, this document puts in writing the important contribution the 
faith sector makes to education, strengthening the sector’s standing within education in 
Wales. Not only is the existence of the document a positive development for the Church in 
Wales, but its launch, fronted by the then Minister for Education Leighton Andrews and the 
Archbishop of Wales and Catholic Archbishop of Cardiff (see Morell 2011), also provided the 
Church with an excellent opportunity to display the sector publicly alongside the cabinet 
minister. Likewise, the Bishops noted in their evidence to the Silk Commission in 2013 that 
they saw the publication of the document as a sign of support from the Welsh Government 
(Church in Wales 2013: 4). The minister’s acknowledgment at the conference that all sectors 
needed to be involved in raising school standards (Morell 2011) consolidated the place of 
the faith sector in education in Wales.        
5.2.3.1.2 The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 
The Church in Wales pursues an insider strategy supplemented by a responsible outsider 
strategy in the case of the Human Transplantation (Wales) Act, with its staff using the Welsh 
Government’s internal consultation process to attempt to change the detail of the 
legislation while the Archbishop spoke publicly about his opposition to the legislation 
through the media. The evidence indicates that the Church in Wales received a specialist 
insider status in this area. 
The Church in Wales’ insider strategy was first pursued in coalition with the Catholic 
Church and the Orthodox Mission. The FBOs responded to the consultation on the Welsh 
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Government’s White Paper in 2012. The White Paper notes that the families of the 
deceased would be ‘involved in the decision making process around donation’ (Welsh 
Government 2011b: 9) but the coalition argued: ‘The law needs to state unambiguously 
whether, in the absence of an explicit statement of the wishes of the deceased, the relatives 
will be able to refuse permission for the removal of organs’ (Church in Wales et al 2012). 
The Bishop’s adviser for Church and Society continued to use the insider mechanism, giving 
more detailed evidence to the Assembly’s Health and Social Committee in February 2013. 
The representative of the Church in Wales noted the Bishop’s opposition to the principle, 
further underlining the role of the family (National Assembly for Wales 2013a: 20). 
The Bishop’s adviser pursued this insider strategy, while the Archbishop of Wales 
pursued a responsible outsider strategy through the media, initiating a public debate which 
otherwise might not have happened. In defiance of the political establishment’s support for 
the legislation, he argued before the Governing Body in his 2011 Presidential address that 
the legislation would create a situation where: ‘our bodies are State assets and therefore at 
the State’s disposal’ (Morgan 2011b). This type of hyperbolic language was picked up by the 
media and covered extensively (see BBC News Wales 2011b, and WalesOnline 2011). The 
Archbishop continued to speak out publicly against the legislation until it was passed (see 
BBC News Wales 2013b). It is likely the Archbishop knew the legislation was not going to be 
repealed, but his responsible outsider strategy put pressure on the Welsh Government, 
while his adviser simultaneously pushed the role of the family through the insider strategy. 
This reflects Binderkrantz’s (2005: 703) findings, that organisations will pressure decision 
makers through an outsider strategy while approaching decision makers directly through 
the insider strategy.   
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In April 2013, the Health Minister noted when responding to the questions of AMs 
that he wanted further discussions with faith communities regarding the role of the family 
(BBC News Wales 2013c). That same month, the minister announced that the role of the 
family would be strengthened in the legislation, referring to the Health and Social Care 
Committee’s evidence as a reason for the amendment (BBC News Wales 2013c). The 
committee’s report gave the evidence of the Bishop’s Adviser as support for its 
recommendation regarding the role of the family (National Assembly for Wales 2013b: 58). 
Therefore, in terms of MacKay et al’s (2005: 10) continuum of influence, the evidence 
suggests that the Church in Wales succeeded in changing the terms of the public debate, 
provoking reconsideration of the legislation and seeing concrete changes in policy 
outcomes. 
5.2.3.1.3 Constitutional Issues 
The thresholder strategy is also evident in the Church in Wales’s engagement with 
constitutional issues. The Church has oscillated between an insider and responsible outsider 
strategy, submitting evidence to constitutional commissions and utilising an outsider 
strategy in its usage of the media and public events. 
The Church in Wales gave evidence to the Richard commission via insider 
engagement through Cytûn (see Cytûn 2003), and then pursued an insider and  a 
responsible outsider strategy in the continuing constitutional debate. Archbishop Barry 
Morgan then agreed to become the public face of ‘Cymru Yfory’, a civil society movement 
working to see the Richard Commission’s recommendations implemented (see Morgan 
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2009).39 Under Morgan’s leadership, ‘Cymru Yfory’ briefed and lobbied Members of both 
Houses of Parliament when the Government of Wales Act was under consideration in 2005-
6 (Morgan 2008:6). Morgan then used public opportunities to argue for moving from Part 3 
of the Government of Wales Act to Part 4 (Morgan 2008) at a public lecture in Cardiff 
University in 2008 and again in a speech at the Senedd steps in 2009 when Cymru Yfory 
presented its petition in favour of primary law making powers  (Morgan 2009: 7). In doing 
this, the Archbishop was able to offer an alternative dimension to the debate, with the 
Archbishop appearing as a leader above politics, ensuring his issue remained on the agenda. 
The Church hierarchy continued its outsider strategy through its outspoken support 
for primary law making powers during the 2011 referendum campaign, joining political 
parties, third sector organisations and trade unions in the ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign. The 
Church’s support disgruntled the ‘No’ campaign, ‘True Wales’, which stated on a prominent 
display outside its launch that the organisation demanded a reform of all tiers of 
government in Wales and an end to the ‘undemocratic influence of the Church hierarchy’ 
(see Wyn Jones and Scully 2012: 213). Those opposed to primary law making powers 
evidently saw the Church as playing an influential role in the campaign, setting them aside 
from other third sector organisations for specific criticism (see Wyn-Jones and Scully 2012: 
102).  
The Archbishop’s use of the responsible outsider strategy is linked to the role’s 
ability to attract media attention in a way other FBO leaders cannot. Since the election of 
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 It is unclear whether the Archbishop headed the organisation in a personal capacity or in his capacity as 
Archbishop. The way Morgan discussed his role in his 2015 Presidential Address at the Governing Body gives 
the impression it was as Archbishop (see Morgan 2015). Furthermore, it is worth noting that a spokesperson 
representing the Church in Wales defended the Archbishop’s work with Cymru Yfory when it was criticised by 
David Jones MP (see Shipton 2015a) giving the impression that it was done in his capacity as Archbishop. Either 
way, it is difficult to separate the individual from the role of the Archbishop.  
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Glyn Simon to the position of Archbishop in 1968, the Church has chosen its Archbishop on 
his potential as a leader, rather than on seniority (Walker 1976: 177), and this has also 
continued after 1999. As this trend has developed, the role of the Archbishop has come to 
be seen as a political role. The Archbishop of Wales’ ability to attract media attention may 
also come from what some have called the ‘vestiges of establishment’ (see Doe 2004: 107), 
whereby the Church enjoys a particular status in Wales, despite being disestablished. It 
would also seem that ‘the Bishop’ still plays an important role in the minds of Welsh citizens 
and journalists. This could be due to the anglicised nature of Wales’ media consumption. It 
is also much easier for the press to approach a figure such as a bishop who remains in the 
role for a long period of time, building a reputation for himself, than it is to approach the 
moderator or president of a denomination which changes on an annual basis. This status, 
combined with the assistance of his staff, enables the Archbishop to receive a high level of 
media coverage.   
Since 2011, the Church has continued to engage with constitutional issues through 
an insider approach. The Church’s evidence to the Silk Commission, intimating that the 
Assembly does not have enough members to carry out its scrutiny role, and the problems 
with a centrally administered civil service was cited in part 2 of the Commission’s report 
(Commission on Devolution in Wales 2014: 154, 164, 175). This was followed by support for 
a reserved powers model in the Bishops’ evidence to the Assembly’s Constitutional and 
Legal Affairs Committee’s inquiry into the Draft Wales Bill in 2015 (Bishops of the Church in 
Wales 2015). 
 
In summary, the Church in Wales has utilised a thresholder strategy, pursuing both 
an insider and outsider strategy in its engagement with constitutional issues in Wales. There 
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is no direct evidence that the Church has influenced the development of the constitutional 
settlement in Wales, but the evidence does suggest that the Church, through the 
Archbishop, has been an important voice in civil society for the pursuit of constitutional 
change since 1999. In terms of MacKay et al’s (2005: 10) continuum, the Archbishop was 
recognised as a legitimate voice and at the very least challenged the public debate which led 
to a reconsideration of Wales’ devolved settlement.  
5.2.3.2 The Catholic Church in England and Wales 
The Catholic Church pursues an insider strategy in each policy area. It also utilises the 
responsible outsider strategy to some extent when engaging on the Human Transplantation 
legislation and on constitutional issues. The Catholic Church has specialist insider status 
conferred upon it by decision makers. 
5.2.3.2.1 Education 
The Catholic Church is a provider of education for 30,549 pupils across 91 primary and 
secondary schools in Wales (Catholic Education Service undated a) and therefore makes up 
the second half of the ‘faith sector’ in education in Wales. It utilises its Bishops and Wales 
based communications officer to speak out on issues related to education, but the bulk of 
its engagement is done through an insider strategy of responding to consultations and 
meeting with ministers. The Catholic Church has specialist insider status conferred upon it 
by decision makers. 
The Catholic Church avidly engages with Welsh Government consultations, 
presenting detailed evidence on a regular basis. Interviews with CES staff based in London 
suggest that the service sees the consultation process as an important part of engaging with 
the legislature and executive, noting that giving evidence at an early stage minimises 
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problems in the legislation at a later stage.40 With staff members responsible for education 
in Wales located in London until 2015, it is no surprise that written consultations have been 
its main access point. However, the Standing Advisory Councils for Religious Education 
(SACREs) at local authority level are also important spaces where the Catholic Church has 
access (see Ap Siôn 2014).  
However, the Catholic Church also utilises some measure of a responsible outsider 
strategy. Monsignor Robert Reardon, a parish priest in South Wales, acts as the Church’s 
Communications Officer in Wales, and is used regularly to respond to the media on issues 
related to education such as the cost of school transport (Servini 2013). Similarly, the 
communications officer defends Catholic education (see WalesOnline 2011), as seen in its 
response when Edwina Hart questioned the future of faith education at the Welsh Labour 
leadership husting in 2009 (see Shipton 2009).  
The Bishops of the Catholic Church in Wales are also utilised in the Church’s wider 
strategy. The CES took part in co-writing the ‘Faith in Education’ document with the Welsh 
Government and the Church in Wales (Welsh Government 2011a). The Archbishop of 
Cardiff, George Stack, then represented the Church at the ‘Faith in Education’ conference 
along with the director of the CES (Morrell 2011). The Archbishop’s public appearance 
alongside the education minister and the Archbishop of Wales serves to underline the role 
of faith education in Wales, and consolidates its position as a key partner in education in 
Wales. 
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 Interview with senior respondent from CES (11
th
 February 2015). 
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The Catholic Church predominantly engages with education through an insider 
strategy, but at times uses a responsible outsider strategy. The Catholic Church has 
specialist insider status conferred upon it in return.   
5.2.3.2.2 The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 
The Catholic Church utilised an insider strategy in relation to the Human Transplantation 
legislation, working with other FBOs to challenge the legislation. It supplemented this 
insider strategy with a responsible outsider strategy, but it was a much softer outsider 
strategy than that utilised by the Archbishop of Wales, with the Catholic Church relying to a 
greater extent on an insider strategy of submitting specialist research during the 
consultation process.  
As noted previously, the Catholic Church in Wales worked in coalition with the 
Church in Wales and the Orthodox Mission to respond to the Welsh Government’s White 
Paper in 2012. In this joint evidence the churches highlighted the need to strengthen the 
role of the family in the legislation (Church in Wales et al 2012). However, the Catholic 
Church also engaged with the legislative process beyond this coalition response, utilising its 
England and Wales structure to draw on Catholic based expertise from outside Wales. The 
Anscombe Bioethics Centre, an apex group within the Catholic Church, created by the 
Archbishop of England and Wales in 1977 to ‘serve’ the Church on bioethical issues 
(Anscombe Bioethics Centre undated) gave evidence to both Westminster’s Welsh Affairs 
committee in February 2011 and the Assembly’s Health and Social Care Committee in 
February 2013. The Anscombe centre tackled issues such as the family and ante-mortem 
donations in the legislation. The centre recommended to the Health and Social Care 
Committee that the legislation needed ‘an explicit requirement to consult relatives and a 
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right for relatives to object where there is no evidence of prior express consent by the 
deceased’ (Anscombe Bioethics Centre 2013).  
As noted previously, in April 2013, the Health Minister, Mark Drakeford, announced 
that the legislation would be amended so as to provide a clear right of objection by which 
the family can confirm that a potential donor would not have wished the donation to take 
place. The legislation still puts the onus on the family to provide evidence that the deceased 
did not want to donate, but it was brought closer to the recommendations of the Catholic 
Church’s wishes, as expressed through both the joint consultation to the White Paper and 
the evidence given to the Health and Social Care Committee by the Anscombe Centre for 
Bioethics. The Catholic Church was not the only organisation calling for this change, but the 
Centre’s position ended up as a committee recommendation and acted upon by the 
Minister (National Assembly for Wales 2013b: 72). However, it is worth noting that while 
the committee noted the centre’s concerns regarding ante-mortem procedures, it was not 
persuaded to make a recommendation to the Minister on this basis (see Anscombe Centre 
for Bioethics 2013 and National Assembly for Wales 2013b: 121).  
The Church in Wales supplemented its insider strategy with a responsible outsider 
strategy through the Archbishop of Wales, but the Catholic Church‘s outsider engagement 
was much more muted. The Archbishop of Cardiff spoke out against the legislation with the 
Archbishop of Wales and Archimandrite of the Orthodox Church in 2012 (BBC News Wales 
2012a), and signed a joint public letter asking for the family amendment (Catholic Church in 
England and Wales 2013), but Archbishop George Stack was not as prominent in the public 
debate as Archbishop Barry Morgan.  
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The Catholic Church pursued an insider strategy in response to the Human 
Transplantation legislation, with some minimal responsible outsider activity. The evidence 
suggests that the Catholic Church received specialist insider status in return. In terms of 
MacKay et al’s (2005: 10) continuum, the Catholic Church has had a legitimate voice in the 
policy process and in all likelihood challenged the way the Government thought about the 
legislation and potentially succeeded in influencing concrete changes in policy.   
5.2.3.2.3 Constitutional Issues 
The Catholic Church in Wales has utilised a thresholder strategy when engaging with 
constitutional issues. It has provided evidence through insider means to both the Richard 
Commission and the All Wales Convention. The Bishops of the Catholic Church in Wales 
have not been nearly as visible or prominent as the Archbishop of Wales, but they have also 
pursued an outsider strategy through use of the media and sending letters to parishioners 
ahead of referendums.    
The Bishops of the Catholic Church in Wales did not publicly support political 
devolution in 1997, but engaged with the issues in an outsider fashion by presenting a letter 
to Parishioners written with the assistance of the Church’s communications officer and 
Professor John Loughlin underlining the compatibility between devolution and Catholic 
social teaching (Loughlin 2001). While some in the Church thought its engagement with the 
devolution referendum was too ‘muted’ (Dixon 2001), the Church engaged in more detail 
with the question of Wales’ devolution settlement in joint evidence to the Richard 
Commission with Cytûn’s other member churches in 2004 (Cytûn 2003). This insider 
engagement continued with the Catholic Bishops presenting evidence to the All Wales 
Convention in 2009. With the assistance of Professor Loughlin, the Bishops set out their 
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support, not only for the principle of devolution, but for primary law making powers for 
Wales, which they argued was fully in line with the Catholic Church’s principle of subsidiarity 
(Loughlin 2009). The Catholic Bishops then returned to their outsider engagement during 
the 2011 referendum, sending another public letter to parishioners ahead of the 
referendum on primary law making powers. The Bishops were careful to ensure they did not 
tell parishioners how to vote in the referendum, but the letter read: 
we broadly support the principle of improving the functioning of the Assembly and 
point out that this would be in line with the principle of subsidiarity found in Catholic 
social teaching. We would welcome measures to improve the Assembly's decision-
making process. We would also welcome a strengthening of the democratic legitimacy 
of the National Assembly and any measures to increase the accountability of the 
politicians elected to the assembly. (BBC News Wales 2011a) 
The ‘No’ campaign responded by condemning the letter as ‘inappropriate’ (BBC News Wales 
2011a), which indicates that some saw the Church’s interjection as influential. Therefore, while the 
Catholic Bishops have been much more muted than the Archbishop of Wales in the way they have 
engaged with constitutional issues, they have engaged in both an insider and a responsible outsider 
fashion, providing evidence to constitutional commissions as well as providing guidance for their 
parishioners on how to vote in both the 1997 and 2011 referendums. 
 
5.2.3.3 Cytûn: Churches Together in Wales 
Cytûn pursues an insider strategy, supplementing this to a certain extent with the 
responsible outsider strategy in the area of constitutional issues. Acting as a facilitator 
between Christian denominations and decision makers, and at times between the faith 
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sector and decision makers, Cytûn has specialist insider status conferred upon it by decision 
makers at the devolved level.  
5.2.3.3.1 Education 
Cytûn engages in education through an insider strategy, attempting to facilitate the 
representation of Christian denominations, particularly those which do not provide 
statutory education. In doing this, Cytûn presented itself as a facilitator which decision 
makers recognised as an important part of the non-statutory faith education sector, and 
hence receives specialist insider status.   
As noted in Chapter 2, Cytûn does not hold its own positions, but instead seeks to 
encourage its affiliated members to come to a common position (Davies 2008: 95). 
Representatives from Cytûn also noted that the organisation seeks to explain the nuances 
and differences in the denominations’ political positions to government.41 In the area of 
education, Cytûn seeks to portray the views of Christian denominations which do not 
provide statutory education. A respondent noted in an interview how it did this in the case 
of the education curriculum:  
recently we were in a meeting with the WJEC, where we had to, on the one hand 
say this is what the Catholic Church feels, this is what the Church in Wales thinks 
– they were in the room to say it themselves. What we were saying at the same 
time was, this is the view of the Free Churches which do not provide education, 
but they would emphasise these priorities.42 
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 Interview with respondents from Cytûn (January 8
th
 2015). 
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Cytûn attempts to facilitate the relationship between the Christian denominations and 
the National Assembly and Welsh Government as a liaison between the institutions. This 
gives Cytûn access to the Welsh Government, as a voice on faith education (see Misstear 
2012). For instance, the Chief Executive of Cytûn, Aled Edwards, was invited by the Welsh 
Government to speak at the launch of the ‘Faith in Education’ document. Taking questions 
alongside the then Education Minister Leighton Andrews, the Archbishop of Wales, the 
Catholic Bishop of Wrexham and the Chief Executive of CES (Morell 2011), Cytûn was in a 
position to make the other denominations visible, and to be seen as possibly a more minor, 
yet third stakeholder in faith education in Wales. As a representative of the Faith 
Communities Forum, Cytûn’s policy officer also sits on the education department’s 
‘Strategic Stakeholder Group’ which has been given responsibility of shaping the new 
‘religion, philosophy and ethics’ curriculum proposed by the Welsh Government in response 
to Lord Donaldson’s review of the curriculum (Rhys 2016).  
In acting as a ‘facilitator’ between the Welsh Government and the Christian 
denominations which do not provide education, Cytûn pursues an insider strategy and 
receives a specialist insider status in return, as it is recognised as what MacKay et al (2005: 
10) refer to as a ‘legitimate voice’ by decision makers. 
5.2.3.3.2 Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 
Cytûn pursued an insider strategy in relation to the Human Transplantation legislation, 
giving oral evidence to the Assembly’s Health and Social Care Committee in 2013. Again, 
Cytûn acted as a link between its affiliated members and decision makers, attempting to 
communicate the Christian denominations’ varying positions. However in this policy area, 
Cytûn’s role went beyond explaining its member’s positions, to helping decision makers 
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liaise with non-Christian faith communities too. This further bolstered Cytûn’s specialist 
insider status. 
The Human Transplantation (Wales) Act was controversial among many faith 
communities (Blake 2015). Some of Cytûn’s members were actively in favour of the 
legislation, but others were vehemently opposed to it. This gave Cytûn an opportunity to 
explain the nuanced positions amongst its members. A respondent from Cytûn explained: 
‘Our role in the dynamic was to remind the Assembly…and to filter through to the 
government, the complexity of the issue’.43 Cytûn used the Assembly’s eagerness to consult 
with faith communities to ensure it was part of this process. This was particularly evident 
when a range of FBOs gave evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee in 2013 (see 
National Assembly for Wales 2013a). Cytûn’s Chief Executive and its Policy Officer attended 
the evidence session with the Bishop’s Adviser for the Church in Wales, the President of the 
Methodist Synod in Wales and the General Secretary of the MCW.  While these FBO leaders 
gave their own evidence, Cytûn’s Chief Executive and Policy Officer acted as chairpersons, 
presenting the FBOs (National Assembly for Wales 2013a: 15), and adding to their 
comments. The Policy Officer even provided the Muslim and Jewish ‘view’ at one point in his 
evidence (National Assembly for Wales 2013a: 16). Aled Edward’s capacity as Chief 
Executive of Cytûn and Chair of the Inter-faith Council also allowed him to present the 
organisation as not only a liaison between the Christian denominations and the Welsh 
Government, but as an agent of the faith sector in its wider sense.  
By staying above the fray, not taking an explicit position itself, Cytûn could 
claim to be useful to both faith communities and to the Assembly, and in turn 
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consolidate its position within the sub-state political system. The Chair of the 
committee’s gratitude for the ‘help’ Cytûn and the other representatives provided in 
enlightening the committee on a ‘deep and complex issue’ (National Assembly for 
Wales 2013a: 29) suggests that Cytûn was perceived as an important resource in this 
area. 
5.2.3.3.3 Constitutional Issues  
     As in the policy areas discussed above, Cytûn pursues an insider strategy in relation to 
constitutional issues. However, through its Chief Executive, Cytûn also engages with 
constitutional issues through an outsider strategy. It is not always clear when the Chief 
Executive is working in a personal capacity or representing Cytûn, but the media often 
perceives this public engagement to be in the name of Cytûn. 
Cytûn did not take a public position in favour of devolution in 1997 (Davies 2008: 94-
95), but since 1999 the organisation’s engagement on constitutional questions has 
advocated further devolution. This can be seen in the evidence it provided to the Richard 
Commission in 2003. As was noted in the findings pertaining to the Catholic Church, Cytûn’s 
engagement with the Richard Commission brought representatives from each of its 
affiliated members together to give evidence. Cytûn’s evidence was careful to note the 
difference in opinion amongst its members, but it welcomed the separation of the 
legislature and the executive, noted that greater powers would lead to more coherence in 
Assembly activity and that the Assembly should receive tax raising powers in the future 
(Cytûn 2003). Despite having a political advocacy structure which inhibits Cytûn from having 
too definite a position, its response contributed a number of recommendations to the 
Commission in an insider manner.   
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Furthermore, in 2009 Cytûn‘s General Secretary, Aled Edwards, represented the 
‘Faith Forum’ on the All Wales Convention (Williamson 2008). This was another opportunity 
for a representative of Cytûn to take part in an insider fashion through a government 
established constitutional commission. Edwards was not on the board to give Cytûn’s 
opinion on Wales’ constitutional future, but his selection as the representative of the ‘Faith 
Forum’ further placed Cytûn as the representative of the faith sector as it took one of 
twelve civil society places on the convention (see Williamson 2008).  
Edwards has also engaged with Wales’ constitutional debate through a responsible 
outsider strategy, using the media. In 2015, he led a group of civil society representatives 
who called upon the UK government to make seven key changes to the Draft Wales Bill, 
drafted in response to the Silk Commission’s findings (Shipton 2015b). Edwards was 
probably engaging in a personal capacity, but it was reported in the media that ‘Canon Aled 
Edwards, Chief Executive of Cytûn: Churches Together in Wales’ was leading the group 
(Shipton 2015b), and hence the stunt was connected directly to Cytûn as an organisation. As 
a public figure, Edwards’ work and activities are often connected to Cytûn, whether his 
actions represent the organisation or not.  
The evidence indicates that Cytûn mainly engages with constitutional issues through 
an insider strategy, with its Chief Executive engaging in an outsider fashion at times. This 
outsider engagement may not be strictly pursued in Cytûn’s name, but it is often attributed 
to the organisation.  
5.2.3.4 The Muslim Council of Wales 
The MCW pursues an insider strategy in each policy area and has utilised the responsible 
outsider strategy on constitutional affairs to a certain extent. Because decision makers 
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identify the MCW as the representative of the Muslim community in Wales it has specialist 
insider status conferred upon it by decision makers.  
5.2.3.4.1 Education 
The MCW engages in education through an insider strategy. The Council does not have 
statutory status in education, but it is consulted by the government. However, the MCW is 
also active outside of statutory education, working with the Welsh Government to provide 
community and leadership education as part of the Welsh Government’s anti-radicalisation 
strategy. It does not hold the same level of specialist insider status in education policy as the 
other FBOs under study, but its role as a representative of the Muslim community selected 
to roll out part of the Government’s anti-extremism  strategy gives it unique specialist 
insider status.   
The MCW has engaged with education policy, on issues such as the religious 
education curriculum and sex education (Muslim Council of Wales undated c). A respondent 
from the Council noted that this tends to be done orally, with the minister approaching the 
Council to ask advice on how the community’s view may differ to the faith communities 
which are consulted on a statutory basis.44 For instance, a former government minister 
noted the role of the Faith Communities Forum in ensuring the Muslim community 
understood the Government’s education policy and for discussion in this policy area.45 
There is also some evidence of the MCW speaking out publicly on the religious 
education curriculum. When the former Education Minister, Huw Lewis, proposed 
combining religion with philosophy and ethics as part of a wider strategy of overcoming 
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extremism in Wales, the Chief Executive of the MCW, noted that a ‘better understanding’ of 
the ‘similarities and values’ of different faiths could be taught through effective religious 
education (Evans 2015).  
The MCW may engage with statutory education policy to a lesser extent than the 
other FBOs under study, but its wider engagement with the Welsh Government’s anti-
extremism strategy has meant that it has had substantial involvement with community 
education. For instance, the role of the MCW was noted in this area in the ‘Faith in 
Education’ document published in 2011. The document noted good practice between 
Wales’ faith communities, with the MCW, amongst other FBOs, noted for their work in the 
Welsh Government’s ‘Getting On Together Project’, aimed at countering extremism in 
schools (Welsh Government 2011a: 24, Ap Siôn and Francis 2014: 279). The MCW has also 
received funding as part of the Welsh Government’s ‘Prevent’ work. This has included the 
‘Adfywiad’ project, providing training for Muslim leaders to address the risks of 
radicalisation within their communities by developing good governance structures within 
their institutions and a better understanding of radicalisation and extremism, as well as how 
to counter it (see Welsh Government 2012b: 5-8, Robinson et al 2012). The MCW also ran 
the ‘ILead’ project, providing citizenship and leadership training for young people within the 
community (see Robertson et al 2012, Reflections 2011a: 8-9).   
The MCW does not have a specialist insider role in statutory education, but its role in 
community education, underlines its unique specialist insider status in education within the 
government’s anti-radicalisation strategy. The Board which selected the MCW for this work, 
which is chaired by the Association of Chief Police Officers Cymru and the Welsh 
Government (see Welsh Assembly Government 2009: 40-41), justified its choice by 
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underlining how the Council provided access to ‘a wide variety of audiences’ (Welsh 
Government 2012b: 5). While this status is challenged by some key actors within the Muslim 
community,46 it suggests that the Welsh Government perceives the council as the 
representative of the Muslim Community in Wales and as an important insider which 
provides access to a community which is difficult to reach. In this respect, the MCW receives 
unique specialist insider status.    
5.2.3.4.2 Human Transplantation (Wales) Act 
The MCW pursued an insider strategy when engaging with the Human Transplantation 
legislation by taking part in consultation with the Welsh Government, and providing oral 
evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee in 2013. The Council noted that it would 
like to see the role of the family strengthened in the legislation, but its priority was to argue 
against the principle of the legislation. The Council did not achieve this, but its concerns 
were quoted in the committee’s report, which suggests that the Council was seen as the 
representative of the Muslim community in this regard.        
The MCW engaged with the Human Transplantation legislation by engaging in an 
insider fashion through the legislature and the executive. The Council co-signed a public 
letter against the legislation with other faith leaders (see Catholic Church in England and 
Wales 2013), but its public engagement was minimal.  
At an early stage in the legislative process, the Council discussed the Bill at the Faith 
Communities Forum, where it had the opportunity to voice its concerns (BBC News Wales 
2012b). Following this, as noted previously the MCW gave oral evidence to the Assembly’s 
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 Interview with key informant within the Muslim community in Wales (January 12
th
 2015). 
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Health and Social Care committee. Here, the Chief Executive presented the Council as the 
representative of the Muslim community in Wales: 
I would humbly request, on behalf of the Muslim community in Wales, that you 
reconsider the concept of presumed or deemed consent. I believe that it may 
have a negative impact on our communities and instead of increasing organ 
donors, it may decrease the number. I also suggest that resources may be 
provided to raise awareness among our communities. (National Assembly for 
Wales 2013a: 19)  
The Council’s insider approach was far stronger in its opposition to the Bill, than found 
in the evidence given by the Church in Wales and the Catholic Church. The Chief Executive 
notes that an increased role for the family would be appreciated, but he is adamant in his 
evidence that the legislation should not go ahead, noting: 
If it is specifically mentioned that family consent will be taken, that would soften 
it, but it would not change the concept of presumed consent, and ‘presumed’ is 
the word that we are disagreeing with. What I mentioned is that, if the law has 
to be made, then mandated choice consent would be better than presumed 
consent, because that means that people would at least be making choices. 
(National Assembly for Wales 2013a: 24) 
 
Here, the Council does not prioritise amending the legislation, but rather seeks an end 
to its legislative journey. The MCW was not successful in this endeavour, but decision 
makers were keen to ensure its voice was heard, with the Health and Social Care Committee 
referencing the Council’s concerns in its report (National Assembly for Wales 2013a: 28, 58, 
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97). This suggests that the MCW had specialist insider status conferred upon it as a 
representative of the Muslim Community, with what MacKay et al (2005: 10) refer to as a 
‘legitimate voice’ in the policy process, despite not seeing the legislation repealed. 
5.2.3.4.3 Constitutional  Issues. 
The MCW has engaged with constitutional issues through both an insider and outsider 
strategy. As the Council has become more involved in constitutional discussions, it has also 
consolidated its insider status within the Welsh political system. 
The MCW has been engaging with Wales’ constitutional settlement since its 
mobilisation. The Council’s short, but positive, experience of political devolution led it to 
give evidence to the Richard Commission in May 2003 (see Richard Commission 2004).47 The 
MCW has also engaged with constitutional issues through a responsible outsider strategy, 
campaigning publicly for primary law making powers for Wales as part of the referendum’s 
‘Yes’ campaign. The Council actively campaigned within the Muslim community, giving out 
flyers encouraging Muslims to vote ‘Yes’ (Muslim Council of Wales undated d, Reflection 
2011b: 2, Whittaker 2015: 18). The Council argued that Muslims should vote in favour of 
primary law making powers because of the benefits it had brought to the community since 
1999 and because voting ‘Yes’ would give minorities a stronger voice (Muslim Council of 
Wales undated d). 
The Muslim community’s involvement with the ‘Yes’ Campaign was encouraged by 
political elites who were keen to ensure that the devolution process gives a civic and 
inclusive image by including minorities such as the Muslim community.48 The Muslim 
community in Wales may not be large, but the engagement of the MCW sent an important 
                                                     
47




 Interview with former politician involved in the ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign (February 17
th
 2015). 
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message that devolution, and Wales’ political establishment are inclusive. As Whittaker 
(2015:17) has suggested, the MCW speaking out publicly in favour of devolution was 
‘symbolic’ of an inclusive space for minorities within participatory politics in Wales.  
This outsider engagement has continued beyond 2011. The Council’s Chief Executive, 
was one of Aled Edwards’ signatories asking for the UK Government to make seven key 
changes to the Draft Wales Bill in 2015 (Shipton 2015b). This was another opportunity for 
the MCW to engage with Wales’ constitutional settlement, but it was also another 
opportunity for the MCW to consolidate its place as a key part of civil society in Wales. 
The MCW has engaged with constitutional issues as both an insider and as a 
responsible outsider. The evidence suggests that this engagement furthered the Council’s 
specialist insider credentials, as it has consolidated itself within civil society in Wales, and 
has been seen by Wales’ political elite as an attribute to the political devolution process and 
the constitutional debate.   
5.2.4 Strategy: Analysis 
This section analyses the findings in regards to FBO strategy. First, the strategy utilised by 
the FBOs is analysed, followed by the status conferred upon the FBO by decision makers. 
Each FBO in the Wales case study has pursued an insider strategy. This indicates that FBOs 
perceive Wales’ political system as open for engagement. Strongly rooted organisations 
actively supplemented this with a responsible outsider strategy in a number of high profile 
cases, with weakly rooted organisations making less use of the responsible outsider 
strategy, but nevertheless employing it at times. The use of the responsible outsider 
strategy through the media is connected to two main factors. Firstly, FBOs with the staff 
capacity to engage with the media use this strategy most prolifically. Secondly, in line with 
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Binderkrantz’s (2005: 710) claim, FBOs supplement their insider strategy with an outsider 
strategy when the position they have taken is controversial or if they foresee the position 
will receive a high level of opposition from government decision makers or public opinion. 
The findings also provide a number of examples of coalition building which is found in 
salient policy areas, where there is conflict between interests and in order to share internal 
resources and reach common goals.   
The FBOs which supplement their insider strategies with outsider strategies the most 
are those with the capacity to take advantage of public and media opportunities. This is 
clearest in the case of the Church in Wales and its Archbishop. As a recognisable figurehead 
in Wales, the Archbishop can attract media attention, using it to shape the public debate. 
Archbishop Barry Morgan did this in the case of both the Human Transplantation legislation 
and on Wales’ constitutional settlement. Likewise, the Bishops of the Catholic Church, while 
not possessing as formidable a status as that of the Archbishop of Wales, have used their 
position to speak out on constitutional issues and on the Human Transplantation legislation. 
The more weakly rooted organisations have not been as visible in their responsible outsider 
engagement, but both Cytûn and the MCW have supplemented their insider engagement 
with a responsible outsider strategy at times. 
The responsible outsider strategy is utilised when the position taken is controversial, 
or when the FBO perceives opposition to its position. This can be seen in the way that the 
Church in Wales and the Catholic Church consistently utilise an insider strategy in education, 
apart from when they feel faith education is under threat. Furthermore, a responsible 
outsider strategy has been used extensively by the Church in Wales and to some extent the 
Catholic Church in controversial policy areas. For instance, with a large majority of the 
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political elite in Cardiff Bay supporting the Human Transplantation legislation, the 
Archbishop of Wales used a high profile responsible outsider strategy to challenge what was 
perceived by many as a settled matter. Likewise, the Archbishop of Wales’ position on 
Wales’ constitutional settlement was far more radical than many of the political elite when 
the Richard Commission was published in 2004, and hence he chose to take part in a high 
profile campaign as the figurehead of Cymru Yfory, to push for further powers for the 
National Assembly for Wales.  
The evidence does not suggest that roots in society have influenced whether the 
FBOs in the case of Wales have pursued an insider strategy. Conversely, roots in society 
appear to influence the extent to which FBOs in Wales have supplemented this insider 
strategy with a responsible outsider strategy. FBOs with deeper roots in Welsh society have 
used a responsible outsider strategy to a greater extent than weakly rooted FBOs, most 
likely because they have the capacity and status with which to do so.   
The evidence also provides a number of examples of coalition building. Coalition 
building occurs in both salient policy areas, where there is conflict between interests, and in 
order to share internal resources and reach common goals. The Human Transplantation 
legislation was a highly salient issue, and the Church in Wales, the Catholic Church and the 
Orthodox Mission responded to a consultation with a joint position. Following this, Cytûn, 
the Church in Wales, the Methodist Church and the MCW jointly gave evidence to the 
Assembly’s Health and Social Care Committee. Finally, an even wider group of FBOs signed 
an open letter against the legislation, asking for the Government to bolster the role of the 
family in the legislation. Working together in this way strengthened the FBOs position 
against the legislation. This example of coalition furthers scholars’ claims that organisations 
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form coalitions on salient issues (Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004) or issues which are likely 
to cause conflict between interests (Heinz et al 1993, Mahoney 2007). However, the 
evidence also provides an example of coalition building in order to share internal resources 
and reach common goals on less salient issues such as education. The Church in Wales and 
the Catholic Church work together as the faith sector in education in order to pursue the 
common goal of maintaining and furthering faith education. This therefore backs the claims 
of scholars that argue coalitions are brokered so as to share internal resources and to work 
for common goals (Hula 1999, Whitford 2003, Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004).    
Each of the FBOs in the Welsh case have received specialist insider status to differing 
extents in each of the policy areas. The evidence suggests that the FBOs with the stronger 
roots in Welsh society have received this level of access on the basis of the specific 
resources they possess. This can be seen most clearly in the case of education. The Church 
in Wales and the Catholic Church receive a high level of access to decision making in 
education, as evidenced in their role on the 21st Century Schools board and in co-writing the 
‘Faith in Education’ document with the education minister. This is down to the specific 
resources they possess in education, providing thousands of school places across hundreds 
of schools in Wales. Here, the FBOs have what Maloney et al (1994: 29) refer to as the 
specific resource of ‘implementation power’. Likewise, with the Human Transplantation 
legislation, the views of the Church in Wales and the Catholic Church were taken seriously, 
with the Assembly’s Health and Social Care Committee and the Minister recognising them as 
legitimate voices and important stakeholders in the discussion. Here the FBOs have the 
specific resources of ‘knowledge’ and ‘technical expertise’ with the Human Transplantation 
legislation and on constitutional issues (Maloney et al 1994: 29). 
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Likewise, the weakly rooted FBOs have ensured they receive specialist insider status 
by identifying specific resources which decision makers desire. Here, Cytûn and the MCW 
might be seen to provide what Maloney et al (1994: 29) categorise as ‘a representative 
base’ as well as ‘knowledge’ and ‘technical expertise’. The evidence indicates that Cytûn, 
positioning itself as a facilitator of the Christian denominations, and in some cases as a 
facilitator of the faith sector, is attractive to the Welsh Government and Assembly, as it acts 
as a voice that can clarify the position of Christian denominations or the faith sector. This 
was most evident with the Human Transplantation legislation, but also evident in its 
engagement with education and constitutional issues. The ability to do this consolidates 
Cytûn’s position as a specialist insider. Likewise, the MCW’s ability to represent the Muslim 
view to decision makers ensures it has specialist insider status conferred upon it by the 
Welsh Government and the National Assembly. This was seen in each of the policy areas, 
with the Council providing the decision makers with the ability to consult the community 
and in doing so to demonstrate inclusivity. These resources may be less tangible than school 
provision, but are nevertheless important in a devolved context with the concept of 
‘inclusivity’ imprinted in its DNA (Chaney 2011: 73). The Faith Communities Forum is also an 
important space which enhances the MCW’s ability to gain access to decision makers, as the 
representative of the Muslim community, sitting alongside the more traditional faith 
community leaders in Wales, with direct access to the First Minister. 
5.2.5 Effectiveness 
Having examined the political advocacy structures and strategies of the FBOs under study, 
this section examines whether the FBOs are well placed to act as effective pressure groups. 
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This is done in relation to the third secondary research question outlined in Chapter 4, 
which asks: 
‘Are faith-based organisations at the sub-state level in the UK well placed to act as effective 
pressure groups in the decision making process?’ 
The secondary research question is analysed using the criterion of effectiveness outlined 
in Chapter 4. The section indicates that each FBO is well placed to act as an effective 
pressure group. However, the specific resources the strongly rooted FBO possess ensure 
their continued specialist or core insider status, while the weakly rooted FBOs are more 
reliant on decision makers continuing to recognise them as representative of their 
respective community for this status to continue.  
5.2.5.1 The Church in Wales 
The Church in Wales is well placed to act as an effective pressure group. It has an 
appropriate political advocacy structure, coherent policy positions, it is consulted widely, 
has core or specialist insider status conferred upon it and has succeeded in seeing a number 
of its objectives met. 
The Church’s political advocacy structure is appropriate for engaging at the sub-state level in 
Wales. Having increasing its staff capacity to engage with the devolved institutions, the 
Church has utilised its staff for insider engagement while its Bishops and Archbishop can 
engage in an outsider fashion. This is an effective political advocacy structure which equips 
the Church to engage in the detail of legislation, while the Archbishop uses his status to 
shape opinion through the media, as seen in the case of the Human Transplantation 
legislation. This political advocacy structure and strategy is well suited for a devolved 
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context with an emphasis on policy consultation (Cairney 2008: 361, Chaney 2011: 263, 
268), where organisations are required to be ‘well-resourced and skilled’ (Day 2006: 651)  
and where civil society is considered to be weak (see Chaney 2011: 215-216), providing an 
opportunity to shape the debate.  
The Church’s effectiveness is heightened further by the Bishops’ ability to articulate 
a message through the media means that the Bishops’ policy positions are coherent and 
well-articulated. For instance, the Church successfully articulated a message against the 
Human Transplantation legislation in public while presenting a more nuanced position 
through its insider strategy. In this case, the Church presented its position differently, yet 
coherently, to both audiences. With regards to being consulted by decision makers, the 
findings indicate that the Church in Wales is consulted by the Welsh Government and is 
seen as an important stakeholder beyond these consultations. Likewise, the Church receives 
a specialist or core insider status in each policy area.  
Finally, the Church has seen many of its outcomes met. For instance, the Church has 
successfully defended faith education in Wales, consolidating its role through the ‘Faith in 
Education’ document. The Church did not succeed in ending the passage of the Human 
Transplantation legislation, but it succeeded in having its voice heard, presenting a high 
profile case against the legislation, in defiance of widespread support for the legislation. 
Further to this, it is likely that the Church was at least partly responsible for the Government 
strengthening the role of the family in the final legislation. The evidence also suggests that 
the Church, through the Archbishop, was an important voice within civil society in the 
campaign for further devolution. In terms of Mackay et al’s (2005: 10) continuum of 
influence, the Church has been recognised as a ‘legitimate voice’, has ‘changed the terms of 
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the public debate’ and has seen some ‘concrete changes in policy outcomes’. In light of the 
criteria, the Church in Wales is well placed to act as an effective pressure group.  
5.2.5.2 The Catholic Church in England and Wales   
The Catholic Church is well placed to act as an effective pressure group. Despite not having 
as appropriate a political advocacy structure as it might, the Catholic Church has coherent 
policy positions, is widely consulted, has had specialist or core insider status conferred upon 
it and has seen a number of its objectives met.  
Having only devolved a limited amount of power to the sub-state level, the Church does not 
have as appropriate a political advocacy structure as it could have, making it more 
challenging for the Church to engage with decision makers. Despite this, the findings show 
that it is effective as it is able to draw on its centric political advocacy structure for expertise 
that it can use in consultation processes, as seen in the case of the Human Transplantation 
legislation. Likewise, the Church has increased its capacity in education as it has perceived 
an increase in divergence within education policy, and noted that it would consider 
increasing its capacity if areas of interest were devolved in future. Despite lacking some 
capacity for insider engagement, it does use its bishops for responsible outsider 
engagement in the region. Its political advocacy structure is not as developed as it could be, 
but it does allow it significant opportunities for engagement.  
The Church’s centralised political advocacy structure ensures that its policy positions 
are coherent, as they are clearly formed and articulated through the Bishops’ Conference. 
This was seen in its support for the role of the family in the Human Transplantation 
legislation. In each of the policy areas under study, the Catholic Church has been consulted 
by decision makers, regarded a stakeholder in education and well received by the Health 
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and Social Care committee with the Human Transplantation legislation. The Church’s 
effectiveness is heightened due to its specialist insider status in each policy area under 
study. This was exemplified in education with the ‘Faith in Wales’ document and with the 
Human Transplantation legislation where the Church was recognised as a ‘legitimate voice’ 
(MacKay et al’s 2005: 10). In terms of seeing its desired policy outcomes met, the Church in 
all likelihood saw ‘concrete changes in policy’ output through influencing the amendment 
made to the Human Transplantation legislation regarding the role of family. It is also likely 
that the Church’s support for political devolution in Wales has had some influence on the 
‘terms of the public debate’. The Catholic Church has some weaknesses in its political 
advocacy structure, but it is well placed to act as an effective pressure group 
5.2.5.3 Cytûn 
Cytûn is well placed to act as an effective pressure group. It presents coherent policy 
positions to decision makers, is widely consulted, has had specialist or core insider status 
conferred upon it and has seen a number of its objectives met.  
Cytûn’s political advocacy structure is effective due to its appropriateness for the devolved 
context in which it engages. Its use of a policy officer to provide representation for a wide 
range of Christian denominations and at times a wide range of faith communities works well 
in a devolved context with inclusiveness at its heart, and an emphasis on minority 
participation (Wyn Jones and Trystan 1999: 90, Chaney 2011: 73). It is therefore 
advantageous for the Welsh Government  and the Assembly to work with Cytûn, as the face 
of a wide range of Christian denominations which at times also speaks for the faith sector 
more widely. 
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As regards its policy positions, Cytûn provides coherent policy positions to decision 
makers. Acting as the representative of Christian denominations in Wales and facilitating 
the Welsh Government and the Assembly in understanding the position of these 
denominations enables Cytûn to bring a level of coherence to its members’ wide range of 
views, in a way decision makers can understand. This was most clearly seen with the Human 
Transplantation legislation, but was also seen as part of its role in presenting the view of 
non-statutory providers of education. In this respect, Cytûn is also widely consulted, with 
the Assembly and the Welsh Government recognising it as an organisation which offers 
wide representation.   
Cytûn’s effectiveness is heightened by its insider status, as seen in its stakeholder 
position in education, and as a facilitator of its members’ views with the Human 
Transplantation legislation and on constitutional issues. The evidence therefore suggests 
that Cytûn has influence as understood in terms of Mackay et al’s (2005: 10) continuum. 
Cytûn is recognised by decision makers as having a ‘legitimate voice’ in issues affecting faith 
communities and is an organisation that plays a role in ‘provoking reconsideration of the 
way others think’. It also ensures that the views of Christian denominations, and at times 
the wider faith communities, are understood by decision makers. 
Cytûn is well placed to act as an effective pressure group, but it is somewhat reliant 
on the Assembly and Welsh Government continuing to recognise it as the FBO which can 
represent the Christian denominations and faith communities in a holistic sense. This 
reliance could limit Cytûn’s ability to criticise decision makers (Grant 1995: 20).  
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5.2.5.4 The Muslim Council of Wales 
The MCW has the weakest political advocacy structure for engaging with the devolved 
institutions in Wales. Despite this, it has coherent policy position, is widely consulted, has 
core or specialist insider status conferred upon it and has seen a number of its desired 
outcomes met. This is likely due to the government sponsored mechanisms it has at its 
disposal.  
The MCW is the only FBO in the case of Wales to utilise a voluntary based political advocacy 
structure. This could be problematic in a sub-state context known for an emphasis on policy 
consultation, and a high level of access for organisations which have the staff capacity and 
skills to exploit it. Nevertheless, the MCW overcomes this by utilising two government 
mechanisms to its advantage.  Perceived as the representative of the Muslim community in 
Wales, the Council has a space on the Faith Communities Forum as well as a Partnership 
Protocol (Welsh Assembly Government undated) with the Welsh Government. This means 
that despite its lack of capacity to engage with a wide range of written consultations, it has a 
number of access points where it can have informal discussion with Welsh Government 
ministers.  
The MCW cannot always provide a coherent Muslim view to the Welsh Government 
(see National Assembly for Wales 2013a: 28), but it can and does in the majority of cases, as 
seen with its engagement with the Human Transplantation legislation and on constitutional 
issues. As explained above, the Council is also fully consulted by decision makers and 
recognised as the representative of the Muslim community in Wales in each policy area. The 
MCW has also had specialist insider status conferred upon it, as a representative of the 
Muslim Community which provides decision makers with an opportunity to display its 
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inclusiveness. This was particularly evident in its funding to provide anti-radicalisation 
education within the Muslim community and in the way the MCW gave an inclusive face to 
the ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign. There is also evidence of the MCW seeing its desired policy 
outcomes met. The MCW was disappointed that the Human Transplantation legislation 
went ahead, but it is likely that its opposition to the legislation, along with other FBOs, was 
recognised as legitimate by the Assembly and Welsh Government, and in arguing against it 
provoked reconsideration in the way others thought about the legislation. 
The MCW is be well placed to act as an effective pressure group. However, similarly 
to Cytûn, it is reliant on the Welsh Government and decision makers within the Assembly 
recognising it as the representative of the Muslim Community in Wales for its continued 
specialist insider status. This could at least in theory be challenged by another Muslim 
organisation. Seeking to maintain its continued status as representative could also entrap 
the Council, leading it to become a ‘prisoner organisation’ which finds it difficult to criticise 
decision makers (Grant 1995: 10).  
To sum, the analysis in this section has indicated that each of the FBOs are currently 
well placed to act as effective pressure groups. The Church in Wales and the Catholic 
Church’s effectiveness is mainly based in the specific resources they possess, such as 
providing education and technical knowledge in areas such as the Human Transplantation 
legislation, as well as its wide presence within Wales. To some extent, Cytûn and the MCW 
rely on the Welsh Government and National Assembly continuing to recognise them as 
representatives of key communities which can explain complex views that can be difficult to 
decipher. The MCW also seems to be reliant on government sponsored structures. For this 
reason, they could be prone to become what Grant (1995:20) refers to as ‘prisoner groups’.  
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5.3. Testing the Hypotheses 
This final section examines the hypotheses in light of the findings and the analysis of 
political advocacy structure, strategy and effectiveness of the FBOs studied in the Wales 
case study. In the Welsh case, devolved autonomy influences the political advocacy 
structures of FBOs. However, neither roots within society or theological orientation 
influence the strategies pursued by FBOs or the status conferred upon FBOs as 
hypothesised.   
H1: ‘As the devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
higher the levels of capacity within the political advocacy structures of FBOs’. 
H1 has been founded. Each FBO in the case of Wales has increased its capacity to 
engage with the devolved political institutions. Apart from the MCW, this has been done by 
appointing staff to engage in the sub-state political system. However, the MCW has 
developed a voluntary based political advocacy structure as the political devolution process 
has become entrenched. The Church in Wales, the Catholic Church and the MCW have 
increased their capacity as the powers devolved have become more entrenched.  
H3: ‘As the powers devolved become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
more likely it is that the region’s FBOs develop a distinct strategy for political engagement at 
the sub-state level’. 
H3 has been founded. Each FBO has focused to a greater extent at the sub-state 
level as the powers devolved have become more extensive and more entrenched in the 
region. This development can be seen most clearly in the case of the MCW and the Catholic 
Church.  
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H5: ‘The stronger the FBO’s roots within the devolved region, the more likely it is to have a 
staff based political advocacy structure’. 
H5 has been founded. The only FBO not to develop a staff based political advocacy 
structure has been the MCW, a weakly rooted FBO. However, Cytûn, which is also a weakly 
rooted FBO has developed a staff based political advocacy structure. It is likely that this is 
due to its historical engagement with Welsh politics and the support for further devolution 
amongst many of its members. 
H6: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is to 
utilise an insider strategy’. 
H6 has not been founded in the case of Wales, where each FBO has pursued an 
insider strategy. Conversely, the FBOs with stronger roots in Welsh society have been found 
more likely than the weakly rooted FBOs to supplement this insider strategy with a 
responsible outsider strategy, utilising their staff capacity and their ability to gain media 
attention. 
H7: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is that 
the devolved institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
H7 has not been founded. Each FBO has had a specialist insider status conferred 
upon it. However, weakly rooted FBOs are more reliant on the government continuing to 
recognise them as representatives who can speak on behalf of a wide range of people than 
the strongly rooted FBOs which rely on resources such as education provision. 
H8: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is to pursue an insider 
strategy’.  
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H8 has not been founded. Theology has not been found to influence the strategy of 
FBOs, with more theologically moderate and less theologically moderate FBOs pursuing 
insider strategies.  
H9: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is that the devolved 
institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
H9 has not been founded. Theology has not been found to influence the status 
conferred upon FBOs, with each FBO receiving specialist insider status for different reasons.  
H10: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the better placed it is to 
act as an effective pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
H10 has not been founded. Each FBO has been found to be well placed to act as an 
effective pressure group. Despite this, the weakly rooted FBOs are much more reliant on the 
government continuing to recognise them as representatives who can speak on behalf of a 
wide range of people than the strongly rooted FBOs which rely on resources such as the 
education they provide. Therefore, while H10 has not been founded, the evidence could 
suggest that the status conferred upon strongly rooted FBOs is stronger than weakly rooted 
FBOs.   
H11:‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the better placed it is to act as an effective 
pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
H11 has not been founded. Theology does not seem to play a role in whether a FBO 
is well placed to act as an effective pressure group. Each FBO is well placed to act as an 
effective pressure group.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings in relation to secondary research question 1, 2 and 3 
in the cases of the FBOs selected for the case of Wales. The Chapter illustrates that each 
FBO has increased its capacity to engage with the devolved political institutions in Wales. 
Apart from the MCW, each FBO has appointed new members of staff for this purpose, with 
the MCW forming a voluntary based political advocacy structure for political engagement 
for the first time. Each FBO pursues an insider strategy, supplementing this with a 
responsible outsider strategy. The strongly rooted FBOs have used this responsible outsider 
strategy in a fuller sense than the weakly rooted FBOs, taking advantage of their internal 
capacity and position within society in order to do so. Each FBO has had specialist or core 
insider status conferred upon them. The strongly rooted FBOs have utilised specific 
resources for this purpose such as education provision, but the weakly rooted FBOs have 
identified specific resources which have significance within Wales’ devolved political 
context. They have also made use of the government sponsored faith structures. In light of 
this, each FBO is well placed to act as an effective pressure group. The next chapter will 
examine the secondary research questions in light of the FBOs under study in the case of 
Northern Ireland.   
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Chapter 6: The Case of Northern Ireland 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the three secondary research questions with regards to each of the 
FBOs selected for the Northern Ireland case. The first section outlines the historical role of 
religion in Northern Ireland and refers to the potential opportunities political devolution 
created for FBOs. Section 2 investigates the findings in response to the three secondary 
research questions. With regards to the first secondary research question, each FBO apart 
from the Catholic Church is a territorial organisation. Each FBO, apart from the Caleb 
Foundation, has increased its staff capacity to differing extents to engage with the devolved 
institutions. In response to the second secondary research question regarding FBO strategy, 
it finds that each FBO examined in the Northern Ireland case study pursues an insider 
strategy, with strongly rooted FBOs supplementing this with a responsible outsider strategy 
when necessary. Strongly rooted FBOs have identified specific resources they exchange with 
government decision makers and hence have received specialist or core insider status in 
return, but weakly rooted FBOs have not. Finally, examining findings with respect to the 
third secondary research question illustrates that the strongly rooted FBOs are well placed 
to act as effective pressure groups, but weakly rooted FBOs are not. This again comes down 
to the organisation’s staffing capacity which affect political advocacy structures and the 
specific resources which influence the status conferred upon the FBO. Section three 
assesses the findings in light of the hypotheses. It underlines that in the Northern Ireland 
case study, devolved autonomy influences the political advocacy structure of FBOs. Roots in 
society does not influence the strategy the FBOs pursue as hypothesised, but it does 
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influence the status conferred upon the FBOs by decision makers as hypothesised. Theology 
plays only a minimal role. 
6.1 The role of religion in (Northern) Ireland and the potential 
opportunities provided by political devolution. 
Examining the historical significance of religion and the relationship between religion and 
politics in this section illustrates that religion has played a key role in Northern Ireland’s 
politics historically, and that religion and politics are still intrinsically linked today. Following 
this, the opportunities political devolution in Northern Ireland affords FBOs are discussed, 
serving as a backdrop to the chapter’s empirical findings of FBO engagement in Northern 
Ireland’s political system. 
6.1.1 The Role of Religion in (Northern) Ireland’s politics 
Celtic Christians travelled from Britannia to Hibernia, from the late 4th century spreading the 
faith across Ireland through a network of Christian communities deeply embedded in each 
local dynastic grouping. When the Protestant reformation hit Europe, colonised Ireland held 
firm to its Catholic faith (MacCulloch 2010: 330-331). The failure of the reformation in 
Ireland meant that the religion of the people was not the religion of the state, an 
unprecedented phenomenon in Europe at this time (Gallagher and Worrall 1982: 5). This 
contradiction meant that religion was intrinsically political in Ireland.  
By the sixteenth century, land was taken from Irish families seen to be rebellious and 
given to settlers who often professed the Protestant faith (Bradshaw and Keogh 2002: 88). 
As time went on, the indigenous population, whether of Gaelic or English origin, found their 
Catholic faith becoming an increasing barrier to their political and economic progress. These 
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tensions, hand in hand with the counter-reformation’s revival of the subversive Catholic 
spirit through a hagiography, history and martyrology sensitive to the Irish’s ‘proud 
traditions’, led to political rebellion most famously encapsulated in the uprisings of 1590 
and 1640 (Bradshaw and Keogh 2002: 86-91). In response to this, the English state, by this 
time in the hands of Cromwell’s puritanical Commonwealth, banned Catholic worship 
(Bradshaw and Keogh 2002: 93-95). The fate of the Catholic population was not wholly 
sealed however until the defeat of Catholic James II by Protestant William of Orange in 
1690. This led to the rise of the ‘penal laws’ making it difficult for Catholics to own land and 
barring Catholics, unprepared to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown’s supremacy, 
from Parliament and public office.  
It was not only Catholics whose faith brought persecution however. Dissenters, most 
of whom were Presbyterian, resented that their ministers were not recognised by the state 
and begrudged paying tithes to the Established Church. It was because of this that 
Presbyterians such as Wolfe Tone were active leaders in the United Irishmen’s Rebellion in 
1789 (Holmes 2000: 171-172). Pressure such as this led to the disestablishment of the 
Church of Ireland in 1869 and a campaign for Home Rule (Gallagher and Worrall 1982: 7). 
This entwined politics and religion to an even greater extent.  Overnight, Protestants who 
had enjoyed privilege for centuries feared living in a Catholic-majority state. Many 
Presbyterians who themselves had been an oppressed minority in Ireland, turned against 
Home Rule for fear of an Irish Parliament, dominated by Catholics (Holmes 2000: 117). This 
led to the popular maxim that Home Rule would mean ‘Rome Rule’ (Gallagher and Worrall 
1982: 7). The Ulster Covenant, which threatened armed revolt in response to Home Rule, 
was signed by thousands of Protestants at the doors of countless Churches (Gallagher and 
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Worrall 1982: 7-8). There is no doubt that Ireland’s partition in 1921, creating Northern 
Ireland, was in many ways, rightly or wrongly, a product of Northern Protestant’s fears of 
living in an Ireland dominated by Catholicism and the Catholic Church. 
FBOs were active in their engagement with the Northern Ireland Parliament 
throughout its short life. This is epitomised in the way both the Protestant churches and 
Catholic Church engaged with education policy. Ó Corráin (2006: 121) gives the example of 
the Protestant churches working with the Orange Order to influence the 1923 Education 
Act, ensuring that newly created state schools became de facto Protestant schools. As was 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Catholic Church engaged heavily with education policy 
throughout the 20th century. At the beginning of the century, Catholic Education was 
entirely funded by the Church, but as the century continued the Church achieved greater 
funding for its schools (see McGrath 2000, Ó Corráin 2006). 
Religion and politics have therefore been intrinsically fused throughout Ireland’s 
history, including the creation of Northern Ireland. However, by the 1990s an academic 
consensus was developing which argued that religion was no more than an ethnic marker in 
the conflict (Ganiel and Jones 2012: 310). McGarry and O’Leary (1995) argued that the 
conflict was ethno-national and that attributing religion as the cause of the conflict was 
greatly over-simplifying the conflict’s reality. However, this position has been challenged. 
For instance, Mitchell’s (2011) thesis builds upon Ruane and Todd’s (1996: 10-11) argument 
that the conflict is a product of the connections between various dimensions of difference in 
Northern Ireland. Mitchell (2011:1) is clear that the Northern Ireland conflict is not and has 
never been a ‘holy war’, but argues that because somebody no longer identifies as religious, 
it does not mean that they drop their association with Catholicism or Protestantism. She 
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argues that the role of the churches in education and family formation and the role of 
religious ideas and symbolism within society create the wealth of ideological concepts found 
in Northern Ireland (Mitchell 2011: 4-20). 
Not only is religion a key factor in the way individuals understand Northern Ireland’s 
society but FBOs have at times been part of proliferating the conflict. There is little evidence 
that the Churches or clergy played a role in the violence (Mitchell 2011: 43-44, 51-52), but it 
is possible that the language and rhetoric used by some religious leaders may have 
encouraged sectarianism and even violence. For instance, Ian Paisley’s ‘Protestant 
Telegraph’ was used as a propaganda machine against Catholicism and the Catholic Church 
(Elliott 2009: 89). Some of the Catholic Bishops, such as Archbishop (later Cardinal) Tomás Ó 
Fiaich, could also be accused of causing division in Northern Ireland, taking every 
opportunity to ‘imbibe the republican tradition and anti-partitionist sentiment’ (Gallagher 
and Worrall 1982: 118). However, individuals such as Archbishop Robin Eames, the Rev. Roy 
Magee and Father Alec Reid, also played key roles in the peace process (see Brewer et al 
2011: 110-117). The churches may have missed their opportunity to publicly outline a ‘vision 
of political compromise’ (Brewer et al 2011: 99-100), but their public neutrality may have 
allowed individual clerics to help bring about key secret peace talks. It is important to note 
that these individuals were not always representing their respective churches (see Brewer 
et al 2011: 110-113), but nonetheless it is also difficult to detach these figures from the 
churches with which they were so intimately involved. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 4, 
the churches have also traditionally been involved in education policy and on questions of 
sexuality and reproductive rights in Northern Ireland. 
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Religion is still intimately connected to Northern Ireland’s society, but FBOs have 
been engaging in a much more pluralistic society since 1998. As noted in Chapter 4, 
Northern Ireland still has a high level of religiosity (Ashworth and Farthing 2007: 10, Ganiel 
and Mitchell 2012: 68-69). Even so, the peace process signalled a ‘repositioning’ of civil 
society (McCall and Williamson 2001: 372). In the latter half of the ‘Troubles’, the UK 
Government and EU greatly strengthened Northern Ireland’s civil society by facilitating 
funds and developing close relationships between the community sector and policy makers 
(McCall and Williamson 2001: 364). The Northern Ireland faith sector has also expanded. 
Organisations such as the Evangelical Contribution On Northern Ireland (ECONI),49 which 
received Community Relation Council funding as part of the Peace Process (Ganiel 2008a: 
39), have set up alongside the more traditional denominations. Furthermore, a Muslim 
community of around 4,000 individuals now exists (Young 2016). Northern Ireland has also 
had a politically active inter-faith forum since 1993 (see NIFF undated). These additions add 
a new dimension to Northern Ireland’s political sphere to which traditional FBOs need to 
adapt.  
6.1.2 The potential opportunities created by political devolution 
Chapter 1 raised how devolution from Westminster to the sub-state level in Northern 
Ireland provided an opportunity for FBOs to engage politically in a way that had not before 
been possible. This section investigates these opportunities in greater depth, identifying the 
access points available for FBOs to engage with the devolved political institutions. It 
examines in turn each of the Belfast Agreement’s three ‘strand 1’ institutions; the legislative 
Assembly, the Executive and the Civic Forum. 
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 Or ‘Contemporary Christianity’ has it has been named since 2005.  
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As noted in Chapter 4, the Northern Ireland Act (1998) transferred the functions 
which had been administered by the six departments that had evolved as part of the 
Northern Ireland Office under direct rule to the Northern Ireland Assembly (Wilford 2000: 
581). The Northern Ireland Assembly therefore has responsibility for social and economic 
policy areas, with ‘excepted matters’ or matters of national importance remaining the 
responsibility of Westminster. Policies such as broadcasting and genetic research remain 
‘reserved matters’ and could be devolved in future, as happened with the ‘reserved matter’ 
of policing and justice in 2010 (UK Government 2013). FBOs engaged with the Northern 
Ireland Office on a number of these policy areas under administrative devolution and hence 
while FBOs were not new to engaging with political institutions in Northern Ireland, political 
devolution set the basis for increasing the access points available to them. However, there is 
evidence that the Catholic Church and main Protestant denominations were part of 
Northern Ireland’s territorial policy community prior to 1998 (Connolly 1990: 118-119), 
consequently this democratisation of access may not have strengthened their role in the 
same way as it may have done for more weakly rooted FBOs. Even so, the widening of 
access brought about through the establishment of the Assembly may well be positive for 
FBOs more generally. This access has at times been limited as the Assembly was suspended 
or collapsed four times between 2000 and 2007 (see Knox 2010: 9-12), with pressure groups 
re-orientating themselves towards the Northern Ireland Office during these periods (Watts 
2007: 161). However, relative stability since 2007 has strengthened the opportunity for 
engagement with the devolved political institutions.  
The legislature provides a number of opportunities for FBO engagement. Firstly, 
elected representatives currently from eight different political parties may provide 
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opportunities for FBOs to find allies, build coalitions, and defend or challenge legislation 
with the wide range of political voices represented in the Assembly. The Northern Ireland 
Assembly’s consociational design also creates opportunities for engagement through its 
departmental committees. In addition to their more conventional legislative and scrutinising 
roles, the statutory committees advise and assist the executive departments in the 
formulation of policy and can initiate primary legislation (Wilford 2000: 581-582, Knox 2010: 
19), although Birrell (2012: 102) has noted that the committee’s roles have evolved into a 
more traditional role of scrutiny, policy development and consultation with ministers. Even 
so, the legislature’s committee system is an outlet by which pressure groups can attempt to 
influence legislation, whether this is through giving evidence, attempting to use the 
committee to amend legislation or to influence primary legislation from within the statutory 
committees. Likewise, Private Members’ Bills can also be passed from within the legislature 
(Knox 2010: 20), providing further opportunities for FBOs to pursue its agenda along with 
sympathetic MLAs. Not only does the legislature provide potential opportunities for FBOs to 
further their agendas, but the Assembly’s consociatonal design also provides methods for 
FBOs to prevent undesired legislation. For instance, the Assembly’s ‘Petition of Concern’ 
mechanism, whereby legislation can be vetoed with the signatures of thirty MLAs if it is 
perceived as detrimental to one of the two communities (Wilford 2000: 580), may also 
provide an opportunity for pressure groups to combat undesirable legislation by lobbying 
for its use. Unlike the legislature in Wales, there is no cross party group on faith associated 
with the Northern Ireland legislature. However, non-Christian FBOs may find the Assembly’s 
All Party Group on Ethnic Minority Communities (APGEMC) a valuable space for working 
with MLAs and other organisations on common issues.   
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The executive also presents potential opportunities for FBO engagement. For 
instance, the expectation on Government departments to consult widely throughout 
voluntary and community groups (Osborne 2003: 350) may provide opportunities for a wide 
range of organisations to engage with decision makers. Furthermore, Chaney (2011: 264) 
has noted the apparent emphasis on partnership working and policy consultation in 
Northern Ireland. This presents a shift from the situation prior to 1998, where Northern 
Ireland was run by ‘hands off’ direct rule Ministers (Carmichael and Osborne 2003: 208) who 
were at times disinterested or even ignorant of the political context (Levy 1995: 213-214). 
Section 75 of the Belfast Agreement also places a duty on executive departments to 
promote equality of opportunity when drafting legislation, with religious belief and race 
included in its definition. Not only should the Executive evaluate the effect of its legislation 
on minority groups, but it must also actively consult these groups when developing policy 
(Beveridge et al 2000: 401-403). There are mixed reports regarding the Executive’s success 
in consulting and engaging widely with ethnic minorities and FBOs (see Chaney 2011: 234-
235, 259), but it does, at least in theory, provide a potential opportunity for minority FBOs 
to engage with the policy process. 
The consociational design of the Northern Ireland executive may also provide 
potential opportunities and challenges for FBO engagement. The ‘grand coalition’ Executive 
which includes both sides of the ethnic divide (Wilford and Wilson 2003: 11) 50 makes it 
more likely that at least one minister will be sympathetic to the FBO’s cause. However, this 
could also present a problem for FBOs, if a minister for a particular policy area is not 
                                                     
50
 Between 2011-2016, five parties were represented in the Northern Ireland Executive. The Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Féin, The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP). However, after the 2016 election, the UUP and the SDLP decided not to take the one ministerial 
position both parties were entitled to, opting instead to form the official opposition.  
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sympathetic to the FBO’s position. This could be particularly problematic for FBOs that are 
intimately connected to one side of the nationalist or unionist community, possibly making 
access to ministers on the ‘other side’ more difficult. However, the possibility of a party or 
minister turning an executive department into a personal ‘fiefdom’ is offset by a mechanism 
of no confidence from within the Assembly, which can be set in motion with thirty 
signatures and cross party support (Wilford 2000: 581). 
An opportunity for FBOs to engage with the Northern Ireland Executive on issues 
specifically related to faith might also be provided through the ‘Community Faiths’ Forum’ 
(CFF). This space is more limited in its scope than the Welsh Government’s ‘Faith 
Communities Forum’, as it engages with issues surrounding one department, Social 
Development (see Communities Faith Forum undated). Even so, this may be a potential 
access point for certain policy areas, particularly for weakly rooted FBOs which might be 
more limited in their opportunity to access decision makers.  
Finally, the Civic Forum, may also provide potential opportunities for FBO 
engagement. The Civic Forum was created by the Northern Ireland Act (1998) as an 
independent body which was to have consultative status with representatives drawn from 
civil society, including the Churches (Chaney 2011: 81). The Forum’s members were to 
discuss economic, social and cultural issues (Wilford and Wilson 2001: 56-57) with the First 
and Deputy First Ministers required to consult the Forum on a regular basis (Knox 2010: 26). 
Minority FBOs were not given a place on the forum, but this space gave the churches an 
opportunity to attempt to have their voices heard. However, a number of politicians were 
unhappy with the Civic Forum’s consultative role (Wilford and Wilson 2001: 57) and the 
Forum’s short life ended in 2002 when the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended (Knox 
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2010: 26). When the Assembly was re-installed after the suspension, the Democratic 
Unionist Party vehemently opposed the return of the Forum, claiming that it was ‘anti-
unionist, anti-Orange and anti-Evangelical’ (Knox 2010: 27). The Forum has not been re-
instated and hence it could be seen as a lost opportunity for FBO engagement (see Chaney 
2011: 81-82). 
In conclusion, this section has shown that religion has played a key part in Northern 
Ireland’s politics both now and historically. The changes in Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
set-up may present some challenges for some FBOs used to having close contact to the 
political class, but it also provides potential opportunities for FBO engagement more 
broadly. The remainder of this empirical chapter examines how FBOs have attempted to 
capitalise on these opportunities by engaging with Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions. 
6.1.3 The Cases 
Having discussed religion and politics in Northern Ireland and the opportunities the 
Northern Ireland Assembly has created for engagement, this section establishes the 
background to the political engagement of the FBO case studies prior to 1998. This acts as a 
backdrop to the post-devolution findings in the following sections. Each FBO case study is 
examined in turn. 
As regards the Presbyterian Church before the establishment of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, it was actively involved in the politics of the region. Presbyterians were 
historically persecuted as dissenters outside the established Church, but in the 20th century 
they became politically allied to unionism and the British state (Holmes 2000: 117-123). As 
one of the main Protestant denominations in Northern Ireland, the Presbyterian Church 
formed part of the Northern Ireland Office’s territorial policy community, providing it with 
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opportunities to engage with education and on a number of moral issues (Connolly 1990: 
118). The Church and Government Committee has traditionally been given responsibility for 
the Church’s political engagement and consulted with the UK government during direct 
rule.51 The Presbyterian Church engages with education policy through the Transferor 
Representative Council (TRC) (McKelvey 2006). Furthermore, as has already been noted, the 
Church also played an important role in the constitutional debates prior to 1998. 
As noted in Chapter 4, the Catholic Church in Ireland has always been a key 
institution within the Northern Ireland Catholic community, acting as the sole 
representative of the community for many years (Mitchell 2011:45-48) and supporting 
Catholic emancipation through the Civil Rights movement (O’Corrain 2006: 143, Mitchell 
2011: 44-45). Clerics from within the Church were also involved as mediators in the Peace 
Process (Brewer et al 2011: 110-114). As with the Protestant denominations, the Catholic 
Church formed part of the Northern Ireland Office’s territorial policy community, providing 
it with opportunities to engage with a number of moral issues and with education policy 
(Connolly 1990:118, McGrath 2000, O’Córrain 2006). Its Bishops have also consistently 
spoken out on the social condition of its community in relation to issues such as health, 
housing and welfare (O’Córrain 2006: 114-142). 
The Muslim community in Northern Ireland has traditionally been careful to 
maintain a low profile within Northern Ireland society, not wanting to take sides or become 
embroiled in the conflict (Marranci 2004: 20) and hence was not significantly engaged with 
the region’s politics before the establishment of the Assembly in 1998. This could be due to 
                                                     
51
 The Church and Government Committee changed its name to the Church and Society Committee by the 
General Assembly of 2005 and to the Council for Church in Society by the General Assembly of 2016. However, 
by September 2016 the Presbyterian Church in Ireland’s website refers to it as the ‘Council for Public Affairs’ 
(see Presbyterian Church in Ireland undated c).  
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a combination of both the ‘Troubles’ and a lack of capacity to do so. However, since 1998 
the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC) has expressed the wish to play a greater role within 
Northern Ireland society (Marranci 2004: 20).  
Likewise, prior to the establishment of the Assembly, the Caleb Foundation’s political 
engagement was minimal, focusing instead on social and cultural issues. For instance, its 
aims included lobbying the BBC for more air time for denominations which espoused more 
fundamentalist Christian theology (Ganiel 2008a: 111-112). However, the organisation took 
an anti-agreement stance in the public debate surrounding the Belfast Agreement (Brewer 
et al 2011: 119-120). 
6.1.4 The Hypotheses 
Before reporting on the findings of how the FBOs have engaged with the devolved political 
system, the expected findings as hypothesised are outlined. For this case, it is possible to 
test hypotheses 1, 3 and 5-11. 
H1: ‘As the devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
higher the levels of capacity within the political advocacy structures of FBOs’. 
In response to Hypothesis 1, we expect to see a greater level of capacity within the 
political advocacy structures of FBOs as a greater level of autonomy is devolved to Northern 
Ireland and as the political devolution settlement becomes more entrenched. 
H3: ‘As devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the more 
likely it is that the region’s FBOs develop a distinct strategy for political engagement at the 
sub-state level’. 
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With respect to hypothesis 3, we expect so see FBOs in Northern Ireland developing 
distinct strategies as the powers in the region become more extensive and entrenched. 
H5: ‘The stronger the FBO’s roots within the devolved region, the more likely it is to have a 
staff based political advocacy structure’. 
The expectation is that the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the Catholic Church in 
Ireland will have a staff-based political advocacy structure owing to their stronger roots in 
society, while the BIC and the Caleb Foundation will not, owing to their relatively weaker 
roots within society. 
H6: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is to 
utilise an insider strategy’. 
On the basis of Hypothesis 6, there is a greater expectation that the Presbyterian 
Church in Ireland and the Catholic Church in Ireland will pursue an insider strategy than the 
BIC and the Caleb Foundation. 
H7: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is that 
devolved institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
Hypothesis 7 leads to the expectation that the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and 
the Catholic Church in Ireland are more likely to have core or specialist insider status 
conferred upon them by the devolved institution than the BIC and the Caleb Foundation. 
H8: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is to pursue an insider 
strategy’.  
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Hypothesis 8 takes us in a different direction. In light of this hypothesis there is a 
greater expectation that the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the BIC will pursue an 
insider strategy than the Caleb Foundation and the Catholic Church. 
H9: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is that the devolved 
institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
Similarly, Hypothesis 9 leads to the expectation that the Presbyterian Church and the 
BIC are more likely to have core or specialist insider status conferred upon them than the 
Caleb Foundation and the Catholic Church. 
H10: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the better placed it is to 
act as an effective pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
In response to Hypothesis 10, we expect to see that the Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland and the Catholic Church in Ireland are better placed to act as effective pressure 
groups than the BIC and the Caleb Foundation. 
H11: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the better placed it is to act as an effective 
pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
Hypothesis 11 on the other hand, leads to the expectation that the Presbyterian 
Church in Ireland and the BIC are better placed to act as effective pressure groups than the 
Caleb Foundation and the Catholic Church. 
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6.2. Findings and Analysis. 
Section 1 provided an historical context for FBO political engagement and assessed the 
hypotheses in the case of Northern Ireland. On this basis, the findings in relation to FBO 
engagement post-devolution can now be presented.   
6.2.1 Political Advocacy Structure: Findings 
This section examines the first secondary research question, which asks:  
‘What type of political advocacy structures have faith-based organisations adopted to 
engage with political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
As noted in Chapter 4, this thesis analyses three aspects of FBO political advocacy 
structure; whether it is a centralised or devolved organisation, whether its elite run or 
democratic and whether its engagement is carried out by volunteers or professional staff 
members. How the FBOs have adapted to engage with the devolved political institutions in 
Northern Ireland is also examined.  
The section indicates that FBOs in the case of Northern Ireland, apart from the 
Catholic Church are territorial organisations. Each FBO has adapted its political advocacy 
structures to engage with the devolved political institutions by increasing staff capacity 
apart from the Caleb Foundation. 
6.2.1.1 The Presbyterian Church 
The Presbyterian Church in Ireland is a territorial organisation. The Church has a democratic 
political advocacy structure, although elites are dominant within its day to day political 
engagement. There is a role for volunteers within its political advocacy structure, but 
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professional staff members are highly involved in its political engagement. This staff 
capacity has increased to engage with the devolved institutions. 
The Presbyterian Church in Ireland is what Keating et al (2009) refer to as a territorial 
organisation, which engages in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. It is fully 
autonomous with its headquarters in Belfast. The Church’s focus is in Northern Ireland 
(O’Córrain 2006: 1), and this is also the case with its political engagement with the ‘Republic 
of Ireland Panel’ making up only a small sub-division of the Council for Church in Society’s 
report.52 
The Church has a democratic political advocacy structure, but elites within the 
Church are dominant in its day to day political engagement. The Assembly is the ‘supreme 
governing body’ of the Church, providing an opportunity for Ministers and an Elder from 
each Congregation to deliberate and vote on the Church’s business every June (Presbyterian 
Church in Ireland undated a). Within the General Assembly sits the ‘Council for Church in 
Society’ which engages politically on behalf of the Church and has a number of sub-
committees such as the Education Committee which engages with education policy. The 
make-up of the Council itself is democratic, in that each Presbytery may nominate a 
representative elder to the Council (Presbyterian Church in Ireland undated a). However, 
while the reports of the ‘Council for Church in Society’ must be passed by the General 
Assembly, it also represents the Church throughout the year, providing consultation 
responses, meeting decision makers and with its convenor speaking publicly on political 
issues (e.g. see Williamson 2015). Therefore, the committee is scrutinised by the General 
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 In the Council for Church in Society’s report to the General Assembly in 2016 
<https://www.presbyterianireland.org/getmedia/a7c89058-4f5d-476d-bfcd-f0dc81add6ea/12-Church-in-
Society.pdf.aspx>, the Republic of Ireland Panel’s report took up less than one page of the twelve pages that 
made up the main body of the report.   
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Assembly, but it is at quite some liberty to shape the Church’s agenda between Assemblies. 
The Council’s convenor is particularly powerful in this respect, often appearing in the media 
as the representative of the Church on political matters. Furthermore, the Church’s 
moderator, a ‘first among equals’ (Dunlop 1995: 9) for only one year, can also use his or her 
position to speak out in a personal capacity. Therefore, the Presbyterian Church does have a 
democratic political advocacy structure, but the role of the convenor of the Church in 
Society committee and the Moderator means that elites within the Church play a powerful 
role in its day to day engagement.    
The Presbyterian Church utilises both volunteers and professional staff in its political 
advocacy structure. Lay people can serve on the Council for Church in Society and its sub-
committees. However, the Church is staff focused, utilising professional staff, such as the 
Clerk and Deputy Clerk, in the day to day workings of the Church (see Presbyterian Church in 
Ireland undated b). In response to political devolution, the Church has increased its use of 
professional staff within its political advocacy structure. In 2007, as the Assembly was 
restored, the Church recognised that as control of education policy returned to the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, there was a need for the Church to ensure it had the capacity to 
engage with it sufficiently, particularly because of the increasing levels of consultation.53 
Education had also become very politicised with the Department of Education’s decision to 
re-structure the Education and Library Boards, into one Education Authority (General 
Assembly 2006: 209). 54  In response to this, the Church added education policy to the 
responsibilities of the Deputy Clerk, one of its senior members of staff (see General 
Assembly 2008: 220). According to a senior respondent from the Church, this decision was 
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 The original proposal was to create an Education and Skills Authority, however later legislation led to the 
eventual body being named the Education Authority. 
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made within a wider context of the Church beginning to consider the implications of the 
Assembly for its political engagement.55 The Church’s use of professional staff was 
developed further in 2015. During an overhaul of its structure, the committee for Church 
and Society was upgraded to a Council of the Church and appointed a Public Affairs Officer 
to serve it (General Assembly 2015: 213). A senior representative was clear in an interview 
with the author that the Church felt other interest groups, ones which at times oppose the 
Church’s agenda, had the capacity to engage, and that the Church needed to increase its 
capacity in order to be competitive in Northern Ireland’s political sphere.56 The re-
establishment of the Assembly and the politicised nature of education policy appear to have 
led the Church to adapt its structure to focus on political engagement and to increasing its 
staff capacity for this purpose. 
In sum, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland is a territorial organisation, based in 
Northern Ireland but also engaging in the Republic of Ireland. It is democratic, but elites 
within the Church are dominant in its day to day political engagement. There is a role for 
volunteers within its political advocacy structure, but professional staff members play a key 
role. The Church has increased its staff capacity since the establishment of the Assembly. 
6.2.1.2 The Catholic Church in Ireland 
The Catholic Church in Northern Ireland is a centralised organisations based in Maynooth in 
the Republic of Ireland. However, the Northern Bishops and their staff have a high level of 
autonomy at the sub-state level to engage politically in Northern Ireland. The Church is elite 
run with professional staff carrying out its political engagement. The Church has increased 
its staff capacity to engage with the devolved institution. 
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The Catholic Church in Ireland is a centralised organisation at the central level, which 
confers a high level of autonomy on the Church in Northern Ireland to engage politically. 
This is illustrated in the fact that the Northern Ireland Church sends its Bishops to the Irish 
Catholic Bishops’ Conference where decisions regarding the Church’s political engagement 
are made, but at the same time has its own staff in Northern Ireland engaging with Northern 
Ireland matters and the devolved institution. The Church in Northern Ireland enjoyed this 
high level of autonomy prior to 1998 and it has continued since the establishment of the 
Assembly.57  
The Church is elite led with no democratic function within the Church, and hence the 
political engagement of the Church is elite driven. The Church is also staff focused with the 
Northern Bishops advised by a permanent member of staff who takes responsibility for both 
political affairs and education in Northern Ireland.58 The Church also relies on a statutory 
body, the Catholic Council for Maintained Schools (CCMS) for political representation in 
education. In 2003, the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference formed the Northern Ireland 
Catholic Council on Social Affairs (NICCOSA), increasing the Church’s staff capacity for 
political engagement in Northern Ireland.59 The Council coordinates and enhances the work 
of the Northern Bishops on political issues in Northern Ireland and represents the Bishops to 
decision makers (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference undated). This structure was created 
during direct rule, but it was created so as to engage with social policy in Northern Ireland, 
and hence was created for engaging with the devolved structures (see Irish Catholic Bishops’ 
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Council undated). In 2006, the Church appointed a full time researcher for the Council. This 
individual co-ordinates the consultation responses and publications produced by NICCOSA.60 
In sum, the Catholic Church in Ireland is a centralised organisation which has 
conferred a high level of autonomy on the Church in Northern Ireland. Its political advocacy 
structure is elite run, with very minimal membership involvement and no democratic 
function. The Church has increased its capacity to engage with the devolved institutions 
through the creation of NICCOSA. The Church utilises staff for its political engagement, 
having increased its staff capacity in Northern Ireland in 2006 in order to engage with the 
devolved political institutions. 
6.2.1.3 The Belfast Islamic Centre 
The Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC) is a territorial organisation loosely affiliated to the central 
level. Its political advocacy structure is democratic and it utilises volunteers in its political 
engagement. However, with support from the Northern Ireland Executive, the BIC has 
increased its staff capacity to engage with the devolved institution.   
The BIC is a territorial organisation with full autonomy at the sub-state level. The BIC is 
affiliated to the Muslim Council of Britain, recognised as one of its ‘local’ member 
organisations (see Muslim Council of Britain undated), but has full autonomy over its 
political engagement in Northern Ireland. The BIC has a democratic political advocacy 
structure, using a delegate based system. The centre is governed by an elected executive 
committee which makes decisions regarding the organisation’s political advocacy, and is 
answerable to the organisation’s membership.61 Its executive committee is made up of 
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volunteers, who have responsibility for the organisation’s political engagement (Marranci 
2004: 20).62 According to McCombe and Khan (2005: 37) the BIC’s engagement in the public 
sphere increased greatly under the voluntary chairmanship of Dr. Mamun Mobayed 
between 1992 and 2000, with the centre gaining stability as an organisation and favourable 
media coverage at this time. However, since 2008 the BIC has had a partial staff based 
political advocacy structure. The Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
(OFMDFM) awarded the BIC £45,000 to assist in the appointment of a Director and an 
Administrator (Northern Ireland Executive 2008). This funding is to ‘allow BIC to carry out a 
range of activities to help local Muslims integrate in to wider society’ (Northern Ireland 
Executive 2008) but it also means that the BIC has staff which have time to engage politically 
and respond to government consultations.63 In this respect, the return of political 
devolution has focused the organisation’s political engagement, with OFMDFM acting as a 
‘patron’ providing the necessary means for the centre to move towards a staff based 
political advocacy structure. 
In summary, the BIC is an autonomous territorial organisation which has a 
democratic based political advocacy structure. The BIC utilises volunteers in its political 
advocacy, but since 2008 it has utilised a partial staff based political advocacy structure. In 
this respect, it has increased its staff capacity, with the support of OFMDFM, to engage with 
Northern Ireland’s devolved political institutions. 
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6.2.1.4 The Caleb Foundation 
The Caleb Foundation is a territorial organisation. It is elite led and its political advocacy is 
run by volunteers. The Caleb Foundation has not increased its capacity to engage with the 
devolved institution. 
The Caleb Foundation is what Keating et al (2009) refer to as a territorial organisation. The 
organisation is wholly independent and autonomous in its political engagement in Northern 
Ireland. Caleb’s political advocacy structure is elite driven. It does not have a defined 
membership structure (Clarke 2012), and hence its ‘Council of Reference’, through which it 
conducts its decision making is not democratically elected. Instead, a number of high profile 
Ministers and Elders from within conservative/fundamentalist Protestant church circles are 
co-opted onto the Council of Reference.64 Within this structure, an executive committee 
undertakes the day to day decisions (see Ganiel 2008a: 112).65 The role of the Chairperson is 
relatively symbolic with the organisation’s secretary undertaking most of the work.66 All of 
Caleb Foundation’s engagement is done on a voluntary basis. The Caleb Foundation is 
therefore a territorial organisation which is wholly autonomous in its political engagement. 
Caleb’s political advocacy structure is elite driven and voluntary based.  
6.2.2 Political Advocacy Structure: Analysis 
The case of Northern Ireland indicates that the majority of the FBOs selected are territorial 
organisations, with the BIC a territorial organisation affiliated to a central level organisation. 
However, the Catholic Church is a centralised organisation which has conferred a high level 
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of autonomy on the Church in Northern Ireland. As regards whether the FBO is democratic 
or elite driven, the BIC is the only organisation in the case of Northern Ireland which has a 
purely democratic political advocacy structure, while the Catholic Church and Caleb 
Foundation are elite driven. The Presbyterian Church’s political advocacy structure is 
partially democratic through the General Assembly. However, elites are dominant in its day 
to day engagement. With regards to having a staff or voluntary based political advocacy 
structure, the Catholic Church is the only organisation which is wholly staff based. It has also 
increased its staff capacity to engage with the devolved institutions. The Caleb Foundation is 
at the other end of the spectrum with a wholly voluntary based political advocacy structure. 
Both the Presbyterian Church and the BIC utilise a combination of volunteers and 
professional staff. The BIC has traditionally used a voluntary based political advocacy 
structure, but has become partially staff focused since 2008. The Presbyterian Church has a 
longer history of utilising professional staff and increased its staff capacity in 2007.   
The findings indicate that Keating’s drivers of adaptation have played a role in 
shaping the political advocacy structures the FBOs have adopted to engage with the 
devolved political institutions. Keating (2013: 119) argues that the devolution of power from 
the centre to the sub-state level can induce pressure groups to follow suit and engage 
politically in the region. This has been seen in the case of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland 
and the Catholic Church in Ireland which have increased their staff capacity so as to engage 
with the devolved institutions. In this case, re-establishment of the Assembly in 2007 and 
the politicised nature of education policy in Northern Ireland appear to have been catalysts 
in the organisations’ decision to strengthen their political advocacy structures through 
greater staff capacity. This has also been seen in the case of the BIC, which has adopted a 
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staff based political advocacy structure due to support from the devolved executive. The 
role of the Executive in providing the means by which the BIC has been able to increase its 
political engagement through a partially staff based political advocacy structure, suggests 
that Keating’s (2013: 123) claim that sub-state governments encourage and even sponsor 
pressure groups to adapt to the sub-state level is evident in the case of Northern Ireland. 
In summary, the FBOs selected for the case of Northern Ireland have diverse political 
advocacy structures. The majority of the FBOs selected are territorial organisation and are 
autonomous over their political engagement in Northern Ireland. Only the Catholic Church’s 
political advocacy structure is centralised although it has conferred a high level of autonomy 
on the Church in Northern Ireland. The BIC’s political advocacy structure is democratic while 
the Presbyterian Church is partially democratic and the Catholic Church and Caleb 
Foundation are elite run. The political advocacy structure of each FBO is either wholly or 
partially staff based, apart from the Caleb Foundation which is voluntary based. Each FBO, 
apart from the Caleb Foundation, has increased its capacity to engage with the devolved 
political institutions in Northern Ireland. 
6.2.3 Strategy: Findings 
Following the examination of the political advocacy structures of FBOs, this section 
investigates the second secondary research question, which asks: 
‘What type of strategies have faith-based organisations adopted to engage with the political 
institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
The strategies adopted by the FBOs are investigated using the three policies 
presented in Chapter 4; education, same-sex marriage legislation and constitutional issues. 
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The section demonstrates that each FBO pursues an insider strategy, with strongly rooted 
FBOs supplementing this with a responsible outsider strategy. The strongly rooted FBOs 
have a specialist or core insider strategy conferred upon them by decision makers, but the 
weakly rooted FBOs do not. The strongly rooted FBOs have identified specific resources 
which they have exchanged with decision makers for specialist or core insider status but this 
is not the case for weakly rooted FBOs.  
6.2.3.1 The Presbyterian Church in Ireland. 
The Presbyterian Church pursues an insider strategy in each of the policy areas, 
supplementing this with an outsider strategy when engaging with the issue of same-sex 
marriage and on constitutional issues. The Church has core or specialist insider status 
conferred upon it in each policy area.  
6.2.3.1.1 Education 
The Presbyterian Church pursues an insider strategy in education and has received specialist 
insider status in return.  One of the largest issues looming over education policy in Northern 
Ireland since the re-establishment of political devolution in 1998 has been the restructuring 
of the region’s Education and Library Boards into one centralised Education Authority (see 
AgendaNI 2013 and McCarry 2015). Legal advice obtained by the Minister stated that 
allowing Transferor Representatives, such as the Presbyterian Church, representation on the 
board contravened the equality requirements of the Northern Ireland Acts (Transferor 
Representative Council 2007: 1) and hence the Church found itself defending its right of 
representation on the Board which is responsible for primary and secondary school services 
in Northern Ireland.   
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The Presbyterian Church utilised an insider strategy in response to this statement by 
engaging with both the executive and the legislature. The Presbyterian Church worked in 
coalition with the other Protestant denominations, through the Transferor Representative 
Council, an organisation which represents the Protestant denominations which transferred 
their schools to the state in the twentieth century (see McKelvey 2006). By working in 
coalition, the Church was able to present a Protestant position. This was first done through 
responding to the Review of Public Administration in 2007. Here, the Church argued against 
appointments to the board being made by the Minister on the basis of ‘merit’, arguing 
instead that Transferor Representatives should be represented by right (General Assembly 
2007: 206). The Church then contested the department’s legal advice (General Assembly 
2010: 267) and began to consider whether judicial review would be required.67 It also put 
pressure on the Minister by questioning whether Catholic representation on the board 
without Protestant representation was leading to inequality in education (General Assembly 
2007: 207). In all likelihood, questioning the decision on this basis ensured that the unionist 
parties in Northern Ireland supported the Church’s representation. A senior respondent 
from the Church noted in an interview with the author: ‘we took legal advice…of course we 
did that, of course we lobbied, but we were pushing open doors from every party, unionists 
certainly, but also (the) SDLP’.68 
This is also evidenced in the public pronouncements made by unionist politicians in 
support of the Protestant Church’s representation. The then Chair of the Education 
Committee, Mervyn Storey, argued that the Democratic Unionist’s (DUP) objection to the 
Bill was based on its failure to provide Transferor representation (Dineen 2012). As is 
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evident from the Committee’s minutes, the Presbyterian Church, along with TRC 
representatives, received a warm welcome from Storey when they provided evidence as 
part of their insider strategy to his committee in 2012 (Northern Ireland Assembly 2012). 
Likewise, the UUP was of the opinion that the position of ‘religious stakeholders’ must be 
protected in the legislation (Dineen 2012). 
The consociational nature of Northern Ireland’s political system makes it difficult for 
controversial legislation to be passed in the legislature and hence the unionist political 
parties’ support of the Transferors greatly bolstered the Presbyterian Church’s position. 
With the unionists supporting the Protestant denomination’s right to representation, a deal 
had to be brokered or the Education Bill(s)69 could not be passed (see Birrell 2013: 771). The 
Church’s success in retaining its insider status in education denotes its ability, with support 
from unionist politicians, to influence legislation within an abrasive political system. The 
Church finds itself engaging in a difficult political environment, but its position is bolstered 
through the support of the unionist political parties.   
Therefore, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland pursues an insider strategy in 
education, and has managed to protect its core insider status despite the challenge to its 
position. However, the findings also suggest that the Church’s historic privilege within 
Northern Ireland’s political system cannot be taken for granted. Even so, while equality 
legislation can challenge the position of the Presbyterian Church, the Church has also 
recognised it as a line of defence.  
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6.2.3.1.2 Same-Sex Marriage 
The Presbyterian Church, through its Council for Church in Society70 has utilised an insider 
strategy, supplemented by a responsible outsider strategy to oppose same-sex marriage. It 
has also utilised a responsible outsider strategy in coalition with the Catholic Church.  
The Church’s main insider strategy has been to contact MLAs and political parties, asking 
them to defend traditional marriage. The Council for Church and Society sent out letters to 
each party, and subsequently to each MLA so as to ensure that they were aware of the 
Church’s opposition on the proposed change to marriage law in Northern Ireland (General 
Assembly 2013). This can be seen as a strategy to shore up support for the Church’s 
position, ensuring MLAs are aware that they are opposing the Church if they opt to support 
same-sex marriage. 
This insider strategy had some success in shaping the debate within the chamber. In 
each debate, the views of Northern Ireland’s Churches,71 and particularly the Presbyterian 
Church,72 is a common discussion point. The Church did not succeeded in changing the 
position of those in favour of same-sex marriage, but the Church’s position appears to be 
respected even by those who support the Bill. This would suggest that the Church’s insider 
strategy had some impact on the tone of the debate, and as a respected institution within 
Northern Ireland it managed to ensure that the position against the legislation is widely 
viewed as an acceptable and defensible one. Further to this, the Alliance Party’s leader, 
David Ford, a supporter of the Bill, proposed amending the Bill so as to add protection for 
faith groups. He noted that this echoed the Presbyterian Church’s call for a ‘respectful 
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debate and dialogue on the issue’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard 2013: 17). It is not 
clear if Ford pursued this amendment in order to try and satisfy the Presbyterian Church’s 
dissatisfaction with the proposed legislation, but it is worth noting that it has been widely 
reported that he stepped aside from his role as a Presbyterian Elder because of the unease 
his position caused to many within his Church (see Cranmer 2013). This might be perceived 
as comparable to the practice of some Catholic priests refusing mass to politicians who vote 
in contrary to the Church’s teaching on moral issues (see McConnell 2013).   
The Church has also engaged with the public debate utilising a responsible outsider 
strategy. However, the public debate has been challenging for the Church. Those in favour 
of same-sex marriage have framed the debate around the question of equality. For instance, 
Amnesty International’s Northern Ireland Director, Patrick Corrigan, has argued that ‘it’s 
high time Northern Ireland said a big ‘we do too’ to equality’ (Cromie 2015). Furthermore, 
Sinn Fein has connected the debate to the wider narrative of civil rights in Northern Ireland 
(Northern Ireland Assembly 2013: 43). This plays into what Bean (2007: 10) has referred to 
as Sinn Féin’s ‘performative discourse of equality’. The use of this language questions 
whether all citizens in Northern Ireland are equal, or whether some are still treated as 
second class citizens. This subtle, yet stinging accusation makes it difficult for those against 
same-sex marriage to develop a positive narrative against the legislation. Despite this, the 
Church’s responsible outsider strategy has publicly challenged the idea that to oppose 
same-sex marriage is to oppose equality by arguing that opposition to same-sex marriage is 
a matter of conscience (General Assembly 2015). In this fashion, the Presbyterian Church 
has worked in coalition with the Catholic Church, expressing a view that future Assembly 
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votes on same-sex marriage should not be whipped (BBC News NI 2015). This furthers the 
narrative that they are not against equality, but believe the issue is a matter of conscience     
In summary, the Presbyterian Church has engaged with MLAs through an insider 
strategy and with the public debate through a responsible outsider strategy. The Assembly 
has not amended marriage law, but the Church’s position has been vigorously challenged, 
particularly in the public sphere. Reflecting this challenging political environment, the 
margin against the legislation in the Assembly has diminished over time. For instance, 
without the DUP’s petition of concern in November 2015,73 the legislation would have 
passed. 
6.2.3.1.3 Constitutional Issues 
The Presbyterian Church pursues an insider strategy when engaging with constitutional 
issues. The evidence suggests that the Church is cautious in this policy area, but is well 
received by decision makers. 
The Presbyterian Church has pursued an insider strategy in its engagement with 
constitutional issues engaging with a raft of consultation processes and meeting with 
decision makers. For instance, the Church met with the political parties ahead of the St. 
Andrew’s discussions in 2006 (see General Assembly 2006: 18, General Assembly 2007: 15-
17). The Church has also given evidence as part of formal consultation processes regarding 
policing, the future of the Civic Forum and the issue of parades. In relation to policing and 
justice, the Church put forward a defined position regarding the need to include Sinn Féin 
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within the policing structures and Police Board (General Assembly 2007: 16). Likewise, the 
Church offered a nuanced position regarding the devolution of policing and justice, while 
noting its reservation about the recommendation for 50:50 police recruitment (General 
Assembly 2008: 36). Then, when responding to the ‘Temporary Recruitment Provision’ 
consultation in 2011, the Church called for an end to 50:50 policing in Northern Ireland once 
the numbers had reached what the Patten report considered ‘acceptable’ (Presbyterian 
Church in Ireland 2011). The Church also offered detailed recommendations in response to 
the reform of the Civic Forum in 2009, proposing reduction in its membership, widening of 
the forum’s remit to include societal issues as well as commitment from politicians to 
engage with the forum’s work (General Assembly 2009: 80-81). Likewise in 2013, the Church 
met with the former American diplomat Richard Hass (Presbyterian Church in Ireland 2013) 
who chaired talks on parading, flags and ‘the past’. Here, the Church recommended 
devolving determinations on contested parades so as to bring local accountability and 
responsibility to the issue (Hamilton 2013). 
Despite this insider engagement, the perception that the Church has not been active in its 
engagement with constitutional issues since 1998 is found both within the Presbyterian 
Church and amongst unionist politicians. One senior representative of the Presbyterian 
Church noted in an interview that it had lacked the capacity to deal with big constitutional 
issues post 1998, with the Church having taken its ‘eye off the ball’.74 Further to this, 
another respondent from the Church noted that it had moved from a world where it was 
clear of its position against violence to a much more nuanced and confused world after 
1998.75 Likewise, a Unionist MLA argued that the Church was fearful of ‘writing anything 
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down’ because this could reveal internal disagreement within the Church76 and an Alliance 
MLA noted his frustration at the lack of detail provided on constitutional issues in 
comparison to issues such as same-sex marriage.77  
While these perception would suggest that Brewer et al’s (2011: 99-100) pre-1998 criticism 
that the Church desensitised politics, relying on vague pronouncements, still stands post 
1998, the evidence also signals that these perceptions may be unfair, with the Church 
having engaged with numerous consultation processes.  
In sum, the Presbyterian Church pursues an insider strategy with constitutional 
issues. Despite the perception that the Church has been inactive on constitutional issues 
since 1998, there is evidence which signals that the Church’s insider engagement has been 
relatively widespread. The evidence also reveals the willingness of political parties and 
commission chairs to meet Church representatives, suggesting that it is seen as an 
important stakeholder on constitutional issues, receiving specialist insider status. 
6.2.3.2 The Catholic Church in Ireland 
The Catholic Church pursues an insider strategy in each of the policy areas under study, 
supplementing this strategy with a responsible outsider strategy when necessary. The 
Catholic Church has specialist insider status conferred upon it in each of the policy areas. 
6.2.3.2.1 Education 
The Catholic Church has used an insider strategy in its engagement with education 
policy. This can be seen clearly in the way the Church has engaged with the Executive’s 
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Review of Public Administration. In doing this, the Church has defended its specialist insider 
status in education.  
An important part of the gains made by the Catholic Church in education during the 
twentieth century was the creation of the Catholic Council for Maintained Schools (CCMS). 
However, the Review of Public Administration which began in 2002 threatened the statutory 
role of CCMS. The original re-organisation proposed the creation of a new sectoral body for 
Catholic maintained schools, but the Church feared that the new body’s lack of statutory 
status would mean that it would not be sufficiently consulted by decision makers. In light of 
this, the Church feared a downsizing in its specialist insider status in education. The Church 
also feared that it would not have the same level of influence in school employment.  
In order to defend the privileged status of CCMS, the Church engaged with decision 
makers through an insider strategy. In 2006, staff from CCMS, along with representatives 
from the Catholic Heads’ Association, met with the representatives from the Department of 
Education on the request of the Archbishop to ensure that the role of Trustees, as owners of 
schools and as a legitimate interest in education, would be guaranteed within the re-
organisation (Council for Catholic Maintained Schools 2006/7: 24). Once power-sharing 
government resumed in Northern Ireland, the Catholic Church continued to pursue its 
insider strategy. Cardinal Brady gave evidence to the Assembly’s Education Committee in 
2009. This was the first time the highest ranking cleric of the Church gave evidence to the 
committee (Irish News 2009a), highlighting the Church’s concern, which was widely covered 
in the media (BBC News 2009, Irish Times 2009). He argued that any new sectoral body 
should have a role in ownership and appointing teachers and governing bodies should have 
a duty to consult the sectoral body:  
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Policy and/or legislation provision needs to be made for their (the sectoral body) 
role in supporting schools in the appointment of teachers particularly at the 
leadership level, their role on behalf of school(s) owners in the planning and 
provision(s) of schools, the advocacy role on behalf of a given sector and their 
role in supporting and developing ethos. Similarly there is no point in having 
support bodies if they can be ignored by the schools in that sector (Irish Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference 2009a). 
The Cardinal continued his engagement through a responsible outsider strategy, 
when giving a Homily at the opening of St. Patrick’s College in Dungannon, calling on 
political representatives to remove the significant threat posed to Catholic education 
by the Education Bill. He then called on Catholics in Northern Ireland to lobby their 
political representatives in this regard (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2009b).  
When the Education Bill was re-drafted in 2012, the appointment of staff returned to 
boards of governors and the role of the sectoral bodies was written into the legislation as 
desired. However, with the Bill’s failure to gain cross-community support it had to be re-
drafted again in 2014. At this point, CCMS gave further evidence to the Assembly’s 
education committee, referring the need for the sectoral body to continue having an aspect 
of employment in its role (Council for Catholic Maintained Schools 2014c). In the final 
legislation, CCMS was retained as a statutory body with the right to prepare and submit 
schemes of employment and management (McCarry 2015). 
It is not possible to directly connect the Catholic Church’s lobbying with the Minister’s 
decision to uphold CCMS’ statutory status with a role in employment, but the Church 
defended its status and role within education through both an insider and responsible 
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outsider strategy, and its objective was met in the final legislation. The post 1998 period has 
seen the Catholic Church transition from its twentieth century battle for state funded 
Catholic education, to defending its specialist insider status within education policy and 
provision. 
6.2.3.2.2 Same-Sex Marriage 
The Catholic Church has also utilised an insider strategy in relation to same-sex marriage, by 
lobbying political parties. The Church has supplemented this insider strategy with a 
responsible outsider strategy through the media, working in coalition with the Presbyterian 
Church. 
The Catholic Church has pursued an insider strategy by contacting MLAs to request 
that they vote against the legislation on numerous occasions and inviting a discussion 
between MLAs and Church representatives (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2014, 2015a). 
This insider engagement has been well received by MLAs, with many referencing the 
Church’s position in the Chamber78 and using the Church’s position as a way of legitimising 
their opposition to the Bill. Further to this, the Catholic Church has put pressure on the 
nationalist political parties, demonstrating that the Church is willing to look elsewhere for 
support on moral issues which it believes are important. The relationship between the DUP 
and the Church has been developing over time (Bowcott 2006) but has become more public 
in recent times. In 2011, the Bishops’ Conference called on its members to challenge 
political parties canvassing for their votes on what they would do to support the institution 
of marriage and the family in the Assembly election (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 
2011a). This suggests that the Catholic Church is willing to suggest to its members that 
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challenging its traditional political parties, and possibly changing one’s vote, is something 
that should be considered.  
Likewise, the DUP has also been eager to capitalise on the situation by signalling its 
willingness to work with the Catholic Church on moral issues (see Tonge et al 2014: 181-
182). For instance, the DUP quoted high profile Catholics in the 2014 same-sex marriage 
debate (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard 2014: 44) using these opportunities to send a 
message that conservative Catholic voters should consider voting for the DUP. Storey noted: 
Many in the Roman Catholic community feel let down and indeed betrayed by 
their political representatives. They are turning to this party as the only party in 
this Assembly that takes a clear and unambiguous stand on the issue’. (Northern 
Ireland Assembly Hansard 2014: 20). 
The DUP has realised that it can use its common position on same-sex marriage for 
political gain. In light of this both the party and the Church have identified one another as 
strategic partners. 
The Catholic Church has supplemented this insider strategy with a responsible 
outsider strategy, attempting to shape the public narrative through the media, at times in 
coalition with the Presbyterian Church (BBC News NI 2015). Like the Presbyterian Church, it 
has faced the claim that it is anti-equality. The Church has attempted to counter this by 
developing a narrative on the principle of ‘conscience’, arguing that the ‘equality’ agenda 
discriminates against those who oppose same-sex marriage, by simply swapping one form of 
discrimination for another (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2015b). The Church has also 
sought to challenge the notion of equality by arguing that it is not discrimination to deny 
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marriage to a distinct type of relationship (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2014). The 
Church’s engagement with the public debate is quite articulate, but it is firmly based in the 
Church’s theological understanding of the purpose of marriage for procreation, and is 
therefore unlikely to have reach beyond the Church’s conservative base.  
In sum, the Catholic Church has pursued an insider strategy which it has 
supplemented with a responsible outsider strategy through the media. The Church’s 
position has been respected within the Chamber, and has found a powerful ally in the DUP, 
but the Church has found it difficult to shape the public debate. Same-sex marriage has not 
been made legal in Northern Ireland, but it would have passed were it not for the DUP’s 
petition of concern in November 2015.79  
6.2.3.2.3 Constitutional Issues 
The Church has pursued an insider strategy of meeting with political parties and members of 
the Executive to discuss constitutional issues. It has also utilised a responsible outsider 
strategy, using public opportunities to take part in the debate regarding Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional situation, which has also been picked up by the media.  
Post 1998, the Catholic Church has continued its practice of representing the 
Catholic community in relation to Northern Ireland’s constitutional settlement through an 
insider strategy of  meeting with political representatives. The pinnacle of this engagement 
was reached in 2006 when Archbishop Brady met DUP leader Ian Paisley ahead of talks in St. 
Andrews (Bowcott 2006). In doing this, it widened its insider strategy, demonstrating its 
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 In 2012 there were 45 Ayes and 50 Noes, in 2013 46 Ayes and 51 Noes, in 2014 43 Ayes and 51 Noes, in April 
2015 47 Ayes and 49 Noes (see NI Assembly Hansard 2012 01/10/12, 29/04/13 (see Northern Ireland Assembly 
Hansard 2013), 29/04/14  (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard 2014 )and 27/04/15) (Northern Ireland 
Assembly Hansard 2015a).  However, in November 2015 (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard 2015b), 
there were 53 Ayes and 52 noes but it did not pass because the DUP utilised the Petition of Concern 
mechanism. 
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preparedness to work with both sides of the political divide. The Church has also engaged as 
an insider in relation to the issue of policing in Northern Ireland. Archbishop Brady has taken 
an interest in policing during the devolved period, attending and speaking at the Northern 
Ireland policing board (Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference 2004c). In 2011, NICCOSA 
provided recommendations on the retention of 50:50 policing for Northern Ireland’s Police 
Service (PSNI), special recruitment and the need for greater representation of Catholics in 
senior roles (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2011b). 
The Church has also engaged with constitutional issues through a responsible 
outsider strategy. In the early years of political devolution, before the 2002-7 suspension, it 
encouraged politicians and extended goodwill to those who were working positively for 
peace (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2001a). This extended beyond press releases, to 
clerics using public opportunities to offer support for peace (see Irish Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference 2001b). During suspension, Archbishop Brady used the re-opening of the 
Garvaghy Road Parish Church in Drumcree, which was embroiled in one of Belfast’s most 
hostile sectarian standoffs, to encourage stakeholders in the peace process to ‘grasp the 
good opportunity’ for an agreement (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2004a). At times, 
these statements have gone beyond support, to denounce the unionist community. In 2004, 
Brady noted what he saw as unionist leaders, British politicians and the media failing to 
treat loyalist paramilitaries with the same ‘vigour’ as republican paramilitaries (Irish Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference 2004b). However, public statements of encouragement and support for 
decommissioning continued throughout the period of suspension right up to the St. 
Andrew’s Agreement in 2006 (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2005, CAIN 2006). This also 
continued post agreement, as the Church looked to encourage parties to move towards 
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peace (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2007) as the decommissioning process continued 
(Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2009c, 2010a, 2010b). The Church also utilised a 
responsible outsider strategy in relation to policing by vocally demonstrating its support for 
the devolution of policing and justice in 2010 (Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference 2010c). It 
has also been vocal in its support for the Hass Talks regarding flags, parades and ‘the past’ 
(BBC News NI 2014).  
The Church has been vocal on constitutional issues, but its public support for the 
political process and decommissioning could be viewed as tokenistic and vague, producing 
encouragement rather than solutions. Similarly to the case of the Presbyterian Church, this 
may suggest that Brewer et al’s (2011: 99-100) pre-1998 criticism that the Church 
desensitised politics, relying on vague pronouncements on constitutional issues, still stands 
post 1998. However, it is also important to remember that the Catholic Church’s voice has 
been part of consolidating support for a volatile political process. The Church has pursued a 
dual role of resolving tensions whilst also engaging with politicians so as to influence the 
constitutional agenda.  
In conclusion, the Catholic Church has pursued an insider strategy, supplemented by 
an outsider strategy in relation to constitutional issues. The Church uses key opportunities 
to speak out in favour of Northern Ireland’s political process and to defend the Catholic 
community in Northern Ireland. The Church’s involvement on constitutional issues is well 
received by decision makers, and its voice has been part of consolidating support for 
political devolution and hence has led to specialist insider status conferred upon it.   
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6.2.3.3 The Belfast Islamic Centre 
The Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC) pursues an insider strategy in the limited engagement it has 
had with education policy and constitutional issues. It does not perceive same-sex marriage 
as an issue of concern to the Muslim community and hence has not engaged on this issue. 
6.2.3.3.1 Education 
The BIC has engaged with the Executive through an insider approach through some 
consultation processes and informal discussions, but it also engaged with education policy in 
an insider fashion in coalition with other faith communities who are part of the Northern 
Ireland Inter-Faith Forum (NIIF). The BIC, working with NIIFF, has seen some small changes 
in religious education policy in line with its requests. Within a political context dominated by 
the churches’ interests, this is no small feat and hence while the BIC does not have specialist 
or core insider status, its status is not wholly peripheral.  
Interview respondents from the BIC noted that while it tries to engage with the 
Executive’s consultation processes, it is difficult because the Centre relies on volunteers and 
limited staff capacity.80 Even so, the BIC responded to the consultation on the Draft 
Cohesion, Sharing and Integration programme to call on the government to ‘diversify the 
curriculum’ so as to include non-Christian religion in religious education (Belfast Islamic 
Centre 2010). Likewise, a politician who had responsibility for education also noted that she 
had discussions with the BIC and the wider Muslim community regarding the religious 
education curriculum when she was in office.81 Despite these insider opportunities, the BIC 
does not have a position on the religious education drafting group which is composed of the 
main Christian denominations (see Richardson 2014: 210).  
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 Interview with a former minister of the Northern Ireland Executive (July 13
th
 2015). 
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However, the Centre also engages in education policy through NIIF which was set to 
lobby government to include a religious education core syllabus sensitive to non-Christian 
religions (see Richardson 2002: 15). Traditionally, the mainstream Christian denominations 
have kept religious education in Northern Ireland confessional82 with little reference to 
‘world religions’, but NIIF has sought to challenge this consensus (see Richardson 2002). 
NIIFF lobbies the Churches and the Executive (Richardson 2014: 216), taking part in 
consultations on the religious education curriculum, in order to highlight this agenda.  
In 2007, the Education Minister, Caitriona Ruane, brought in an aspect of ‘World 
Religion’ to the Key Stage 3 core syllabus (Northern Ireland Curriculum 2007). Much of the 
planning behind this happened during Direct Rule, with the Northern Ireland Office 
engaging with NIIFF among other groups (Department of Education NI 2006). NIIFF lobbied 
for a wider recognition of non-Christian religions through the consultation process 
(Department of Education NI 2006, NIIFF 2010). The Churches, which make up the review 
board, have traditionally opposed a change of this kind (General Assembly 2001, Richardson 
2014: 210). Even so, the change was ultimately introduced (Department of Education NI 
undated). The NIIF’s insider engagement in this policy area, along with a Minister keen to 
see change and sympathetic to NIIF’s agenda ,83 brought a small change in education policy. 
This signals a level of success on the part of NIIF, and organisations such as the BIC which 
make up its membership, but the change to the curriculum only requires schools to teach 
‘World Religion’ as a minor part of the wider religious education curriculum, and only at Key 
Stage 3 (Richardson 2014: 217).  
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 Or what Richardson (2002: 12) refers to as ‘non-denominational neo-confessionalism’. 
83
 Interview with a former minister of the Northern Ireland Executive (July 13
th
 2015). Caitriona Ruane’s 
support for minority communities in education has also been report widely elsewhere. For instance, see 
Cheney (2008).  
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Even so, the BIC has engaged with education policy through NIIF in an insider fashion.  In 
coalition with other faith communities, the BIC has had some success in amending the 
religious education curriculum in a political context where the churches are powerful. Even 
so, while ‘world religion’ is now part of the curriculum, non-Christian FBOs are not part of 
the review board which sets this aspect of the curriculum. Therefore, the BIC does not have 
specialist or core insider status in education, but its status is not wholly peripheral either. 
6.2.3.3.2 Same-Sex Marriage     
The BIC has not engaged with same-sex marriage legislation. It is therefore not possible to 
categorise the organisation’s strategy or status in this area. Even so, the fact that the BIC has 
not engaged on this issue signals the difference between the BIC and other FBOs in 
Northern Ireland. The Muslim community’s lack of capacity and minority status within 
Northern Ireland society means it is more interested in issues which it perceives as directly 
influencing the Muslim community in Northern Ireland than wider moral or societal 
questions affecting Northern Ireland society.  
Respondents from the BIC, and others from the Muslim community were clear in 
interviews that they did not see same-sex marriage as an issue which required its 
engagement.84 When asked whether the organisation had engaged with the debate 
surrounding same-sex marriage, they reacted with surprise at the question. Respondents 
from the BIC noted that it was not something considered important or a priority.85 It is likely 
that a lack of capacity plays a role here, but it is also important to note the BIC’s tendency to 
focus on issues which it sees as important to its members as an explanatory factor. This 
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indicates that the BIC sees itself as an organisation that represents Muslims, rather than an 
organisation which comments on wider societal debates. This understanding means the BIC 
does not feel the need to act as the moral arbiter of Northern Ireland society. This may well 
come from the Muslim community’s minority identity within Northern Ireland society, with 
representatives from the Muslim community86 noting that they were not interested in 
‘dampening down’ the campaigns and pursuits of other groups. 
6.2.3.3.3 Constitutional Issues     
As was noted previously, the Muslim community in Northern Ireland has traditionally 
avoided discussing constitutional issues. However, since power was devolved to Northern 
Ireland in 1998, the BIC, as a representative of the Muslim community, has engaged as an 
insider, taking part in consultation processes with the Northern Ireland’s police board (NI 
Policing Board 2011) and on community cohesion (see Belfast Islamic Centre 2010), but has 
not engaged beyond this. The way in which constitutional debates are framed in Northern 
Ireland make it difficult for groups like the BIC to fully engage. As Conrad (2008: 111-138) 
has noted, Northern Ireland’s ‘two communities’’ model means that the ‘community’ in 
Northern Ireland signifies the unionist/Protestant and nationalist/Catholic communities, 
limiting access to politics by legitimising very particular, binary, understandings of Northern 
Ireland. This makes it difficult for communities such as the Muslim community to locate the 
space for engagement. This was reflected in the words of a key informant from the Muslim 
community who, when discussing the way in which the community is perceived by 
politicians, noted: 
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 Interview with key respondents from the Muslim community in Northern Ireland (July 9
th
 2015). This 
individual is not a representative of the BIC, but has in the past had involvement with the BIC. 
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they don’t ask us to take sides, that has never happened. They don’t put that 
pressure on us. Maybe they know that it makes no difference to them what side 
we are on because we are such a small number, it doesn’t really make any 
difference to them.87 
These findings indicate that Wilford and Wilson’s (2003: 15) suggestions that minority 
groups such as the Muslim community might become the ‘cement’ between the two ethnic 
blocks are far from being realised. In light of this, while the BIC has engages to a certain 
extent with constitutional issues through an insider strategy, it is in reality peripheral in 
constitutional debates. 
6.2.3.4 The Caleb Foundation 
The Caleb Foundation pursues an insider strategy in each of the policy areas under study, 
supplementing this to a certain extent with a responsible outsider strategy when engaging 
on the issue of same-sex marriage. The Caleb Foundation’s lack of capacity and controversial 
policy agenda means that it receives a peripheral insider status in each of the policy areas.  
6.2.3.4.1 Education 
The Caleb Foundation engages with education policy through an insider strategy. However, 
its engagement is severely limited by its lack of internal capacity owing to its voluntary 
based political advocacy structure. In light of this, the Caleb Foundation’s strategy reflects 
that of a peripheral insider in education. 
The Caleb Foundation’s interest in education policy during the devolved period has 
focused upon the niche area of ‘intelligent design’. For instance, the Caleb Foundation has 
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 Interview with key informant from the Muslim community in Northern Ireland (July 23
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lobbied the Ulster Museum to include intelligent design in its ‘nature zone’ (Crawley 2010) 
and likewise lobbied the National Trust to include it as part of its exhibition at the visitor’s 
centre at Giant’s Causeway (see Jones 2012). Further to this, the Caleb Foundation also 
favours the teaching of ‘intelligent design’ as part of Northern Ireland’s curriculum (Ganiel 
2008a: 111, Jones 2012 and Clarke 2012). Ganiel (2008a: 111) notes in her research that 
Caleb has engaged with education officials regarding the teaching of ‘intelligent design’ in 
Northern Ireland’s schools, but a respondent from Caleb stated that it had not engaged with 
the Education Department due to a ‘lack of resources’.88 
Caleb lacks the internal capacity to lobby the Department for Education directly, but 
a member of Caleb’s Council of Reference has been active in doing so in an insider capacity. 
DUP MLA, and former chair of the Assembly’s Education Committee, Mervyn Storey, lobbied 
the Sinn Féin Education Minister, Caitriona Ruane, on the issue of ‘intelligent design’ in both 
2007 and 2008 (Sheeran 2007 and Dumigan 2008). Framing the question in terms of 
Northern Ireland’s equality agenda, Storey asked the Minister whether teachers might use 
their own judgment on whether non-evolutionary explanations of the origin and 
development of life merited discussion in the classroom. The Minister noted that 
alternatives to evolution would be better discussed in religious education rather than 
science classes (McCrory and Murphy 2009: 374). Storey was engaging in his capacity as a 
politician, rather than as a member of Caleb’s Council of Reference, but it is difficult to 
disconnect the two roles.  
Ruane did not dismiss ‘intelligent design’ outright, but the Minister noted that it had 
no place in science and hence Caleb has not seen its agenda met, despite Storey’s position 
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 Interview with respondent from the Caleb Foundation (July 2015). 
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as Chair of the Education Committee. Storey, and other DUP MLAs may support ‘intelligent 
design’, but this position is not supported throughout the DUP (see Tonge et al 2014: 143-
144), and hence it is not wholly surprising that it has gained little traction in education policy 
in Northern Ireland. The niche and controversial nature of its agenda also means that it is 
unlikely to become part of the curriculum in a consociational political system designed to 
force compromise rather than polarising policy positions.   
The Caleb Foundation’s limited engagement with education policy in Northern 
Ireland is due to its limited capacity to engage politically due to its voluntary political 
advocacy structure. One of its members has been in a powerful position as Chair of the 
Education Committee, and has pursued an issue of interest to Caleb through an insider 
strategy, but no change in Northern Ireland’s curriculum has come about. In this respect, 
the Caleb Foundation is at best a peripheral insider in education policy in Northern Ireland. 
6.2.3.4.2 Same-Sex Marriage 
The Caleb Foundation has attempted to engage with the same-sex marriage debate through 
both an insider and an outsider strategy. However, its lack of capacity for engagement 
means that it has not been a visible actor in this area. 
According to a respondent from the Caleb Foundation,89 the organisation has 
engaged in an insider fashion by meeting with DUP representatives to voice its concerns. 
However, unlike the Presbyterian Church and the Catholic Church, the Caleb Foundation 
was not used to legitimise the position of MLAs during the same-sex marriage debate in the 
Chamber. This cannot be used to definitively argue that the Caleb Foundation has not had 
an influence in this area, but it does suggest that decision makers do not see it as a FBO 
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 Interview with senior respondent from the Caleb Foundation (July 2015) 
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which can be used to add support to their argument, unlike the Presbyterian and Catholic 
churches. The Caleb Foundation’s outsider engagement has also been muted. The 
organisation has attempted to gain media attention through releasing statements of 
opposition to same-sex marriage (Caleb Foundation 2014), but it has received minimal 
visibility within the media. 
There are a number of factors which potentially contribute to this lack of 
engagement. Firstly, the Foundation’s voluntary based political advocacy structure which, as 
was noted previously, has only one active individual, means it does not have the capacity for 
engagement. The congruence between Caleb’s agenda, and the agenda of some DUP MLAs, 
means that it can meet with the DUP, but meeting with MLAs from a range of political 
parties would require a time investment that might not be possible for an organisation 
without paid staff and with few volunteers. Further to this, the Foundation’s fundamentalist 
theological and political position makes it difficult for it to relate to MLAs from major parties 
beyond the DUP. Finally, both MLAs and the media are unlikely to pick up on Caleb’s 
opposition to same-sex marriage when the Catholic Church and the Presbyterian Church, 
organisations which are far more representative of Northern Ireland society than the Caleb 
Foundation, are also opposed to amending Northern Ireland’s marriage law. An absence of 
distinctiveness in this area most likely contributes to its lack of interest from decision 
makers and the press.  
In summary, the Caleb Foundation has engaged with the same-sex marriage debate 
through both an insider and responsible outsider strategy. However a lack of capacity, 
distinctiveness and its fundamentalist theological position makes it difficult for the Caleb 
257 | P a g e  
 
Foundation to access decision makers and the public debate, and it is because of this that it 
receives peripheral insider status in the area of same-sex marriage.  
6.2.3.4.3 Constitutional Issues 
The Caleb Foundation has engaged with constitutional issues in a limited fashion through an 
insider strategy. However, Caleb has avoided engaging with questions surrounding power-
sharing government in Northern Ireland, due to disagreement among its members regarding 
whether the DUP should share power with Sinn Féin.  
The Caleb Foundation has pursued an insider strategy, responding to some 
consultations regarding proposed legislation such as the Programme for Cohesion, Sharing 
and Integration (2010). Furthermore, Caleb has successfully lobbied for a position on 
Northern Ireland’s Civic Forum, despite disapproving of its ethos and purpose (Ganiel 2008a: 
112). However, as noted previously, this access point was short lived.  However, Caleb has 
avoided questions of power-sharing in Northern Ireland. This is due to a division amongst 
Caleb’s supporters over whether Ian Paisley should have agreed to share power with Sinn 
Féin in 2007. Many supporters of Caleb are unhappy about the power-sharing arrangement. 
For instance, Traditionalist Unionist Voice (TUV) MLA and supporter of the Caleb 
Foundation, Jim Allister, has been critical of Caleb for failing to frame the DUP’s decision to 
share power with Sinn Féin as a moral question of whether the DUP should share power 
with those formerly involved with the IRA (Clarke 2012). However, other members are keen 
to take advantage of the opportunity to lobby the DUP within the executive.90 Because of 
this divide, Caleb avoids articulating a clear position on power-sharing in Northern Ireland. 
This can be seen in a Caleb press release (Caleb Foundation undated b). 
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From time to time, the question of the stance of the Caleb Foundation towards 
the present power-sharing arrangements at Stormont has been raised, both 
enquiringly and critically. While many individual members of the Council of 
Caleb Foundation have decided views on this subject (and these would vary one 
from another), Caleb as an organisation does not. The reason for this is that the 
purpose of Caleb is not to comment on who occupies positions of government 
and whether or not they should do so. Rather, its purpose is to lobby the powers 
that be, whoever they may be, on matters of policy which relate to Biblical 
doctrine and ethics and which are of concern to all evangelical Christians. 
In summary, the Caleb Foundation has engaged with some constitutional issues 
through an insider strategy with consultation processes. However, it has avoided engaging 
in debates regarding Northern Ireland’s power-sharing agreement. 
6.2.4 Strategy: Analysis 
Each FBO has pursued an insider strategy to different extents in each of the policy areas 
under investigation. This indicates that FBOs perceive Northern Ireland’s political system as 
open for engagement. The Presbyterian Church, Catholic Church and Caleb Foundation have 
supplemented their insider strategies with responsible outsider strategies through the 
media when necessary. However, the strongly rooted FBOs utilise this outsider strategy in a 
much fuller sense than the weakly rooted organisations. The findings also point to 
numerous examples of coalition building in salient policy areas, where FBOs perceive 
opposition to their agenda and when FBOs share internal resources to reach common goals.     
Organisations such as the Presbyterian and Catholic churches supplement an insider 
strategy with a responsible outsider strategy because it is prudent for these strongly rooted 
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organisations to do so. They can attract media attention because they are representative of 
a large number of people, and have traditionally been expected to speak for their respective 
communities, particularly on social, moral and constitutional issues. The BIC and the Caleb 
Foundation on the other hand are much less representative of Northern Ireland society. The 
strongly rooted FBOs also have the capacity to maximise a responsible outsider strategy. 
The Presbyterian’s Council for Church in Society, which has recently appointed a policy 
officer, and the Catholic Church’s NICCOSA, which also has full time staff working on policy, 
can attract press attention in a way that the BIC and the Caleb Foundation’s political 
advocacy structures do not allow. 
The findings also reflect Binderkrantz’s (2005: 710) findings that organisations 
supplement their insider strategy with a responsible outsider strategy when an issue is 
controversial or the FBO believes it will receive a high level of opposition. This is seen most 
clearly on the issue of same-sex marriage. The environment in which the churches engage is 
challenging, with a high level of opposition from political parties and civil society 
organisations in favour of amending Northern Ireland’s marriage law. In response to this, 
the Presbyterian and Catholic churches have utilised a responsible outsider strategy to try 
and shape the debate. Likewise when CCMS was under threat, Cardinal Brady used a public 
event at the opening of a school in Dungannon to speak out publicly against the Education 
Bill and to encourage Catholics to lobby their political representatives. On constitutional 
issues, the churches utilise a responsible outsider strategy because the stakes are high. By 
speaking out publicly, it is possible to shape the narrative and play a role in moving 
Northern Ireland society forward. This is akin to the ‘elastic band leadership’ and ‘leash 
leadership’ role Brewer et al (2011: 98) note as indicative of the churches’ engagement pre-
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1998. Some churches also take advantage of particularly high stake events, such as the re-
opening of the Garvaghy Road Parish Church in Drumcree, to encourage power-sharing and 
the continuation of the political process, knowing that these are opportunities that can 
shape the political debate. 
The findings also provide a number of examples of coalition building. In the case of 
same-sex marriage, the findings evidence what Scholzman and Tierney (1986: 49) refer to as 
a ‘strange bedfellow coalition’ between the Catholic Church and the DUP. Coalition 
formation was also found between the Catholic and Presbyterian churches. This example of 
coalition furthers scholars’ claims that organisations form coalitions on salient issues 
(Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004) or issues which are likely to cause conflict between 
interests (Heinz et al 1993, Mahoney 2007). The findings also point to the Presbyterian 
Church’s broad coalition building with the other Protestant denominations and the unionist 
political parties in the area of education. By building this broad coalition, the organisations 
were able to show that their position was widely representative of a large share of Northern 
Ireland society and in doing so maximised the likelihood of seeing their desired outcome. 
This furthers the claim of Hula (1999: 25-26) who argues that coalitions are built to increase 
the likelihood of an interest achieving its desire outcome. Similarly, the BIC works in 
coalition with other minority faith communities and those sympathetic to widening the 
religious education curriculum. This allows the BIC to engage politically to a certain extent 
despite its lack of capacity. This also furthers the claims of Hula (1999: 25-26) and likewise 
strengthens Whitford’s (2003: 45) claim that coalitions can be used so as to assemble 
minority interests into ‘more powerful blocks’.    
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There is a contrast between the status received by strongly rooted organisations and 
less strongly rooted organisations in the case of Northern Ireland.  The strongly rooted FBOs 
have received specialist or core insider status in each policy area, but the weakly rooted 
FBOs have not. Although the BIC’s role in education is not wholly peripheral, it has not had 
core or specialist insider status conferred upon it, in any policy area.  
The Presbyterian Church and the Catholic Church receive specialist insider status in 
each of the policy areas due to the specific resources they possess and their position within 
Northern Ireland society. A number of the specific resources which Maloney et al (1994: 29) 
identify as key for an organisation to possess if it wishes to have core or specialist insider 
status conferred upon it are possessed by the Presbyterian and Catholic churches. For 
instance, the Catholic Church has ‘implementation power’ because it provides thousands of 
school places in Northern Ireland. The Presbyterian Church and Catholic Church’s position 
within society also ensure it receives specialist or core insider status in education. The 
unionist parties recognise the Protestant churches as representative of the unionist 
community giving their support in defending their core insider status. Ultimately, the 
Education Minister could only pass the Education Bill once the role of the Presbyterian 
Church and other Protestant denominations had been secured. In the case of same-sex 
marriage and on constitutional issues, the churches possess what Maloney et al (1994: 29) 
refers to as a ‘representative base’. This is illustrated by a number of MLAs referencing the 
churches so as to legitimise their opposition to same-sex marriage. Similarly, the churches 
are recognised by decision makers such as the Executive and the chairs of commissions as 
representative voices on a wide range of constitutional issues. 
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The BIC and the Caleb Foundation’s peripheral insider status can be explained by 
their lack of specific resources and their position within Northern Ireland society. Neither 
FBO has identified clear resources desired by decision makers, and hence cannot take part 
in the exchange based relationship that Maloney et al (1994: 23) argue is essential if an 
organisation is to have specialist or core insider status conferred upon it. Furthermore, their 
position within society does not provide them with specialist or core insider status either. In 
the case of the BIC, this is magnified by Northern Ireland’s ‘two communities’ model which 
frustrates the BIC’s political engagement. A lack of government sponsored political 
structures which provide access for the BIC to decision makers in a wide range of policy 
areas also inhibits the BIC’s participation. The ‘Community Faiths’ Forum’ exists, but as 
noted previously, this is limited in the policy areas it covers. This disadvantage is further 
perpetuated by the lack of full time staff focusing on political engagement. Finally, 
theological orientation also plays a role in explaining Caleb’s peripheral insider status. The 
findings indicate that Caleb has quite irregular views in education regarding the teaching of 
‘intelligent design’, which are based on a literal and fundamentalist theological position.    
In summary, each FBO has pursued an insider strategy. Three of the FBOs have 
supplemented this with a responsible outsider strategy, but the strongly rooted FBOs 
pursue a much fuller responsible outsider strategy than the weakly rooted FBOs. This fuller 
responsible outsider strategy is driven by the capacity of the organisations and their position 
in Northern Ireland society, which ensures they receive media attention. The outsider 
strategy is used when the policy issue being engaged with is controversial, as seen with 
same-sex marriage, and when the stakes are high as with constitutional issues. Coalition is a 
strategy utilised when the policy issue is salient, when there is conflict between interests 
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and in order to signal that a political agenda is widely representative of Northern Ireland 
society. The strongly rooted FBOs have had specialist insider status conferred upon them by 
decision makers, while the weakly rooted FBOs receive peripheral insider status. The 
specific resources or lack of specific resources possessed by the organisations, and their 
position within society explain these conflicting statuses. In the case of the Caleb 
Foundation, its less moderate theological orientation is also an explanatory factor, while a 
political system dominated by the two major communities is an explanatory factor in the 
case of the BIC.    
6.2.5 Effectiveness 
Having examined the political advocacy structures and strategies of the FBOs under study, 
this section considers the evidence in relation to the third secondary research question 
outlined in Chapter 4, which asks: 
‘Are faith-based organisations at the sub-state level in the UK well placed to act as effective 
pressure groups in the decision making process?’ 
The criterion of effectiveness outlined in Chapter 4 is used to study this question in 
relation to each FBO. The section indicates that there is a contrast between strongly rooted 
FBOs which are well placed to act as effective pressure groups, and weakly rooted FBOs 
which are much less well placed to do so. This is explained by the staff-based political 
advocacy structures and status possessed by the strongly rooted FBOs, in contrast to the 
lack of staff capacity and peripheral status of the weakly rooted FBOs.    
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6.2.5.1 Presbyterian Church in Ireland 
The Presbyterian Church in Ireland is well placed to act as an effective pressure group. In 
relation to the criterion, it has a political advocacy structure which is well suited for 
engaging with the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, it has coherent policy positions, 
it is consulted widely, it has core or specialist insider status conferred upon it and it has seen 
a number of its objectives met. 
The Presbyterian Church in Ireland’s political advocacy structure is well suited for a devolved 
context with an emphasis on policy consultation (Chaney 2011: 264). Having adapted its 
political advocacy structure and increased its capacity in response to political devolution, its 
staff are able to engage with the detail of policy, as well as utilise the Chair of the Council for 
Church in Society in a responsible outsider fashion. 
The Presbyterian Church’s effectiveness is also heightened by its coherent policy 
positions which are developed through the Council of Church in Society and endorsed 
through its report to the General Assembly on an annual basis. The Church has been clear in 
its objectives to defend its position on the Education Authority and to oppose same-sex 
marriage. The Church’s public position on constitutional issues has been more vague, but 
the evidence it has provided on constitutional issues through consultation processes has 
been more coherent. As regards to consultation, the evidence indicates that the Church is 
widely consulted by decision makers as it has received access to the Executive, MLAs, 
political parties and chairs of commissions. The Presbyterian Church has received specialist 
or core insider status in each of the policy areas under study. As noted previously, the 
specific resources it possesses and its position within Northern Ireland’s society both 
historically and currently, both contribute to this status.  
265 | P a g e  
 
Finally, the Church is well placed to act as an effective pressure group, with its 
objectives met in most cases. The Church’s engagement in education is the most compelling 
example with the Church engaging with decision makers to defend its right of 
representation within Northern Ireland’s educational structures and seeing its objectives 
met. Likewise, the Assembly has not voted for same-sex marriage in line with the objective 
of the Presbyterian Church. However, the growing support for same-sex marriage amongst 
MLAs could jeopardise this objective in future. On constitutional issues, the Church has seen 
policing devolved to Northern Ireland and an end to 50:50 policing in 2011 (BBC News NI 
2011) in line with its agenda, but it has not seen a reformed Civic Forum.  
The evidence suggests that the Church has seen what MacKay et al (2005: 10) refer 
to as ‘concrete changes in policy outcomes’ in education and has had a ‘legitimate voice’ in 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional and same-sex marriage debates, but has not succeeded in 
‘provoking reconsideration of the way others think’ in relation to same-sex marriage. 
Therefore, while the Church has come under pressure in the same-sex marriage debate and 
has not always articulated the clearest message on constitutional issues, it is well placed to 
act as an effective pressure group. 
6.2.5.2. The Catholic Church in Ireland 
The Catholic Church in Ireland is well placed to act as an effective pressure group. With 
regards to the criterion, its staff based political advocacy structure is appropriate for 
engaging with the devolved institution in Northern Ireland, it has coherent policy positions, 
is widely consulted by decision makers, has core or specialist insider status conferred upon 
it and has seen a number of its objectives met. 
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The Catholic Church’s political advocacy is well suited for Northern Ireland’s devolved 
context where, as noted previously, policy consultation is emphasised. The creation of 
NICCOSA and the appointment of a member of staff for the purpose of engaging with the 
devolved institution allows it to engage with the Executive’s policy consultations while 
supporting its bishops in their public pronouncement through research and press 
statements. 
The Catholic Church has coherent policy positions which its bishops develop at the 
Irish Bishop’s Council with assistance from the Council’s secretariat. The Church’s position in 
defence of CCMS’ statutory role with responsibility for appointments was clearly articulated 
through meetings with the Executive, the Education Committee and through public 
pronouncement. Likewise, the Church was clear in its opposition to same-sex marriage. As 
with the Presbyterian Church, the Catholic Church has been more vague on constitutional 
issues. Even so, it has provided a coherent position on policing through insider means. As 
regards consultation, the Catholic Church has been consulted on each of the policy areas 
under study by the Executive, MLAs and legislative committees. 
The Church is also effective due to the specialist or core insider status it has 
conferred upon it in each of the policy areas. The Church’s specific resources in education, 
through the provision of school places, and its position within Northern Ireland society both 
historically and currently, contribute to this. The Church has also seen its objectives met, 
with CCMS maintaining its statutory status and preserving the status quo with marriage law. 
On constitutional issues, the Church has not seen the retention of 50:50 policing beyond 
2011 (BBC NI 2011) as it desired, but has seen the stabilising of politics in Northern Ireland 
which it vocally supported. In this case, the evidence suggests that the Church has seen 
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what MacKay et al (2005: 10) refer to as ‘concrete changes in policy outcomes’ in education 
and has had a ‘legitimate voice’ in Northern Ireland’s constitutional and same-sex marriage 
debates. In light of this, the Church has experienced some obstacles in communicating its 
message on same-sex marriage and constitutional issues, but it is well placed to act as an 
effective pressure group.    
6.2.5.3. Belfast Islamic Centre 
The Belfast Islamic Centre is less well placed to act as an effective pressure group. In light of 
the criterion, its limited staff capacity means it cannot engage as extensively as it might with 
the devolved institution. Furthermore it does not have fully coherent policy positions, it is 
not consulted as widely as it could be, it does not receive specialist or core insider status in 
any of the policy areas studied and has only seen its objective partially met in the case of 
education.   
The BIC’s lack of staff capacity makes it difficult for it to engage in a political system known 
for a high level of policy consultation. The BIC has adapted from a social FBO to a socio-
political FBO in order to engage in Northern Ireland’s political sphere. However, its limited 
staff capacity means it cannot engage widely on political issues. A lack of appropriate state 
sponsored faith structures which could provide access for organisations such as the BIC to 
engage with the Executive perpetuates the difficulty of having a political advocacy structure 
with limited staff capacity. 
The BIC does not hold coherent policy positions in every policy area. In religious 
education it would like to see a greater level of ‘world religion’ taught on the curriculum, 
but it remains neutral in the same-sex marriage and constitutional debate. In light of this, 
the BIC is not consulted consistently by decision makers. It is consulted to a certain extent 
268 | P a g e  
 
on the religious education curriculum, through the NIIFF, but it does not have a position on 
the religious education drafting group. The BIC’s lack of capacity to engage with consultation 
processes may well be part of the explanation as to why it is not consulted by decision 
makers. The focus on the ‘two communities’ in Northern Ireland is another possible 
explanation for this.  
The BIC’s lack of core or specialist insider status also means it is less well placed to 
act as an effective pressure group. While the BIC’s role in the religious education curriculum 
is not wholly peripheral, it does not receive specialist or core insider status in any of the 
policy areas examined. As was noted in the previous section, this can be explained by the 
BIC’s lack of specific resources and the difficulty it finds engaging in a political system 
designed to include the two major communities in Northern Ireland. Finally, the BIC has only 
seen its objective partially met in education with the widening of the Key Stage 3 religious 
education curriculum in 2007. In sum, the BIC ‘s voluntary based political advocacy structure 
and lack of access to Northern Ireland’s political system are barriers which make it less well 
placed to act as an effective pressure group.  
6.2.5.4 The Caleb Foundation 
The Caleb Foundation is less well placed to act as an effective pressure group. Its voluntary 
based political advocacy structure is not appropriate for engaging with the devolved 
institution in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, its policy positions are not coherent, it is not 
widely consulted and it does not have core or specialist insider status conferred upon it. It 
has not seen its policy objectives met in education, and while it has with same-sex marriage, 
it is unlikely that it influenced the debate. 
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The Caleb Foundation’s voluntary based political advocacy structure inhibits its 
effectiveness as it makes it difficult for it to engage in a political system which is known for 
its high level of policy consultation. Its voluntary based political advocacy structure, which 
reportedly only has one active volunteer working for the organisation from day to day, 
perpetuates this problem, making it difficult to engage politically on a consistent and 
frequent basis.  
The Caleb Foundation has coherent policy positions in education and on same-sex 
marriage but not on constitutional issues. It is clear in its policy position that it is against the 
teaching of evolution in schools and in favour of teaching ‘intelligent design’ and is against 
same-sex marriage. However, Caleb does not have a clear position on constitutional issues. 
The findings suggest that this is intentional to avoid disagreements among its members. The 
Caleb Foundation is unevenly consulted on its policy positions. While it has advocates within 
the DUP who ensure the executive hear its position on the education curriculum, the 
evidence does not suggest that decision makers see the Caleb Foundation as an important 
organisation to consult on same-sex marriage or constitutional issues.  
The Caleb Foundation’s effectiveness is impeded due to its lack of specialist or core 
insider status in any of the policy areas examined. This can be explained by its lack of 
specific resources and its distinct theological and ideological positions. In terms of meeting 
its objective, same-sex marriage has not been implemented, in line with Caleb’s policy 
position, but it is unlikely that this can be attributed to the organisation, seeing as there is 
no evidence to suggest that the organisation has what MacKay et al refer to as a ‘legitimate 
voice’ in the same-sex marriage debate. Further to this, there is no evidence that it has seen 
its objectives met in education. In sum, the Caleb Foundation does not have the political 
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advocacy structure or the insider access to be well placed to act as an effective pressure 
group in Northern Ireland’s political system.  
Overall, the analysis in this section has suggested that the strongly rooted FBOs are 
well placed to act as effective pressure groups while the weakly rooted FBOs are less well 
placed to act as effective pressure groups. This can be explained by the FBOs’ staff capacity 
and the status they have conferred upon them by decision makers. The strongly rooted 
FBOs have the staff capacity to engage consistently and frequently in the political system, 
have specific resources desired by decision makers and are perceived as representative of 
Northern Ireland society. In contrast, the weakly rooted FBOs lack the capacity to engage 
consistently and frequently or have not identified specific resources decision makers desire. 
A lack of appropriate state sponsored faith structures which encourage engagement also 
inhibits their effectiveness. In the case of the BIC, Northern Ireland’s ‘two communities’’ 
model hinders its engagement and ultimately its effectiveness. Theological orientation also 
plays a minimal role in the case of the Caleb Foundation.   
6.3. Testing the Hypotheses 
This final section assesses the hypotheses in light of the findings and the analysis of FBO 
political advocacy structure, strategy and effectiveness in the case of Northern Ireland. It 
suggests that sub-state autonomy and roots within society have a key influence on the 
political advocacy of FBOs. Likewise, roots in society influences FBO status, with theological 
orientation also playing a more minimal role. 
H1: ‘As the devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
higher the levels of capacity within the political advocacy structures of FBOs’. 
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H1 has been partly founded. In the case of the Presbyterian Church, the Catholic 
Church and the BIC, capacity for engagement in the sub-state political system has increased 
by the appointment of staff. Caleb is the only organisation not to increase its staffing 
capacity.  
H3: ‘As the powers devolved become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
more likely it is that the region’s FBOs develop a distinct strategy for political engagement at 
the sub-state level’. 
H3 has been founded. Each FBO has focused to a greater extent at the sub-state 
level as the powers devolved have become more extensive and more entrenched in the 
region. The Presbyterian Church has appointed a member of staff to supplement the 
engagement it was having pre-devolution, while the Catholic Church has developed a new 
structure in NICCOSA for the purpose of engaging in Northern Ireland’s political system. The 
Caleb Foundation and the BIC have increased their political engagement at the sub-state 
system since 1998.  
H5: ‘The stronger the FBO’s roots within the devolved region, the more likely it is to have a 
staff based political advocacy structure’. 
H5 has been founded. While the Presbyterian Church and the Catholic Church have a 
staff based political advocacy structure, the BIC, as a weakly rooted organisation also has a 
partial staff based political advocacy structure due to financial assistance from the 
Executive. However, the other weakly rooted organisation under study, the Caleb 
Foundation, does not have a staff based political advocacy structure.  
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H6: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is to 
utilise an insider strategy’. 
H6 has not been founded in the case of Northern Ireland, where each FBO has 
pursued an insider strategy. Conversely, the FBOs with stronger roots have been found 
more likely than the weakly rooted FBOs to supplement this insider strategy with a 
responsible outsider strategy, and have used the strategy more fully, utilising their specific 
resources and their ability to gain media attention. 
H7: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is that 
the devolved institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
H7 has been founded. The strongly rooted FBOs under study have had specialist or 
core insider status conferred upon them, but the weakly rooted FBOs have not. 
H8: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is to pursue an insider 
strategy’.  
H8 has not been founded. Theology has not been found to influence the strategy of 
FBOs, with more theologically moderate and less theologically moderate FBOs pursuing 
insider strategies.  
H9: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is that the devolved 
institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
H9 has only been found in the minority of cases. Theology only plays a role in the 
status conferred upon the Caleb Foundation, with its irregular position on intelligent design 
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thwarting its ability to gain insider access. However, theology has not been found to 
influence the status conferred upon the other FBOs.  
H10: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the better placed it is to 
act as an effective pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
H10 has been founded. The strongly rooted FBOs were found to be better placed to 
act as effective pressure group than the weakly rooted FBOs.   
H11:‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the better placed it is to act as an effective 
pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
H11 has only been found in the minority of cases. The Caleb Foundation’s theological 
orientation makes it difficult for it to gain insider status in education, which contributes in 
turn to it being less well placed to act as an effective pressure group, but theology has not 
influenced the other case study’s effectiveness.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings in relation to secondary research question 1, 2 and 3 
in the cases of the FBOs selected for the case of Northern Ireland. It indicates that the FBOs 
at the sub-state level in Northern Ireland have increased their capacity to engage with the 
devolved institutions. Each FBO pursues an insider strategy with the strongly rooted FBOs 
supplementing this with extensive responsible outsider strategies. Strongly rooted FBOs 
have used their specific resources and position within society to ensure they have specialist 
or core insider status conferred upon them, but the weakly rooted FBO’s lack specific 
resources, privileged position within society and staff capacity resulting in a peripheral 
insider status. In light of this, the strongly rooted FBOs are well placed to act as effective 
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pressure groups while the weakly rooted FBOs are less well placed. The next Chapter will 
analyse these findings along with the findings presented and analysed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 7: Discussion  
Introduction 
Chapters 5 and 6 presented and analysed the political advocacy structures, strategies and 
effectiveness of FBOs in Wales and Northern Ireland. The aim of this chapter is to draw out 
general conclusions by examining the thesis’ central research question in regards to the 
findings presented in these cases. The chapter also draws on the literature regarding FBO 
engagement in Scotland. Following this, the second section assesses the hypotheses in 
response to both case studies. In the final section, the practical contributions of the thesis 
are examined. The opportunities available to FBOs at the sub-state level, appropriate 
strategies, the importance of identifying resources and the role of state sponsored 
structures are discussed. 
7.1 The Research Questions. 
The thesis’ central research question asked: ‘In what ways have faith-based organisations 
engaged with devolved political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ This question 
was investigated using three secondary research questions grounded in the theoretical 
literature assessed in Chapter 3, which analysed the FBO’s political advocacy structures, 
their strategies and whether they were well placed to act as effective pressure groups. Each 
of these secondary research questions are now examined in light of the findings in both 
Wales and Northern Ireland.  
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7.1.1. ‘What type of political advocacy structures have faith-based 
organisations adopted to engage with political institutions at the sub-state 
level in the UK?’ 
 
Partly due to case study selection, the majority of the FBOs are purely territorial 
organisations or territorial organisations loosely affiliated to the centre. Only in the case of 
the Catholic Church in Wales and in Northern Ireland was this not the case. In Northern 
Ireland, the Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference is centralised but had conferred a high level 
of autonomy on the Church in Northern Ireland to engage with political matters in Northern 
Ireland prior to 1998 and this has continued since the establishment of the Assembly. In 
Wales we saw Keating’s (2013) ‘institutional isomorphism’ as the Church devolved 
autonomy over education from the centre to the sub-state level in 2015 as incongruence 
developed between Wales and England’s education systems. Each FBO had some level of 
democracy in its political advocacy structure apart from the Catholic Churches in Ireland and 
Wales which are elite led. Apart from the Caleb Foundation, each FBO increased its capacity 
to engage with the devolved institutions. Each of these FBOs did this by increasing its staff 
capacity, apart from the Muslim Council of Wales (MCW) which has developed a voluntary 
based political advocacy structure to engage with the devolved political institutions. 
However, while Northern Ireland had a greater level of sub-state autonomy than Wales, 
FBOs in the Northern Ireland case did not have a greater level of capacity in their political 
advocacy structures than FBOs in the case of Wales. The empirical research also indicates 
that as part of their political advocacy structures each FBO has developed a regional 
strategy. For instance, the MCW mobilised to engage politically in Wales. The other FBOs, 
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apart from the Caleb Foundation, have appointed staff so as to increase their engagement 
in a political system with a greater level of access than existed prior to 1998/9. 
Three main factors can explain this general pattern of adaptation. The first factor is 
the opportunity political devolution presents to FBOs. In line with Keating’s (2013: 119) 
reference to the way in which organisations are ‘induced’ to engage at the sub-state level as 
the region is defined by the devolved institutions, the FBOs under study have recognised an 
opportunity and have devolved autonomy in the case of the Catholic Church in Wales, or 
increased capacity accordingly in the case of the MCW, Presbyterian Church in Ireland, 
Catholic Church in Ireland, Cytûn and the Church in Wales. Cytûn and the Church in Wales 
appointed staff to take advantage of the opportunities to lobby in the early years of political 
devolution, with organisations such as the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the Catholic 
Church in Ireland by increasing their staff capacity in 2006/7. The resonance of this finding 
for understanding FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK is strengthened by 
Watts’ (2007: 151, 162-163) and Keating’s (2010: 94-95) findings in regards to FBO 
engagement in Scotland which indicate that FBOs increase their staff capacity to engage 
with the devolved political institutions. However, as in Wales and Northern Ireland, this 
appears to mainly be the prerogative of Christian FBOs.  
Secondly, Keating’s (2013: 123) claim that sub-state governments encourage and 
even sponsor pressure groups to adapt to the sub-state level is identified in Wales and 
Northern Ireland. The Welsh Government played a key role in the creation of the MCW, 
acting in Walker’s (1983: 400) terms as a ‘patron’, by facilitating and encouraging its 
mobilisation. Likewise, the Northern Ireland Executive also acted as a ‘patron’ by providing 
financial assistance which paid for the Belfast Islamic Centre’s (BIC) part time member of 
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staff. This member of staff was not specifically, or even mainly for political engagement, but 
the existence of the member of staff allows the BIC to take part in the political system. It is 
no surprise therefore that the FBOs have adapted their political advocacy structures to 
engage with the devolved institutions as access points have been created, opening up new 
opportunities for engagement.     
Thirdly, the role of Identity is more limited than the other two drivers, but it 
nevertheless plays a part. Keating (2013: 119-120) notes that groups which have members 
with an ‘affective attachment to the region’ which lead to the groups having ‘decentralist 
traditions and philosophy’ are likely to engage at the sub-state level. An historical 
ideological attachment to the sub-state level was seen in the case of Cytûn. Cytûn’s decision 
to increase its staff capacity before the Assembly was established in 1999 is likely associated 
with its involvement with the debate for self-government, the Council of Churches in Wales’ 
support for devolution in 1979, and the support for devolution by a number of the 
nonconformist denominations represented by Cytûn.   
To conclude, each FBO is a territorial organisation, apart from the Catholic Church in 
England and Wales and the Catholic Church in Ireland. However, the Catholic Church in 
Ireland conferred a high level of autonomy on the Church in Northern Ireland to engage 
politically prior to 1998 and this has continued since the establishment of the Assembly. The 
Catholic Church in England and Wales devolved autonomy over education policy to the sub-
state level in Wales in 2015. Each FBO has differing levels of democracy in its political 
advocacy structure, apart from the Catholic Church in Ireland, the Catholic Church in 
England and Wales and the Caleb Foundation which are elite led. The majority of 
organisations have adopted staff based political advocacy structures to engage with 
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devolved institutions, increasing their staff capacity. However, the MCW has increased its 
capacity by adopting a voluntary based political advocacy structure. Only the Caleb 
Foundation has not increased its capacity to engage with the devolved political institutions. 
The opportunity political devolution presents, the opportunities created by sub-state 
government, and the role of identity are important factors in explaining this.   
7.1.2: ‘What type of strategies have faith-based organisations adopted to 
engage with the political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
The findings indicate that FBOs at the sub-state level pursue an insider strategy. This 
strategy mainly consists of engaging with consultations, private meetings with the executive 
and members of the legislature, giving evidence to committees and commissions and using 
formal structures where they exist. The insider approach is therefore the primary and base 
strategy of each FBO. Each FBO pursuing an insider strategy underlines the openness of the 
devolved institutions, further bolstering Chambers and Thompson’s (2005a) claim that 
political devolution has provided an opportunity for FBO engagement, with each 
organisation taking the opportunity to engage through insider means. This claim is further 
strengthened for understanding FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK in light of 
Steven’s (2003: 161-165) assertion that FBOs in Scotland also receive substantial access to 
the devolved institutions. However, as discussed in the theoretical literature, access and 
influence are two very different things (see Maloney et al 1994: 25-27), as will be evidenced 
when examining the status conferred on the FBOs by the devolved institutions.  
The findings also indicate that strongly rooted FBOs supplement this insider strategy 
with a responsible outsider strategy. This outsider strategy consists mainly of utilising the 
media, as seen in the case of the Church in Wales with the Human Transplantation Bill and 
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the Presbyterian Church and the Catholic Church in Ireland with same-sex marriage. There 
are also examples in the findings of the Church in Wales, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland 
and the Catholic Church in Ireland mobilising public support through speeches at public 
events, specifically when campaigning on constitutional issues. The Archbishop of Wales’ 
involvement as the main figurehead of ‘Cymru Yfory’, and Cardinal Brady’s use of sermons, 
homilies and prayers as rhetorical devices in favour of constitutional progress are prominent 
examples.  
The explanation for the use of this outsider strategy concurs with Binderkrantz’s 
findings in the theoretical literature that groups engaging in ‘highly politicised policy areas’ 
(2005: 706-708) and which want to ‘place an issue on the agenda’ (2005: 703) are more 
likely to utilise the media. The findings in this thesis suggest that strongly rooted FBOs 
supplement their insider strategy with a responsible outsider strategy, utilising the media 
when FBOs require public support, or when they cannot take government or legislative 
members’ support for granted. This was the case with the Church in Wales and the Human 
Transplantation Bill as well as with the Archbishop’s campaign for further devolution. 
Further to this, the Catholic Church in Ireland and the Presbyterian Church in Ireland utilised 
the media in the same-sex marriage debate as they were unsure of support from MLAs and 
hence utilised a responsible outsider strategy to influence public debate. This finding is also 
reflected in Gillan’s (2008: 167) study which indicates that the Catholic Church in Scotland 
acted as both an insider in the policy process, and utilised an outsider strategy through the 
media. 
Strongly rooted FBOs are able to supplement their insider strategies with outsider 
strategies because of their status within the devolved societies. They do not rely on decision 
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makers for this status and hence can also pursue more critical outsider strategies. Their staff 
based political advocacy structures also makes this strategy more worthwhile. This is seen 
clearly in the case of the Church in Wales, the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the 
Catholic Church in Ireland. These strongly rooted FBOs can ensure they receive the 
headlines they require, making a responsible outsider strategy beneficial. They are FBOs 
which are region-wide and, in the case of the Church in Wales and the Catholic Church in 
Ireland, have recognisable figureheads which remain in post for lengthy periods of time and 
are seen to embody the denomination. These findings shows that it is possible, as Grant 
(2000: 135-136) has argued, to utilise a high profile media strategy in tandem with an 
insider strategy. 
The findings in both Wales and Northern Ireland indicate that the majority of FBOs 
under study work in coalition with other FBOs. The findings suggest that FBOs at the sub-
state level have utilised coalition formation as a strategy in salient policy areas, coinciding 
with Mahoney and Baumgartner’s (2004) findings. Furthermore, the thesis’ findings add 
strength to a claim in the literature which lacks consensus, that pressure groups form 
coalitions where there is conflict between interests (Heinz et al 1993: 358, Mahoney 2007). 
The findings also coincide with the work of Hula (1999) and Whitford (2003) who argue 
pressure groups form coalitions in order to share internal resources and reach common 
goals. 
The majority of FBOs studied received a level of core or specialist insider status from 
decision makers, with others receiving peripheral insider status. In line with Maloney et al’s 
(1994: 29) claim, this division is closely related to the specific resources possessed by FBOs 
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which they can exchange with decision makers for specialist or core status. Theological and 
religious orientation also plays a more limited role. 
Strongly rooted FBOs possess a range of specific resources such as economic power, 
knowledge (normally technical expertise), a representative base, implementation power and 
compliance power’ which Maloney et al (1994: 29) argue can be exchanged for specialist or 
core insider status. For instance, strongly rooted FBOs possess specific resources such as the 
provision of school places (Church in Wales, the Catholic Church in Wales and the Catholic 
Church in Ireland), and an historic role in education (Presbyterian Church in Ireland). These 
are used as resources by strongly rooted FBOs in the negotiation process with decision 
makers in the devolved institutions. These strongly rooted organisations are also perceived 
as key stakeholders with a representative base in policy areas of a moral nature, as was 
found in the case of the Human Transplantation Act and in the same-sex marriage debate. 
The FBOs can use their representative nature and historic involvement in issues such as 
marriage as a resource. The historical role of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland and the 
Catholic Church in Ireland also ensures their involvement in today’s constitutional debates. 
The weakness of civil society in Wales (see Chaney 2011: 215-216), and the Church in Wales’ 
relative strength as a ‘national institution’ (Harris and Startup 1994, Doe 2004) led by a 
reasonably recognisable figurehead, means it has resources it can offer decision makers. 
This was seen in the way the Archbishop of the Church in Wales was used as the figurehead 
of ‘Cymru Yfory’. The strongly rooted FBOs’ position in society and the combination of 
specific resources they use when negotiating with decision makers in the executive and 
legislature mean that they receive core and specialist insider status in return. 
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Weakly rooted organisations are divided between those organisations which have 
specific resources desired by decision makers from the devolved institutions, and those 
which do not. Both Cytûn and the MCW received core and specialist insider status despite 
their weak roots in society. This is because Cytûn allows the government to indicate that it is 
engaging with the faith sector, and because the MCW can provide the Muslim position to 
the Welsh Government. In consulting the Muslim position in this way, the Welsh 
Government is able to show that it is inclusive of a wide range of interests. 
Furthermore, Cytûn and the MCW have offered the Assembly a degree of legitimacy by 
offering their support to political devolution. Providing access to groups marginalised and 
excluded from political power was a key part of the case for political devolution (see Chaney 
and Fevre 2001: 26) and was central to the project’s legitimacy. As Wyn Jones and Trystan 
(1999: 90) noted at the start of the process:  
the challenge will be to generate a sense of legitimacy for the National Assembly 
which is non-partisan and extends to all those who live in Wales. The success or 
failure of this task seems to largely depend on the ability of those involved in the 
devolution process to turn the rhetoric of inclusiveness that has characterised 
Welsh politics since the 1997 general election into reality  
Cytûn’s strong support for the political devolution process, expressed through its 
decision to appoint a member of staff to engage with the Assembly from as early as 
1999 and its eagerness to act as a liaison between the Assembly and the faith sector, 
assists in this legitimising process, with Cytûn receiving specialist insider status in 
return. Likewise, the MCW’s growing support for the political devolution process, and 
for further devolution, allows the Assembly to display the civic and open nature of the 
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devolution settlement. As Whittaker has noted (2015: 17), the MCW’s support for 
primary law making powers in 2011 was ‘symbolic’ of Wales’s political system as an 
‘inclusive space’. The evidence therefore suggests that weakly rooted FBOs at the sub-
state level can also possess the specific resources Maloney et al (1994: 29) argue are 
desired by decision makers, that to some extent differ from the resources of strongly 
rooted FBOs. They may also be resources which strongly rooted FBOs cannot provide.    
Even so, there is also the danger that weakly rooted FBOs may become what Grant 
(1995: 20) refers to as ‘prisoners’ of sub-state decision makers. Decision makers from the 
devolved governments and legislatures may require the resources possessed by these 
weakly rooted FBOs, but they are not wholly dependent on them. For instance, decision 
makers could identify other representative organisations. The fear of losing representative 
status, in this way could lead an organisation to shy away from criticising the legislature or 
the executive. This echoes research findings in the literature which have warned of neo-
corporatist type relationships between organisations at the sub-state level and decision 
makers in Wales (Chaney and Fevre 2001: 37-39, Day 2006, Royles 2007: 170, Chaney 2011: 
258-259,272, Rumbul 2013, Rumbul 2016, Hill 2016, Chaney 2016). The MCW and Cytûn rely 
on decision makers continuing to recognise them as representatives of their faith 
communities. These organisations appear well placed to influence policy, but their ability to 
criticise the decision makers publicly may be limited.  
With this in mind, the evidence suggests that ownership of specific resources is 
important for FBOs at the sub-state level. FBOs such as the BIC and the Caleb Foundation, 
which have not identified specific resources to offer to decision makers are likely to receive 
peripheral insider status in return. Maloney et al (1994: 20-23) are correct when they assert 
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that these specific resources are central to the way a FBO is perceived, with the right 
resources allowing for ‘exchange based behaviour’  between pressure groups and decision 
makers (Maloney et al 1994: 23). However, it is important that a FBO resists the prisoner 
insider status.   
The findings indicate that theological and religious orientation play a limited role in 
determining a FBO’s status. The findings suggest that the Caleb Foundation’s peripheral 
status is due in part to its fundamentalist theological orientation, particularly in relation to 
the teaching of intelligent design. The BIC’s theological orientation does not appear to be 
the cause of its peripheral status, but Northern Ireland’s ‘two communities’ model’ which 
frames its political system through a unionist/Protestant and nationalist/Catholic lens (see 
Conrad 2008: 111-138) does appear to be an obstacle for the organisation. The empirical 
research suggests that being representative of the Muslim community in Northern Ireland is 
not a resource which can be used to negotiate specialist insider status, as it is in Wales. The 
lack of an executive sponsored faith structure makes it difficult for the BIC to gain access to 
decision makers, particularly because it lacks the staff based political advocacy structure 
ideally required to utilise other mechanisms such as the consultation process on a 
consistent and frequent basis. This underlines the way in which the attitude of the devolved 
institutions towards faith engagement greatly influences the ability of FBOs to gain core or 
specialist insider status. However, this is only found in the minority of cases, and is possibly 
connected to Northern Ireland’s unique historical, political and social context, with the role 
of the specific resources possessed by FBOs playing a more central role.  
In sum, FBOs at the sub-state level pursue an insider strategy with strongly rooted 
FBOs supplementing it with an outsider strategy when the political circumstances require 
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them to do so. Strongly rooted FBOs can utilise their internal capacity and position within 
society to make this outsider strategy worthwhile. FBOs utilise coalition in salient policy 
areas, where there is opposition to their agenda and to share internal resources and reach 
common goals. The status bestowed upon FBOs by the devolved institutions is mixed. Once 
again, specific resources which can be exchanged with decision makers in return for 
specialist or core insider status are important, with theological and religious orientation 
playing a limited role. 
7.1.3 ‘Are faith-based organisations at the sub-state level in the UK well placed 
to act as effective pressure groups in the decision making process?’ 
This section analyses the third secondary research question using the criterion of 
effectiveness, presented in Chapter 4.  The criterion of effectiveness is measured by 
analysing the following key questions: 
1. Has the FBO developed its political advocacy structure effectively for engaging 
with the devolved political institutions? 
2. Has the FBO been fully consulted by decision makers?  
3. Are the FBO’s policy positions coherent? 
4. If the FBO pursues an insider strategy, has it received peripheral, core or 
specialist insider status? 
5. Has the FBO met its objectives? 
Strongly rooted FBOs are best placed to act as effective pressure groups, but weakly 
rooted FBOs with core or specialist insider status and which engage in a context where 
formal structures stimulate FBO engagement can also be well placed to act as effective 
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pressure groups. The strongly rooted FBOs fulfil each of the criteria used to measure 
effectiveness. Firstly, as regards political advocacy structure, the strongly rooted FBOs have 
developed effective political advocacy structures to engage with the devolved institutions. It 
has been argued that a staff based political advocacy is most appropriate for engaging with 
the devolved institutions in Wales and Northern Ireland and the strongly rooted FBOs each 
have staff based political advocacy structure and have increased their staff capacity to 
engage with the devolved institutions. As regards policy positions, the strongly rooted FBOs 
also have defined policy positions in each policy area. Even in the area of constitutional 
issues where it could be argued the Presbyterian Church, Catholic Church in Ireland and 
Catholic Church in Wales took a more vague position, their positions could still be discerned.  
As regards consultation, each of the strongly rooted FBOs are also widely consulted by 
decision makers. Having a staff based political advocacy structure allows the strongly rooted 
FBOs to ensure they are fully consulted as they are able to make the most of the 
opportunities available to meet with decision makers which have become characteristic of 
the devolved government’s operations (Cairney 2008: 631, Chaney 2011: 263-264, 268). 
Having staff capacity allows FBOs to be visible in Cardiff Bay and Stormont, increasing their 
capacity to engage with the devolved political institutions. The exception here is the 
Catholic Church in Wales, which has only re-organised its structures and appointed staff for 
the purposes of engaging with education, and only did so in 2015. As regards status, 
strongly rooted FBOs also receive core or specialist insider status. By identifying specific 
resources, the strongly rooted organisations receive core and specialist insider status, 
ensuring that they are well placed to influence decision makers in the devolved institution. 
In relation to their objectives, the strongly rooted FBOs have also seen their policy 
objectives met in a number of areas. This was seen in education, same-sex marriage 
288 | P a g e  
 
legislation, in amendments made to the Human Transplantation Act and on some 
constitutional issues. In light of this, each of the strongly rooted FBOs are well placed to act 
as an effective pressure group.  
However, the findings also show that weakly rooted FBOs which do not have 
appropriate political advocacy structures, but have specialist or core insider status, are also 
well placed to act as effective pressure groups if appropriate state sponsored structures are 
present within the political system and are used by such FBOs. For instance, in regards to 
the first question of the criterion, the MCW has been able to overcome its lack of 
appropriate political advocacy structure because of the Faith Communities Forum. This 
ensures that the organisation is consulted and has the opportunity to discuss directly with 
decision makers. The forum therefore ensures it consults widely. The combination of 
utilising the state sponsored faith structures and having specialist or core insider status also 
allows these weakly rooted FBOs to see that their objectives are met. This was seen in the 
case of education and constitutional issues in the case of weakly rooted FBOs in Wales. 
However, as noted in the previous section, these types of organisations which are in the 
greatest danger of becoming ‘prisoner insiders’.  
However, weakly rooted FBOs in Northern Ireland do not meet the criterion of 
effectiveness. A lack of appropriate formal faith structures in Northern Ireland means they 
are not able to over-come their lack of appropriate political advocacy structures. 
Furthermore, their lack of staff capacity means they do not have coherent policy issues and 
are not consulted widely. A lack of specialist or core insider status also means they have not 
seen their objectives met.  
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This section suggests that strongly rooted FBOs are best placed to act as effective 
pressure groups because they have the internal capacity to develop a political advocacy 
structure attuned to the sub-state level and because they receive core or specialist insider 
status from government. However, the findings indicate that weakly rooted FBOs with 
specialist or core insider status can overcome their lack of an appropriate political advocacy 
structure if the sub-state political system in which they engage has faith structures 
sponsored by the executive. These findings differ somewhat to the literature on Scotland. In 
that case, Steven (2007, 2011) recognises the Presbyterian Church of Scotland as having 
some level of influence in the sub-state political system, but the findings of this study go 
further, recognising that the majority of FBOs in Wales and Northern Ireland are well placed 
to act as effective pressure groups, having identified a number of areas in which FBOs have 
contributed to achieving policy changes or retaining the desired status quo. In this regard, 
the findings in Wales and Northern Ireland are similar to the findings of Gillan (2008: 170-
172, 128) on FBO engagement in Scotland, which attributes FBOs with influencing policy and 
the public debate. 
7.1.4 Summary 
Now that the three secondary research questions have been examined in light of the 
findings presented in the cases of Wales and Northern Ireland and connections drawn with 
the literature on Scotland, it is possible to reflect on what this tells us about how FBOs have 
engaged with the devolved political institutions at the sub-state level in the UK in more 
general terms. Firstly, FBOs are active at the sub-state level, and in most cases engage 
extensively with legislation and policy areas of concern. The FBOs take their political 
engagement with devolved institutions seriously, increasing the capacity within their 
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political advocacy structures, with a number investing significant financial resources to 
ensure they have the capacity to engage. In general terms, the findings indicate that the 
FBOs have progressed from their historical role as part of the political establishment, taking 
on the role of pressure groups which engage alongside other interests and organisations. 
This can be seen in the way both strongly rooted FBOs and weakly rooted FBOs can both 
pursue insider access and have specialist or core insider status conferred upon them, 
although this is more uneven in the case of Northern Ireland. However, a certain level of 
privilege does appear to still exist, in the case of strongly rooted FBOs. Furthermore, there 
are obstacles to non-Christian FBO engagement in Northern Ireland.  
In terms of the engagement itself, FBOs take advantage of the opportunities 
devolution has provided, engaging with consultations, giving evidence to committees and 
commissions, meeting with ministers and taking part in government sponsored faith 
structures where they exist. In this respect, FBOs are visible actors in the sub-state political 
systems. While this insider engagement is the base strategy of FBOs, strongly rooted FBOs 
utilise outsider strategies extensively and at times are critical of government decision 
makers. The findings also highlight the role of the faith sector, particularly in Wales, where 
FBOs engage across the faith spectrum. The use of coalition as a strategy, particularly with 
other FBOs are common. However, Northern Ireland’s faith sector is still dominated by ‘the 
churches’ as it was prior to 1998. In sum, FBOs are active in their engagement, taking 
advantage of the opportunities available to engage with the devolved institutions and doing 
so as part of the wider faith sector when necessary. While a number are effective in their 
engagement as pressure groups, there are also obstacles which can inhibit the engagement 
of weakly rooted FBOs. 
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7.2 Testing the Hypotheses 
Having examined the empirical findings across the case studies it is now possible to assess 
each hypothesis in turn.  
H1: ‘As the devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the 
higher the levels of capacity within the political advocacy structures of FBOs’. 
H1 has been founded. FBOs have increased their capacity as more power has been 
devolved to the sub-state level and/or as political devolution has become more entrenched 
in the region. The Caleb Foundation is the only FBO not to have increased its capacity. 
H2: ‘Regions with greater levels of sub-state autonomy will have FBOs with greater capacity 
in their political advocacy structures’. 
H2 has not been founded. Despite the greater level of sub-state autonomy in 
Northern Ireland than in Wales, there is no evidence to suggest that there is a greater level 
of capacity amongst FBOs under study in the Northern Ireland case than there is in the case 
of Wales. 
H3: ‘As devolved powers become more extensive and entrenched in the region, the more 
likely it is that the region’s FBOs develop a distinct strategy for political engagement at the 
sub-state level’. 
H3 has been founded. As political devolution has become more entrenched at the 
sub-state level the FBOs have developed more regionally focused strategies, and/or have 
increased their focus at the sub-state level.  
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H4: ‘Regions with greater levels of sub-state autonomy are more likely to have FBOs with 
distinct strategies for political engagement at the sub-state level’.  
H4 has not been founded. FBOs in both Wales (where there is less sub-state 
autonomy) and in Northern Ireland (where there is a greater level of sub-state autonomy) 
have developed regionally focused strategies.  
H5: ‘The stronger the FBO’s roots within the devolved region, the more likely it is to have a 
staff based political advocacy structure’. 
H5 has been founded. The stronger rooted FBOs all have staff-based political 
advocacy structures, while half of the weakly rooted FBOs do not. Cytûn and the BIC are the 
only exceptions to this. As noted in the findings, it is likely that this is because of Cytûn’s 
membership’s attachment to the sub-state level, recognising the need to increase capacity 
for political engagement from an early stage. Likewise, the BIC has received funding from 
the Northern Ireland executive. However, this funding is not for political engagement, rather 
it is for social and welfare based work. On this basis, the hypothesis is founded. 
H6: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is to 
utilise an insider strategy’. 
H6 has not been founded. Strongly rooted and weakly rooted FBOs pursue an insider 
strategy in both Wales and Northern Ireland.  
H7: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the more likely it is that 
the devolved institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
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H7 is partly founded. Each of the strongly rooted FBOs has had core or specialist 
insider status conferred upon them, as have half of the weakly rooted FBOs under study. 
However, the insider status may be more limited in the case of the weakly rooted FBOs as 
they are more reliant on decision makers for their core or specialist insider status. 
H8: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is to pursue an insider 
strategy’.  
H8 has not been founded. Both the theologically moderate and more theologically 
conservative FBOs have all pursued insider strategies. 
H9: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the more likely it is that the devolved 
institutions confer core or specialist insider status upon the FBO’. 
H9 has not been founded. The majority of conservative FBOs had core or specialist 
insider status conferred upon them. Even so, the findings suggest that theology can play a 
minor role in the status conferred on a FBO, as seen in the case of the Caleb Foundation.  
H10: ‘The stronger the roots of the FBO within the devolved region, the better placed it is to 
act as an effective pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
H10 is founded. Each of the strongly rooted FBOs are well placed to act as effective 
pressure groups. However, some weakly rooted FBOs are also be well placed to act as 
effective pressure groups.  
H11: ‘The more theologically moderate the FBO, the better placed it is to act as an effective 
pressure group within the devolved political system’. 
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H11 has not been founded. The majority of theologically less moderate FBOs 
received core or specialist insider status despite their theological orientation. Even so, the 
findings suggest that theology can play a minor role in the status conferred on a FBO, as 
seen in the case of the Caleb Foundation.  
Testing the hypotheses for both cases indicates how sub-state autonomy and roots 
within society exert a significant influence on the political advocacy structure of FBOs. 
Likewise, roots within society has some influence on FBO strategy and status with theology 
playing a limited role. Finally, roots within society has some influence on whether a FBO is 
well placed to act as an effective pressure group to a certain extent.    
7.3. Practical Implications. 
Now that the research questions and hypotheses have been examined, it is possible to turn 
to the practical implications of the research findings for FBOs at the sub-state level. These 
practical implications are separated into four main sub-sections. First, the opportunities 
political devolution has provided for FBO engagement will be discussed in practical terms. 
Secondly, the strategies best suited for FBOs at the sub-state level will be covered. Thirdly, 
the role of the specific resources which can be exchanged with decision makers for specialist 
or core insider status is investigated. Finally, the importance of appropriate formal 
structures for faith engagement will be discussed. 
7.3.1 The opportunities for FBOs  
This thesis suggests that the sub-state level offers opportunities for FBO engagement. This 
can be seen in the way the FBOs in Wales have actively engaged with the devolved 
institutions and in numerous cases have seen their objectives met when engaging with 
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decision makers, However, in the case of Northern Ireland, the thesis suggests that political 
devolution has strengthened the strongly rooted FBOs’ grip on access and influence, while 
not always offering the same level of access to organisations which had previously been 
unable to engage with decision makers, as seen in the case of the BIC and the Caleb 
Foundation. Therefore, while political devolution offers an opportunity for FBOs to engage 
as effective pressure groups at the sub-state level, the thesis points to a mixed picture 
regarding the opportunities available to weakly rooted FBOs. Along with the positive 
example of inclusion, there are also examples of political devolution consolidating 
traditional inequalities. Likewise, evidence of an inclusive political system has been 
accompanied by the warning that FBOs could become prisoner insider organisations.   
Even so, the evidence indicates that FBOs could adapt their political advocacy 
structures so as to engage at the sub-state level. This thesis has found that FBOs which have 
increased capacity and have developed structures to engage with the devolved political 
institutions have identified opportunities for access and influence. The Catholic Church of 
England and Wales’ decision to devolve power to the sub-state level in 2015 suggests that 
the potential to influence is worthwhile enough to persuade even a more reluctant and 
centralised FBO to adapt its political advocacy structure. The opportunities available for 
access and influence suggest that FBOs which have not devolved power to the sub-state 
level might contemplate doing so. It is not possible for all organisations to appoint staff for 
this purpose, but the findings indicate that this is an efficient way in which to engage at the 
sub-state level. The thesis found that the devolved institutions’ emphasis on policy 
consultation and regular fora signifies that it is difficult to manage the policy process 
without full time members of staff. The only case in this research of a FBO being well placed 
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to act as an effective pressure group without a staff based political advocacy structure is the 
MCW, and it is likely that this is because its voluntary General Secretary is in reality acting as 
an unpaid member of staff, offering a large amount of professional experience and time to 
the MCW during working hours. The practical implication of this is that a staff based political 
advocacy structure is more appropriate for FBOs wanting to engage politically at the sub-
state level.  
7.3.2 Strategies 
As regards FBO strategies, the thesis points to the value of insider strategies for FBOs at the 
sub-state level, and if feasible supplement these insider strategies with a responsible 
outsider strategy. As noted above, the devolved institutions tendency to consult and 
encourage participation from third sector organisations and pressure groups means there 
are potential access points and opportunities available for influence. However, the evidence 
also suggests that these insider strategies are at their best when supplemented with a 
responsible outsider strategy. It is not possible for all FBOs to utilise a responsible outsider 
strategy as this requires their having the capacity and position within society to gain media 
attention, but it is favourable for FBOs to pursue this strategy if it is realisable. 
Supplementing the insider strategy with a responsible outsider strategy, particularly through 
the media, allows a FBO to build upon its negotiation with decision makers by placing issues 
on the agenda and influencing the public narrative when the issue is particularly 
controversial.   
7.3.3 Resources 
This thesis has pointed to the role of resources in determining the status conferred upon 
FBOs. The thesis indicates that both weakly rooted FBOs and strongly rooted FBOs, can have 
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the specific resources needed to have a privileged status at the sub-state level, but strongly 
rooted FBOs are more likely to be in possession of these resources. The practical implication 
of these findings is that if FBOs can identify the specific resource devolved institutions 
require, they can attempt to take part in exchange based relationships with decision 
makers. This might involve more traditional resources which are policy specific, such as 
running schools (as seen in the case of the Church in Wales, the Catholic Church in Ireland 
and the Catholic Church in Wales) or a resource which ensures more general engagement, 
such as attempting to represent a faith community or faith communities to the devolved 
institutions (as seen in the case of the MCW and Cytûn). 
7.3.4 The role of formal structures. 
The findings also point to the benefits to FBOs from devolved institutions instituting state 
sponsored structures, such as the Faith Communities Forum and the All Party Group on 
Faith. State sponsored structures offered FBOs the required access points, and aided weakly 
rooted FBOs in overcoming their lack of capacity, enabling their engagement with decision 
makers. The evidence in Wales suggests that including minority FBOs such as the MCW 
through state sponsored structures, leads FBOs to adopt a greater stake in the devolved 
process, potentially strengthening the sub-state level and widening participation in the 
policy process. The ‘exchange based’ (Maloney et al 1994: 23) relationship between FBOs 
and decision makers in the devolved institutions could ultimately strengthen democracy at 
the sub-state level. 
However, there is also evidence which indicates this wider participation could at 
times be in danger of fabrication which could lead to FBOs becoming what Grant (1995: 20) 
has referred to as a ‘prisoner’ insider organisations. FBO participation can be strengthened 
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by the devolved executive so that it might show how inclusive it is, or in order to widen 
support for the devolved process. In light of this finding, it is important that the formal 
structures are not used to fabricate a particular image or brand, but instead are used to 
increase engagement, particularly organisations which are otherwise unlikely to be part of 
the decision making process. This can be achieved if decision makers in the devolved 
institutions work to ensure that these structures remain important spaces for negotiation 
rather than places for tokenistic discussion. It is also important that the devolved executives 
and legislatures which retain control of these structures do not allow one organisation to 
become the definitive representative of a faith community, or of faith, ensuring that groups 
beyond those residing in the structure are consulted. The evidence of the relationship 
between the Welsh Government and the MCW also points to the importance of ensuring 
that the voice of a wide theological, geographic and demographic sample from within the 
faith community is heard. The case of Cytûn representing the faith sector to the Welsh 
Government in a number of contexts signals how important it is that devolved governments 
do not simply tick boxes when it comes to consulting with FBOs and faith communities. 
However, this also requires FBOs which are members of a state sponsored faith structure to 
keep a critical distance from decision makers in order to avoid becoming ‘prisoner’ insider 
organisations. This is particularly pertinent for weakly rooted FBOs which can rely heavily on 
decision makers in the devolved institutions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that in general FBOs have increased their political advocacy 
structures’ capacity and focused their engagement at the sub-state level, recognising the 
devolved political system as a productive access point for the purpose of engagement. FBOs 
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have also pursued insider strategies, with stronger FBOs supplementing this with an 
outsider strategy when necessary. The role of specific resources which can be exchanged 
with decision makers in return for privileged insider status was noted as a key factor in the 
status conferred upon FBOs by decision makers. In determining effectiveness, the political 
advocacy structure utilised by the FBOs as well as the role of specific resources which 
determine the status conferred upon FBOs were noted as key factors. Likewise, specific 
resources, along with the ability to utilise formal structures created by sub-state executives 
and legislatures, explain how some weakly rooted FBOs can be well placed to act as 
effective pressure groups. In light of this, the chapter has presented a range of practical 
implications, including the importance of a staff based political advocacy structure, the 
advantages of the insider strategy supplemented with a responsible outsider strategy and 
the role of identifying specific resources and state sponsored faith structures. Now that the 
research findings and their practical implications for FBOs at the sub-state level have been 
investigated, the final chapter will examine the thesis’ contribution to the theoretical 
literature and wider questions surrounding religion and politics and the ‘de-privatisation’ of 
religion in 21st century western liberal democracies 
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Chapter 8: The Conclusion 
The previous chapter analysed the political engagement of faith-based organisations (FBO) 
at the sub-state level in Wales and Northern Ireland in comparative perspective, and 
examined the conclusions in practical terms for both FBOs and the devolved institutions. 
The purpose of this conclusion is to go a step further and to assess the contribution this 
thesis offers to the wider academic literature. The thesis’ contribution to four bodies of 
literature will be discussed in turn. Firstly, the thesis’ contribution to the literature regarding 
faith communities and faith-based organisations is examined. Secondly the way in which the 
thesis understands the representative and socio-political FBO as a pressure group and how 
this understanding can contribute to how we study FBOs in a number of different political 
arenas is discussed. Thirdly, the thesis’ contribution to pressure group theory is examined. 
The thesis provides an analysis of how FBOs adapted structurally to engage with the 
devolved institutions, proposes amendments to Maloney et al’s (1994) insider/outsider 
distinction and presents a developed criterion for measuring effectiveness. Finally, the way 
in which this study’s findings address the broader literature on the privatisation and de-
privatisation of religion is examined. It is argued that the thesis contributes to the widening 
empirical evidence that the role of religion and the engagement of FBOs is prevalent and 
growing in 21st century Western democracies, but also indicates that some FBOs do face 
obstacles to their engagement. The chapter concludes by looking to possible future research 
areas, and to the possibility of developing further the conclusions of this thesis. 
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8.1 Thesis Summary 
This project has sought to explore how FBOs have engaged with the devolved institutions at 
the sub-state level in the UK. This aim derives from the fact that scholarly literature on FBO 
engagement at the national and supra-national level has increased in recent times. 
However, little academic attention has been given to FBO engagement at the sub-state 
level. Furthermore, the notion that religion and faith traditionally played an important role 
in the politics of the sub-states that make up the UK, and Chambers and Thompson (2005a) 
identifying political devolution as an opportunity for FBO engagement in Wales, 
strengthened the importance of the argument for its study of FBO engagement at the sub-
state level in the UK. In light of this, the study has examined this central research question: 
‘In what ways have faith-based organisations engaged with devolved political institutions at 
the sub-state level in the UK?’ 
Chapter 2 sought to address this research question by way of assessing the literature 
on FBO engagement at the sub-state level in the UK, arguing that the extant literature 
provides a number of important insights, but a large proportion of the literature does not 
provide in-depth analysis of FBO engagement, and does not utilise theoretical frames. The 
existing, yet limited, in-depth studies of FBO engagement at the sub-state level post 
devolution focus solely on Scotland, with Wales and Northern Ireland understudied. The 
studies did not compare both representative and socio-political FBOs and focus on Christian 
FBOs, thus leaving non-Christian FBOs understudied. Consequently, the argument was 
advanced for a theoretically grounded comparative study of FBO engagement at the sub-
state level including both representative, socio-political, Christian and non-Christian FBOs.   
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The argument advanced in chapter 3 was that representative and socio-political 
FBOs can be understood as pressure groups and that pressure group theory can be used to 
understand how FBOs engage in the devolved political systems. The thesis’ theoretical 
framework was developed utilising Keating’s (2013) theory of rescaling interest 
representation, Maloney et al’s (1994) development of Grant’s (1978) insider/outsider 
distinction and through employing an adapted version of Steven’s (2003) measurement of 
effectiveness. Chapter 4 established the research design, the case studies and outlined 
hypotheses based on the dependent and independent variables, and the thesis’ 
methodology.   
Chapters 5 and 6 presented the research findings from Wales and Northern Ireland. 
Through the pressure group theory prism, these chapters identified how FBOs have engaged 
with the political system in Wales and Northern Ireland. Chapter 7 then compared the 
research findings from chapters 5 and 6. It concluded that, apart from the Caleb Foundation 
each has increased its capacity to engage with the devolved institutions. It was argued that 
FBOs utilise an insider strategy, with strongly rooted FBOs supplementing this with a 
responsible outsider strategy when necessary. The specific resources FBOs possess 
influences the status conferred upon it by decision makers. These specific resources are 
mainly the possession of strongly rooted FBOs, but there are examples of weakly rooted 
FBOs exchanging resources for core or specialist insider status. Strongly rooted FBOs are 
most likely to be well placed to act as effective pressure groups due to their staff based 
political advocacy structure and possession of resources they can exchange for core or 
specialist insider status. However, weakly rooted FBOs without a staff based political 
advocacy structure can still be well placed to act as an effective pressure group if it can 
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identify resources desired by decision makers and if state sponsored faith structures exist 
within the political system to enable engagement. The variable ‘theological orientation’ has 
only a limited role, and the findings points to the variable ‘roots in society’ as the more 
significant determinant of FBO strategy and effectiveness.  In light of these findings, it is 
now possible to examine the contributions this thesis and its findings make to the wider 
literature.  
8.2 Defining the Faith-Based Organisation 
This thesis argues for the ‘faith-based organisation’ to be understood within its wider 
context of the faith community. By bringing Adam Dinham’s work (2009, 2010) on faith 
communities together with Clarke and Jennings’ (2008: 6) definition of the FBO, this thesis 
has gone some way to outline the relationship between the faith community and the FBO. 
Connecting the two concepts together, and understanding their relationship with one 
another, can contribute to our study of faith-based political engagement across the political 
arenas. For instance, the empirical findings of this thesis showed the connection between 
the FBOs and the communities they represent, with some FBOs using their faith 
communities as a resource to be exchanged for specialist or core insider status. This points 
to the importance of understanding the FBO within its wider context of the faith 
community. 
8.3 The FBO as a Pressure Group 
By conceptualising the FBO as a pressure group, this thesis draws on both the literature 
regarding FBOs and the literature regarding pressure groups. The thesis has understood the 
FBO as a pressure group by bringing Clarke’s definition of the representative and socio-
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political FBO together with Grant’s (2000:14) definition of the pressure group, 
demonstrating the overlapping characteristics which they share. Whilst Steven (2003: 5-20, 
2007: 98-101) and Grant (2000: 16) have previously conceptualised the Church of Scotland 
and the Church of England as pressure groups, they only studied individual ‘representative 
FBOs’. This thesis put forward a comprehensive explanation for why both the representative 
FBO and the socio-political FBO should be understood as pressure groups. Understanding 
the FBO in this way signals that FBOs should not be analysed any differently to other 
pressure groups which engage in the political sphere, instead it is possible to use pressure 
group theory in order to understand their political advocacy structures, strategies and 
effectiveness.  
Conceptualising the FBO in this way sets this thesis apart from many other works 
which examine faith actors as pressure groups. For instance, scholars such as Thompson 
(1997), Leustean (2011), Bollmann (2013) and Hunt (2003, 2011, 2014) refer to religious 
organisations as pressure groups or lobbyists, but they do not conceptualise the FBO as a 
pressure group. Warner (2000: 17-39) offers a conceptual explanation for understanding the 
Catholic Church as a pressure group, but she only does so in relation to the Church’s 
relationship with political parties. As suggested in this thesis, the relationship between FBOs 
and political parties is important, but this thesis also outlined that FBOs engagement 
extends to the executive, legislature, committees and commissions and attempt to influence 
public opinion too.  
Understanding the FBO as a pressure group in this way provides a framework for 
studying FBOs as political actors which seek to gain access to the political system, lobby 
decision makers and influence policy. The thesis consequently makes a contribution to the 
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small body of literature which studies religious actors in Europe as pressure groups, while 
pushing the boundaries further by conceptualising a range of different FBOs as pressure 
groups. 
8.4 Pressure Group Theory  
This thesis has contributed to three main strands of pressure group theory. They are the 
literature on the rescaling of interest representation, the insider/outsider distinction and 
finally, the criterion of effectiveness. 
8.4.1 The rescaling of interest representation 
Building on Keating’s (2013: 117-123) work concerning the rescaling of interest 
representation at the sub-state level, this thesis contributes to an analysis of how FBOs have 
adapted structurally to engage with the devolved political institutions. Chambers and 
Thompson (2005a: 38-39) offered some tentative remarks regarding how some Christian 
denominations in Wales had begun to focus their attention at the sub-state level prior to 
2005, but this thesis systematically studies how FBOs have adapted structurally and 
increased capacity to engage at the sub-state level. This thesis has offered an explanation 
for how FBOs adapt as power is devolved from the centre to the region and the factors 
which drive this adaptation. This is missing from other studies of FBOs at the sub-state level 
(Steven 2003, 2007, Gillan 2008). This thesis provides insights into how FBOs have adapted 
to engage with the devolved institutions at the sub-state level in Wales and Northern 
Ireland and can contribute to the wider body of literature on the rescaling of interest 
representation (Keating et al 2009, Keating 2013, Keating and Wilson 2014, Cairney 2007). 
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8.4.2 The Insider/Outsider Distinction 
Maloney et al’s (1994: 30) adaptation of Grant’s (1978) insider/outsider distinction has 
proved useful for the study of both the strategies pursued and status received by FBOs at 
the sub-state level. Using the distinction indicated how FBOs utilise a range of strategies at 
different times, combining both an insider and responsible outsider strategy so as to 
increase pressure on decision makers. The distinction also offers an insight into how the 
FBO is perceived by government, presenting a view of the policy process from both the 
organisations and decision makers, providing richer findings.  
However, this thesis has indicated that Grant’s (1995: 20) ‘prisoner insider’ status, 
whereby some organisations might be too reliant on decision makers for their privileged 
insider status,  which is not included in Maloney et al’s (1994: 30) distinction, is useful for 
understanding the relationship between FBOs and decision makers. Including the prisoner 
insider status along the with peripheral, core and specialist insider status in future studies of 
pressure groups would offer a more nuanced explanation of how some organisations might 
be influential, but face the risk of having their influence limited by being too close to 
decision makers.     
8.4.3 Measuring Effectiveness 
Another important contribution to pressure group theory in this thesis is the development 
of a measure of FBO effectiveness. The measurement is built upon Steven’s (2003: 66) 
measurement of effectiveness, which is informed by the work of Grant (2000: 195-210) and 
Whitely and Winyard (1987: 125-131). By incorporating Maloney et al’s (1994: 30) 
distinction, this thesis has measured effectiveness by not only looking at the strategy of the 
FBO, as was the case in Steven’s (2003) measurement, but by examining the status the FBO 
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receives from decision makers. This offers a fuller picture of FBO effectiveness by analysing 
it from both the angle of the FBO and the decision maker. Unlike Steven (2003), this thesis’ 
measurement of effectiveness also questions whether the FBO has an appropriate political 
advocacy structure, recognising that an organisation which pursues a promising strategy, 
and is well received by decision makers, might not be able to make the most of this 
advantageous position without an appropriate political advocacy structure. Utilising 
MacKay’s continuum of influence to investigate whether an FBO achieves its policy 
outcomes further strengthens the criterion of effectiveness. The development of Steven’s 
(2003: 66) measurement by including a question regarding political advocacy structure and 
the status conferred upon FBOs by decision makers, allows this thesis to offer a more 
nuanced view of effectiveness, taking a greater number of factors into account. The 
expectation is that this measurement can contribute to pressure group theory, further 
aiding the study of pressure group engagement in a variety of political arenas in the future. 
8.5 The privatisation of religion and the de-privatisation of religion. 
The final body of literature to which this thesis contributes is the debate in the sociology of 
religion regarding the privatisation of religion and the de-privatisation of religion. It was 
noted in chapter one that religion’s retreat into the private sphere has been the driving 
force behind much of the scholarly understanding in the field, but that this retreat is not 
inevitable. Scholars such as Casanova (1994: 212-215) have argued that the differentiation 
of society has led to the privatisation of religion, but this is not an inevitable determinant of 
modernisation. Instead, Casanova (1994: 215) argues it is an option, a possibility among 
others. In light of this, he argues that religion could (and has) re-entered the public sphere, 
underlining this through a number of case studies. Utilising this thesis, Chambers and 
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Thompson (2005a: 44) have argued that political devolution in Wales created the necessary 
conditions for the FBOs to increase their engagement in the public sphere, in defiance of the 
acute secularisation and privatisation of religion in the region. The findings of this thesis 
have confirmed Chambers and Thompsons’ (2005a) conclusions, while noting that the sub-
state political system in Northern Ireland has created more uneven engagement. The thesis 
has also tackled the question of whether this engagement in the public sphere has been 
effective, concluding that the majority of FBOs have managed to engage with the devolved 
institutions as organisations well placed to act as effective pressure groups. However, others 
are less well placed due to a combination of a lack of staff capacity, specific resources and 
the opportunity to engage with state sponsored faith structures. In light of these findings, 
this thesis contributes to the widening empirical evidence that the role of religion and the 
engagement of FBOs is prevalent and growing in 21st century Western democracies, but 
notes that some FBOs face obstacles to their engagement. These organisations are not as 
powerful as they once may have been, but they are showing little sign of fading away. 
8.6 Future Research 
On the basis of its findings, this thesis points to further areas of research. It would be 
expedient to expand this research outside of the UK context, studying the sub-state level 
across European cases. The study of FBOs at the sub-state level can be extended to the 
European level in a similar fashion to how Keating (2013, 2014) extended Keating et al’s  
(2009) study of pressure groups at the sub-state level in the UK, to the sub-state level across 
Western Europe in a number of cases. This would allow future research to examine regions 
in Western Europe which have established Churches as well as regions where the Catholic 
Church has historically been close to the state, offering different political and religious 
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contexts to that which has been studied in this thesis. A study such as this would offer 
further insights into the role of FBO engagement as pressure groups, and offer insights into 
wider questions regarding religion and politics in Europe in the 21st century. Building on the 
work of scholars such as Steven (2010), Leustean (2011), Turner (2013) and Bollmann (2013) 
who study FBO engagement in the European Union, this research could be extended to a 
‘multi-level’ study of how FBOs engage between the sub-state, national and supranational 
level.   
In sum, this thesis has shown that FBOs have been keen to engage politically at the 
sub-state level, with FBOs increasing their capacity and developing strategies for the 
purpose of engaging with the devolved institutions. Roots within society play some role in 
the strategy pursued and status conferred upon FBOs by decision makers, with theology 
playing a very limited role. Specific resources which can be exchanged for core or specialist 
insider status play an important part, with executive sponsored faith structures also aiding 
weakly rooted FBOs in their engagement. However, with some FBOs in Northern Ireland 
failing to identify resources, and with state sponsored faith structures lacking, access and 
status is uneven. Even so, while FBOs are not as powerful as they once may have been, they 
are visible, active and in many cases well placed to act as effective pressure groups in the 
UK’s sub-state political systems.  
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Referenced Interviews 
1. Interview with a senior respondent, Church in Wales (January 7th, 2015). 
 
2. Interview with senior respondents, Cytûn (January 8th 2015). 
 
3. Interview with key informant, Muslim community in Wales (January 12th 2015). 
 
4. Interview with former staff member, Council of Churches for Wales and Cytûn 
(January 29th 2015). 
 
5. Interview with former politician involved in the ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign (February 
17th 2015). 
 
6. Interview with senior respondent, Muslim Council of Wales (February 9th 2015). 
 
7. Interview with senior respondent, Church in Wales (February 9th 2015). 
 
8. Interview with senior respondent, Catholic Education Service (CES) (11th February 
2015). 
 
9. Interview with senior respondent, Church in Wales (19th February 2015 ). 
 
10. Interview with senior respondent, Catholic Church in Wales (26th February 2015). 
 
11. Interview with Senior respondents, Church in Wales (3 March 2015) 
 
12. Interview with senior respondents, Cytûn’s member denomination (January 23rd 
2015 
 
13. Interview with senior respondents, Cytûn’s member denomination January 29th 
2015). 
 
14. Interview with senior respondent, Presbyterian Church in Ireland (June 29nd 2015) 
 
15. Interview with senior respondents, Belfast Islamic Centre (June 30th 2015). 
 
16. Interview with senior respondent, Caleb Foundation (July 2015). 
 
17. Interview with senior representative, Catholic Church in Ireland (July 3rd 2015). 
 
18. Interview with key respondent, Muslim community in Northern Ireland (July 9th 
2015). 
 
19. Interview with a former minister of the Northern Ireland Executive (July 13th 2015). 
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20. Interview with senior respondent from the Presbyterian Church in Ireland (July 22nd 
2015). 
 
21. Interview with key informant, Muslim community in Northern Ireland (July 23rd 
2015). 
 
22. Interview with Alliance Party MLA (August 14th 2015). 
 
23. Interview with Ulster Unionist Party MLA (August 17th 2015). 
 




1. Correspondence with former Welsh Government minister (June 2nd 2015). 
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